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 Introduction 
The adoption of new and profitable technologies (certified seed, inorganic fertilizer, irrigation, 
mechanization, etc.) is crucial to increase agricultural productivity, generate more incomes, 
and reduce poverty. However, the level of adoption of agricultural technologies is still low in 
African countries. For example, the average fertilizer used per hectare stood at 9 kg over 2002-
2003 in the Sub-Saharan Africa region compared to 100 kg in South Asia, 135 kg in Southeast 
Asia and 73 kg in Latin America (Crawford, Jayne, & Kelly, 2006). According to Gebeyehu 
(2016) who cited Dethier & Effenberger (2011), the fertilizer use intensity in 2012 was 23.7 
kg per hectare in Ethiopia, 44.3 kg/ha in Kenya, 39.9 in Malawi, 181.7 in Brazil, and 163.67 in 
India. 
As a critical consequence of this low adoption in Sub-Saharan African countries, agricultural 
productivity is very low. For example, cereals yield in Africa was on average 1.45 tons/ha over 
the period 2000-2017, while during the same period it was 3.61 tons/ha for Asian countries and 
6.05 tons/ha for Northern American countries (FAOSTAT, 2019). Regarding rice which is one 
of the imported and consumed commodities in Africa, the corresponding land productivity is 
also very low compared to other regions of the world. In fact, the average rice yield was 
estimated at 2.37 tons/ha for African countries compared to 4.36 tons/ha among Asian countries 
and 7.87 tons/ha among Northern American countries over 2000-2017. Among West African 
countries, the average rice yield over 2000-2017 stood at 1.51 tons/ha in Guinea, 1.68 tons/ha 
in Nigeria, 2.17 tons/ha in Cote d’Ivoire, 2.92 tons/ha in Benin and 3.24 tons/ha in Senegal. 
Therefore, there is a real need to assess the agricultural sector in African countries in order to 
identify context-specific reasons for the underuse of improved inputs. 
In the technology adoption literature, several studies list factors that influence the adoption of 
new or advanced technologies. Feder, Just, & Zilberman (1985) identified several factors such 
as farm size, land tenure, labor availability, risks and uncertainty, credit constraints, and 
household characteristics. Sunding & Zilberman (2001) also modeled technology adoption as 
dependent on farmer’s characteristics such as education, age, or risk preferences. Other factors 
identified in the literature include market intervention, social network, specialization, farmer 
organization, extension services, transaction costs (Batz, Peters, & Janssen, 1999; El-Osta & 
Morehart, 2000; Garforth, Angell, Archer, & Green, 2003; Millar, 2011; Miller & Tolley, 
1989). A recent review of the literature on agricultural technology adoption was done by 
Ugochukwu & Phillips (2018). 
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The importance of assessing the determinants of technology adoption resides in the 
identification of agricultural policy options to reverse the current trend of low technology 
adoption. Evidence that investment in agricultural inputs is profitable, even in the presence of 
production risks, could finally trigger the Green Revolution in Africa. However, to produce 
high quality and relevant policy recommendations, two central inputs are required. The first 
ingredient is the data used for the research. As usually said ‘garbage in, garbage out’. Without 
good data quality, any nice or sophisticated research methodology would result in bad or at 
least misleading findings and policy recommendations. This work took advantage of a huge 
project of data collection conducted in Senegal between 2017 and 2018. This data collection 
process received technical support from the International Food Policy Research Institute and 
Michigan State University. This project aimed to provide key information on local agriculture. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use this rich dataset to analyze technology 
adoption in Senegal.  
The second major input to inform policymaking, in addition to good data, is the identification 
of the right methodology to apply for generating relevant policy recommendations. A good 
methodology is as important as a good dataset. In methodological terms, we have decided to 
apply methods that are at the frontier of applied economic research to address each of our 
research problems. The most relevant microeconometrics approaches have been selected and 
applied in this research work.  
The entry point of this dissertation is the exploration of the decision to adopt improved 
technologies such as certified seed and chemical fertilizers in crop production. When a farmer 
makes an adoption choice in the presence of two or more agricultural technologies, should the 
econometrician analyze these choices separately or together? If these technologies are 
complements or substitutes, the choice of one technology is not independent of the others. 
Thus, the modeler would benefit from considering a simultaneous analysis of the different 
choices. Although many studies have focused on the analysis of the determinants of the 
adoption of agricultural technologies, very few have taken into account the issue of dependency 
between technologies available on the market. However, since Feder (1982) and Feder et al. 
(1985), it is obvious that agricultural technology choices analysis should be carried out in a 
multidimensional context. Thus, the chapter 2 of this dissertation, following some recent 
studies (Abay et al., 2018; Ogada, Mwabu, & Muchai, 2014; Teklewold, Kassie, & Shiferaw, 
2013),  considers a joint adoption of certified seeds and inorganic fertilizers in Senegal. A 
bivariate probit model is adopted to analyze the joint adoption of certified seeds and inorganic 
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fertilizers. The standard assumption in this model is that the joint distribution is a bivariate 
normal distribution with a constant correlation. In this chapter, we challenge this assumption 
of constant correlation parameter. To the best of our knowledge, no study before this one went 
in that direction in the literature of agricultural technology adoption. However, in the statistics 
literature, it is well known that the conditional correlation between two random variables given 
a set of covariates is not constant but depends on the covariates (Filippou, Marra, & Radice, 
2017; Marra & Radice, 2011, 2013; Vatter, 2016). Therefore, this chapter contributes to the 
literature by first testing the presence of a heterogeneous correlation between the two decisions 
under consideration, and second, when a heterogeneous correlation is confirmed to the 
identification of the drivers of that heterogeneous correlation. The main advantage of this 
flexible bivariate probit model lies in the fact that it allows better targeting of the policy 
implications of joint modeling. 
As a consequence of the arguments developed in chapter 2, we consider in chapter 3 the impact 
of joint technology adoptions on rice farmers' technical efficiency and production per hectare. 
Recent studies (Kassie, Teklewold, Marenya, Jaleta, & Erenstein, 2015; Manda, Alene, 
Gardebroek, Kassie, & Tembo, 2016) went in that direction by assessing the impact of multiple 
technology adoptions on various outcomes. Using similar logic, chapter 3 uses a two-step 
approach to estimate the level of productivity and technical efficiency of rice for each 
technology adoption group, and then to identify the treatment effects of technology choices on 
the technical efficiency and rice productivity measured as the potential production per hectare. 
Three technology choices were considered: irrigation, rice certified seeds, and inorganic 
fertilizers. These technologies are critical for rice production in Senegal dominated by the 
irrigated system. Since the choice of improved inputs influences the mix of production factors, 
farmers in the various groups may operate under different production frontiers. Under these 
conditions, estimating a common production function will bias the estimated productivity 
levels. Hence the adoption here of the stochastic meta frontier approach (Battese, Rao, & 
O’donnell, 2004; Huang, Huang, & Liu, 2014; O’Donnell et al., 2008). A stochastic meta 
frontier framework is an extension of the standard stochastic frontier analysis to the case of 
heterogeneous frontiers of production in a selected industry. This framework has the advantage 
to disentangle the overall (meta) technical efficiency into group-specific technical efficiency 
(managerial efficiency) and the technology gap ratio which measures the gap between group-
specific frontiers and the metafrontier. Even though the metafrontier approach takes into 
account the heterogeneity of the frontiers, it does not account for selection bias in the choice 
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of technologies. This chapter combines the metafrontier framework with an impact assessment 
approach appropriate in the context of a multinomial treatment variable. We specifically use 
the multinomial treatment effects model proposed by Deb & Trivedi (2006a, b) that accounts 
for selection bias due to both observed and unobserved. 
The remaining chapters complement the first two in the sense that they focus on the motives 
of market participation, especially the drivers of the decisions to buy inputs or sell part of 
produced outputs. In chapter 4, we investigate the decision of farm households to invest in 
agricultural inputs, especially on those we named ‘risky inputs’ that include seeds and 
inorganic fertilizers. We qualified these inputs as risky because farmers need to make these 
decisions before the realization of rainfall, while the return of such investment is highly 
correlated with rainfall volume and distribution over the rainy season. Following the theoretical 
model by Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, & Udry (2014) extended by Magruder (2018), this chapter 
develops a model of investment in risky inputs. The model mainly focuses on credit constraints, 
production risks, and imperfect information. In the empirical estimation, a Heckman model is 
used to identify the main drivers of the investment decision and the level of investment. The 
main advantage of the Heckman model is that the investment decision as well as the level of 
investment are simultaneously analyzed. Moreover, in order to test the return on investment in 
risky inputs, an endogenous switching regression model is used to identify the causal effect of 
this investment decision on agricultural profit and household food security. This framework 
accounts for selection bias and allows one to estimate the common treatment effects statistics 
(average treatment effects, average treatment effect on the Treated, etc.), but also the 
heterogeneity effect which is the difference of performances between the two groups under 
each level of treatment. The outcome variables considered are per hectare profit and the food 
availability per capita. 
In chapter 5, the analysis in chapter 4 is extended to analyze the joint input-output market 
participation in Senegal. From the production theory, firms produce to sell and maximize their 
profit. To accomplish that, they make input choices. Therefore, the decision to adopt 
technologies or invest in inputs are directly linked to productivity, and thus correlated with the 
decision to market produce. Hence, the joint modeling of these decisions should be a standard 
choice in empirical works. From the farm household perspective, these decisions may have a 
big impact on their likelihood. For example, a staple producer can buy improved inputs to 
produce enough for his consumption. When the production is large enough, this farmer may 
decide to sell the surplus. Thus, in a context where improved inputs are profitable, farmers 
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should purchase inputs to maximize production in order to satisfy self-consumption and 
generate income for the purchase of other goods and services. In the literature, only Teklewold 
(2016) had simultaneously analyzed the decisions to adopt technologies and to sell output in a 
multivariate probit framework. Our framework goes beyond that adopted by these authors at 
least for two reasons. First, all the market participation regimes are considered and analyzed in 
a multinomial framework. Second, the impact of market participation regimes on the 
agricultural gross income per hectare is analyzed. Thus, in this chapter, we develop a theoretical 
farm household model of input-output market participation. Empirically, we use a multinomial 
endogenous treatment effects model, which accounts for the selection bias on observed and 
unobserved factors, to assess the welfare impact of market participation regimes.  
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 Introduction 
Adoption of new and profitable technologies is crucial for smallholder farmers to increase their 
productivity (yield), and then their production, which in turn will allow them to move from 
subsistence farming towards market-oriented production. However, the level of adoption of 
agricultural technologies is still low in African countries. For example, the average amount of 
fertilizer used per hectare stood at 9 kg over 2002-2003 in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to 
100 kg in South Asia, 135 kg in Southeast Asia and 73 kg in Latin America (Crawford, Jayne, 
& Kelly, 2006). According to Dethier & Effenberger (2011) (cited in Gebeyehu, 2016), the 
fertilizer use intensity in 2012 was 23.7 kg per hectare (kg/ha) in Ethiopia, 44.3 kg/ha in Kenya, 
39.9 kg/ha in Malawi, 181.7 kg/ha in Brazil, and 163.67 kg/ha in India. The low adoption rate 
in Sub-Saharan Africa may be explained by apparent financial constraints. As a response, 
policy reforms have been launched by almost all African countries to disseminate new 
agricultural technologies and make them accessible to farmers. In Senegal, fertilizer subsidies 
mainly focus on fertilizer price paid by farmers, still set at levels well below international 
prices. Over 2006-2010, according to the agricultural ministry, the Senegalese government 
spent more than $20 million on fertilizer subsidies per year. The Senegalese government also 
provides certified seeds to farmers at subsidized prices, but the seed value chain is not totally 
controlled by parastatal institutions as is the case for chemical fertilizer. 
At farm household level, various technology options are available (certified seeds, inorganic 
fertilizers, agricultural mechanization, etc.). These different agricultural technologies can act 
as complements or substitutes. For example, various studies have shown that the production 
per unit of land area increases significantly if farmers adopt both certified seeds and chemical 
fertilizers (Abay et al., 2018; Ogada, Mwabu, & Muchai, 2014; Teklewold, Kassie, & Shiferaw, 
2013). Therefore, for agronomic or economic reasons, technology choices by farmers may be 
interrelated and the choice of multiple technologies will be more relevant to maximize 
production or revenue. Consequently, agricultural technology adoption usually takes place in 
a multivariate choice setting. In addition, various surveys conducted in different contexts have 
shown that farmers do not usually adopt a single technology. Studies that consider the adoption 
of only one technology (i.e. fertilizer use or adoption of improved seeds) may be biased since 
they do not consider the potential dependency between the decisions to use different elements 
of a technology package (Dorfman, 1996; Feder, 1982; Feder, Just, & Zilberman, 1985). Abay 
et al. (2018) argue that studies based on univariate technology adoption models show a partial 
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view of technology adoption status at hand and are subject to endogeneity and simultaneity 
problems. 
In Senegal, the literature on agricultural technology adoption, especially agricultural inputs, 
remains very limited. Regarding the adoption of seeds or fertilizers, only two papers are found, 
namely Thuo et al. (2011, 2014). Both studies use data collected between 1998-2006 in the 
peanut basin of Senegal. In the first one, Thuo et al. (2011) analyzed the adoption of chemical 
fertilizer among groundnut and millet farmers. They found that education, larger family size 
and farm size encourage the use of chemical fertilizers. Their study also revealed a decrease in 
fertilizer application intensity over the period under consideration. On the other hand, Thuo et 
al. (2014) were interested in the joint adoption of a groundnut variety (La Fleur 11) and 
chemical fertilizer. They found that the two decisions were independent. Groundnut variety 
adoption was positively associated with ownership of draft power but negatively related to 
farmers’ level of experience. Conversely, greater farm size and number of plots increased the 
probability of fertilizer use, while this probability was negatively affected by access to off-farm 
income and ownership of draft power. 
This paper contributes to the literature on agricultural technology adoption in several ways. 
First, our analysis focuses on two common technologies (certified seeds and inorganic 
fertilizers) in the context of rainfed agriculture in Senegal. Studies on agricultural technology 
adoption in Senegal is very limited in scope and coverage (Thuo et al., 2011; 2014). Second, 
we consider a flexible framework that simultaneously models the decision to adopt improved 
seeds and fertilizers. The dependence between the two decisions (correlation) is modeled as a 
function of different covariates. For example, from one agroecological area to another, farmers 
may have different motives to make joint adoption decisions or not. Knowledge of input 
complementarity may influence the set of technologies to adopt. Risks related to crop 
production or climate change affect both individual technology adoption and joint adoption. 
Third, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a country representative 
agricultural survey is used to analyze agricultural technology adoption in Senegal. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents background information on 
agricultural input policies in Senegal. The theoretical framework and the empirical model are 
discussed in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 presents the study area, the data used for analysis, and 
a short description of selected variables. Section 6 displays and discusses the results. Section 7 
provides concluding remarks and policy implications.  
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 Input subsidies in Senegal 
Input subsidy policies pursued by most governments in developing countries are generally 
aimed at improving productivity in the agricultural sector through easier access to and better 
use of improved seeds and fertilizers by producers. Overall, the agricultural sector in Senegal 
has always been supported by the different governments since independence through input 
subsidies, especially for fertilizers and seeds. Among the various public policies in favor of 
agriculture, Senegal has recently chosen to focus on subsidies (Seck, 2017). Fertilizer is the 
main target of subsidy programs. Fertilizer subsidies represent 30% of total agricultural 
subsidies and aim to improve the availability and use of fertilizer through a reduced purchase 
price (Seck, 2017). The government plays a key role in the access and distribution of fertilizers. 
It sets the minimum levels of manufacturing and imports of fertilizers as well as their market 
prices.  
Fertilizer subsidy usually focuses on the producer price which is set below the price on the 
international fertilizer market. Thus, the government plays a role in regulating the domestic 
market of supply and demand through legislation, taxation, credit system, and establishment of 
basic infrastructure (port infrastructure, roads, and rural tracks, etc.). The level of subsidy 
remains relatively high since the country aims to increase the uptake of improved inputs in 
order to improve its productivity. However, the process of distribution of inputs established is 
far from being efficient due to several unclear procedures to select private operators (IPAR, 
2015). In addition, significant delays in reimbursement to private businesses by the government 
can affect the efficiency of subsidies. 
On the other hand, the level of private investment in this area remains very low due to an 
inadequate institutional environment that often results in opacity surrounding the allocation of 
quotas between suppliers, as well as the absence of reliable control over the actual quality and 
quantity of fertilizer sold to farmers (Seck, 2017). Indeed, the current architecture for input 
subsidies in Senegal suffers from multiple failures that would limit their effects on productivity. 
In addition, the lack of relevant information and data makes it almost impossible to assess the 
effectiveness of fertilizer subsidies, which would legitimize the continuation of such policy or 
suggest changes. It is therefore of interest to conduct a study on the input sector to provide new 
guidance for a better operationalization of the subsidies which remain a necessity for the 
agricultural development of Senegal. 
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 Conceptual framework 
In this paper, we model the farm household’s choice of improved inputs (certified seed and 
fertilizer) in the risky environment following a framework similar to that by Koundouri, 
Nauges, & Tzouvelekas (2006). This framework assumes that technology choice by farmers is 
influenced by the distribution of risky agricultural output. The output distribution in this model 
is represented by its first and higher-order central moments (Antle, 1983, 1987; Antle & 
Goodger, 1984). The approach adopted could be seen as an extension of that by Koundouri et 
al. (2006) in various aspects. First, we consider a multi-output framework, while these authors 
modeled the production risk for a single output. Our setting is preferred since farm households 
in developing countries are generally involved in several crop farming. Therefore, we assume 
that farmers decide to adopt technologies to maximize their overall farming returns. In addition, 
crop diversification is a risk management strategy for farmers (Di Falco & Chavas, 2009). 
Moreover, Antle (1987) and Kim & Chavas (2003) argue that strong assumptions are required 
to estimate any behavioral equation-based single farming activity. Second, we extended the 
single technology adoption to multiple technology adoption (two in this case). A similar 
approach was also adopted by Ogada et al. (2014) who studied the adoption of maize improved 
variety and inorganic fertilizer in Kenya. Third, we follow the risk-value model that is more 
general than the prospect theory or expected utility-based models. The latter are special cases 
of the risk-value model (Antle, 2010). This model assumes that the behavior of decision-makers 
is not the same in presence of negative or positive outcomes. 
Let consider a farm household that chooses variable inputs to produce n crops in a risky 
environment (weather shocks, pests, price uncertainty, etc.). The stochastic output is defined 
as 
𝑞 = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑒)    (2.1) 
where q is output per unit of land, x represents variable inputs, z is a vector of farm or 
household-specific variables such as agroecological zones, access to extension services, e is 
weather variables (rainfall and temperature), and 𝑓(. ) is well-behaved (i.e., continuous and 
twice differentiable) production function. For simplicity purposes, we consider x, z, and e as 
scalars. We assume that 𝑞 follows a distribution 𝜙(𝑞|𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑒). 
The gross income from all farming activities when w is the unit cost of variable inputs is defined 
as 
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𝜋 =  𝑞 − 𝑤𝑥  (2.2) 
Let define the expected net returns as  𝜇1 − 𝑤𝑥 > 0, where 𝜇1is the first moment of 𝑞.  
The objective function in the risk-value model depends on the expected outcome, and on 
negative and positive deviations from this expected outcome. 
max
𝑥
𝑉[𝜇1(𝑥), 𝜂2(𝑥), 𝜑2(𝑥), 𝜂3(𝑥), 𝜑3(𝑥)]   (2.3) 
Where 𝜂𝑗(𝑥) are the jth central moments for negative deviations, 𝜑𝑗(𝑥) is the jth central 
moments for positive deviations, and  𝑗 ≥ 2. 
The first-order condition of equation (2.3) in the elasticity form is as follow 
𝜇1
∗ −
𝑤𝑥
𝜇1
= 𝑠2(𝑉2𝜂𝜂2
∗ − 𝑉2𝜑𝜑2
∗) + 𝑠3(𝑉3𝜂𝜂3
∗ − 𝑉3𝜑𝜑3
∗)   (2.4) 
where 𝑠𝑗 = 𝜇𝑗/(𝜇1(𝜇1 − 𝑤𝑥)
𝑗−1), 𝜂𝑗
∗ = 𝜕 ln 𝜂𝑗 /𝜕 ln 𝑥, 𝜑𝑗
∗ = 𝜕 ln 𝜑𝑗 /𝜕 ln 𝑥, 𝜇1
∗ =
𝜕 ln 𝜇1
𝜕 ln 𝑥
, 
𝑉𝑗𝜂 =  −(𝜇1 − 𝑤𝑥)𝑉𝜂𝑗/𝑉𝜇1, and 𝑉𝑗𝜑 =  −(𝜇1 − 𝑤𝑥)𝑉𝜑𝑗/𝑉𝜇1. In the model (4), 𝑉𝑗𝜂 and 𝑉𝑗𝜑 
represent the risk attitude to negative and positive deviations from the expectation and are 
interpreted as disappointment and elation in the risk value model. Input will have a symmetrical 
impact of the jth central moment of the outcome if 𝜂𝑗
∗ = 𝜑𝑗
∗. In the empirical investigation, we 
compared results using partial moments (𝜂𝑗  , 𝜑𝑗) with that from the full moments (𝜇𝑗). 
From equation (2.4), input use is a function of its cost (𝑤), expected profit (𝜇1), partial moments 
of profit (𝜂𝑗 and 𝜑𝑗), and farm and household characteristics. Therefore, the adoption of 
productivity-enhancing technology such as inorganic fertilizers or improved seeds will depend 
on expected technology returns, risk premium (R), and any information-related costs required 
to efficiently use the technology (Koundouri et al., 2006). 
For a selected crop k, a farm household will adopt a technology t (t=1 for adoption and t=0 for 
non-adoption) if and only if the gap between expected utility associated to certainty equivalent 
of the use of technology and the non-adoption is greater than any additional premium related 
to the technology (VI). 
𝐸[𝑈(𝜇1 − 𝑤𝑥 − 𝑅)]𝑘,𝑡=1 − 𝐸[𝑈(𝜇1 − 𝑤𝑥 − 𝑅)]𝑘,𝑡=0 > 𝑉𝐼𝑡=1   (2.5) 
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 Empirical model 
From equation (2.5), the adoption of an improved input for a selected crop depends on the 
expected total gross income per unit of land, its higher-order partial moments, farm and 
household characteristics, and any sources of information that are useful about technologies. 
Following Koundouri et al. (2006), we estimate the first three moments of the total gross 
income from crop production. As stated by Antle (1983, 1987, 2010), the specification of the 
mean gross income distribution is critical in this framework. Therefore, following Antle (1987) 
and Ogada et al. (2014), we adopt a quadratic functional form for the first moment of the gross 
income. The variables considered in this quadratic function are farm size in hectares, fertilizer 
use in kilograms, total rainfall, and average temperature over the rainy season. These weather-
related variables are obtained using farm household coordinates and the dataset from the 
Climate Hazards Center of the University of California, Santa Barbara 
(https://www.chc.ucsb.edu/data). We include also three agroecological zones in the model 
(Senegal River Valley, Groundnut Basin, and Casamance), a soil quality index, and three 
dummies for household level overall technology choice: (i) adoption of certified seeds for at 
least one crop, but with no use of fertilizer, (ii) adoption of fertilizer only for at least one crop, 
(ii) adoption of certified seeds and fertilizers. 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑥𝑖) + 𝐳𝒊
′𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖        (2.6) 
where 𝜋𝑖 is the gross income per hectare for ith farm household from all crops produced, 𝑔(𝑥𝑖) 
denotes the quadratic specification in inputs x, 𝐳 are additional variables included in the 
moments (dummy for technology adoption and agroecological zones). As suggested in the 
literature, a Feasible Generalized Least Squared (FGLS) was used to estimate equation (6). The 
empirical variance is estimated as follow 
log [(𝜋𝑖 − 𝑢?̂?)
2] = 𝑔′(𝑥𝑖) + 𝐳𝒊
′𝛾 + 𝑢′𝑖        (2.6’) 
where 𝑢?̂? are the residuals from an OLS estimation of equation (2.6), 𝑔′(𝑥𝑖) is a linear function 
of inputs. The log transformation is preferred to ensure the positivity of the predicted variance. 
The predicted variance is used as a weight in the GLS estimation to consistently estimate the 
mean gross income per hectare (𝜇1) and the residuals (𝑢𝑖
𝐺𝐿𝑆) useful for higher-order moments. 
The higher-order moments are estimated following 
𝜇𝑖
𝑗
= 𝑔′(𝑥𝑖) + 𝐳𝒊
′𝛾𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑗
          (2.7) 
𝜂𝑖
𝑗
= 𝑔′(𝑥𝑖) + 𝐳𝒊
′𝛾𝑗,𝑛 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑛
𝑗
     if  𝑢𝑖
𝐺𝐿𝑆 < 0    (2.8) 
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𝜑𝑖
𝑗
= 𝑔′(𝑥𝑖) + 𝐳𝒊
′𝛾𝑗,𝑝 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑝
𝑗
         if  𝑢𝑖
𝐺𝐿𝑆 > 0     (9) 
Equation (2.7) represents the full higher-order moments' specification, equations (2.8) and (2.9) 
are for partial moments. Equation (2.8) and (2.9) are combined in a kind of threshold regression 
for their joint estimation. The dependent variable in equation (2.7) is the residuals 𝑢𝑖
𝐺𝐿𝑆 raised 
to the power j (2, 3), while the dependent variables in (2.8) and (2.9) are the absolute residuals 
𝑢𝑖
𝐺𝐿𝑆 raised to the power j. For the variance specification (2nd moment) of (2.7) and for all 
partial moments, a log transformation is preferred to preserve the positivity of predicted 
moments.  Equations (2.7) to (2.9) were estimated using OLS corrected for heteroscedasticity 
following MacKinnon & White (1985). The predicted mean and higher-order partial (full) 
moments are used in the adoption model as explanatory variables. 
From equation (5), the adoption of an improved input can be modeled using a probit model. 
Since certified seeds and fertilizers are generally proposed to farmers as complementary 
technologies, their adoption may not be independent. In addition, the return to certified seeds 
will be higher if farmers use inorganic fertilizers as a complementary technology. Therefore, 
simultaneous modeling is more appropriate (Abay et al., 2018; Feder et al., 1985; Ogada et al., 
2014; Teklewold et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2012). Hence, the two technology decisions may be 
modeled in a bivariate probit setting. Following Greene (2012), the model can be written as: 
𝑦1
∗ =  𝐱1
′𝛽1 +  1,    𝐶𝑆 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ > 0 and 0 otherwise; 
𝑦2
∗ =  𝐱2
′𝛽2 +  2,    𝐶𝐹 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2
∗ > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
(
1
2
| x𝟏, x𝟐) ~𝑁 [
0
0
, (
1 𝜌
𝜌 1
)]            (2.10) 
where 𝑦𝑘
∗ is the latent variable associated with the adoption of technology k (1,2), CS and CF 
are the binary choice variables for certified seeds (CS) and chemical fertilizers (CF), 𝐱1 et 𝐱2 
are the explanatory variables associated with the two decisions, and 𝜌 is the correlation 
(dependence) between the two decisions. 
The model (10) is the standard bivariate probit model. This model assumes a constant 
correlation between the two decisions. The assumption is quite strong, as the correlation 
between the two decisions may be heterogeneous across farmers. From a statistical point of 
view, the correlation between the two dependent distributions should not be constant. As stated 
by Vatter (2016), the conditional correlation between two random variables Y1 and Y2 given 
X is not constant, but depends on the “value of the conditioning variable explicitly”. See Vatter 
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(2016) for short proof. Therefore, there is a need to account for variable or heterogeneous 
correlation while modeling joint adoption. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first-time 
heterogeneous correlation is accounted for in the technology adoption literature. For simplicity, 
we assume that the correlation is a linear function of factors such as access to extension 
services, farmer organization membership, access to credit, agroecological zones, production 
risk, and other information-related factors. 
𝜌 =
exp(𝐱′3𝛽3) − 1
exp(𝐱′3𝛽3) + 1
                     (2.11) 
where 𝛽3 are the parameters of interest. A positive and significant 𝛽3 means the selected 
covariate increases the dependency between the two inputs under consideration, while a 
negative sign can be interpreted as decreasing the likelihood of adopting the two inputs. 
Readers interested in non/semi-parametrical specification of the correlation equation (2.11) are 
referred to Ieva, Marra, Paganoni, & Radice (2014); Marra & Radice (2017); Giampiero Marra 
& Radice (2011, 2013); McGovern, Bärnighausen, Marra, & Radice (2015).  
We argue here that information and production risk are critical in technology adoption, 
especially for the correlation between interrelated technologies. For a two-dimensional 
technology adoption model, a standard maximum likelihood can be used. For higher-
dimensional model, advanced methods are required (Filippou, Marra, & Radice, 2017; Vatter, 
2016; Vatter & Nagler, 2018). 
 Data  
Data used in this study were collected under the PAPA1 project, which is an initiative of the 
Government of Senegal funded by USAID-Senegal as part of the "Feed The Future" initiative 
implemented for a 3-year period (2015 - 2018) by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Facilities with a technical support provided by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI). 
A two-stage sampling method was used with the primary units being the census districts (CDs) 
as defined by the 2013 General Census of Population, Housing, Agriculture and Livestock 
(RGPHAE2) and the secondary units being agricultural households. In order to have a better 
 
1 The ‘Project d’Appui aux Politiques Agricoles’ (PAPA) is an ambitious country-wide project. The website of the 
project is http://www.papa.gouv.sn/, where more information about the project are available. 
2 Recensement Général de la Population, de l’Habitat, de l’Agriculture et de l’Élevage  
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picture of rice production in the country, we combine the rain-fed led agriculture survey (4,533 
farm households) and the irrigated rice oriented survey (730 farm households) distributed 
across all the 42 agricultural departments of the country (except the urban departments of 
Dakar, Pikine, and Guediawaye). Data collection took place between April and May 2017. 
After data cleaning, the final sample size for this analysis is 5207 farm households. We remove 
all households that have a very small land size (less than 0.1 hectares, a total of 33 households). 
2.5.1. Certified seeds and fertilizer adoption in Senegal 
This section discusses the joint adoption of certified seeds and chemical fertilizers at crop level. 
Figure 2- 1 shows the number of households involved in the production of each crop and the 
associated technology adoption pattern. Among farming activities, the top 5 crops include 
groundnut (63% of households), millet (53%), maize (33%), rice (28%), and cowpeas (19%). 
In terms of the use of certified seeds or inorganic fertilizer, Figure 2- 1 shows that except for rice 
production, most households do not use any of the two selected inputs to produce crops. For 
rice production, only 33 percent of farmers do not use any improved inputs compared to 93 
percent in sorghum production, 86 percent for cowpeas, 75 percent for millet and 61 percent 
for groundnut. It is obvious that technology adoption pattern is specific to cropping systems. 
For millet and maize, technology adopters put priorities on the adoption of certified seeds, 
while for rice production a simultaneous adoption of certified seeds and inorganic fertilizers is 
the most common choice. For the groundnut system, the major cash crop in Senegal, the 
technology choice is more heterogeneous; respectively 41 percent, 39 percent, and 20 percent 
of adopters have used chemical fertilizers, certified seeds, and the two technologies, 
respectively. For all farm households in the sample, about 33 percent had adopted certified 
seeds for at least one crop, while 45 percent of them had used inorganic fertilizers. 
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Figure 2- 1 Multiple technology adoption across crops in Senegal 
 
Source: PAPA data (2017). 
One key statistic of technology adoption is the intensity of chemical fertilizer use. Table 2- 1 
displays for each crop the mean fertilizer uses per hectare along with the three quartiles and the 
standard deviation. Results reveal that rice producers have the highest rate of fertilizer 
application in the sample (192 kg/ha) followed by maize producers (63 kg/ha), and 20 kg/ha 
for groundnut and millet producers. At household level, the average fertilizer intensity is 
estimated at 69 kg/ha3. This high level of fertilizer use intensity is mainly driven by fertilizer 
use in the irrigated rice system which is clearly oversampled. When only rainfed agriculture is 
considered, the fertilizer application rate is much lower. In fact, the average inorganic fertilizer 
used per hectare is around 27.8 kg in the rainfed system compared to 271.3 kg in the irrigated 
system. 
Table 2- 1 Distribution of fertilizer use per crop 
 
Observation Quartile 1 Mean Median Quartile 3 
Standard 
deviation 
Groundnut 3258 0 20.02 0 0 49.72 
Millet 2739 0 20.06 0 0 55.28 
Maize 1721 0 62.62 0 100 111.56 
Rice 1482 0 191.66 131.05 366.67 198.42 
Cowpeas 1001 0 2.48 0 0 22.90 
Sorghum 764 0 4.19 0 0 27.35 
Total 5207 0 69.04 0 64.52 134.23 
Source: PAPA data (2017). 
 
3 This result is based on the sample of households in the survey. With the sampling weight, the estimated 
country’s fertilizer use intensity is about 62 kg/ha. 
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From Figure 2- 1, we know that not all technologies are of equal importance across crops. Table 
2- 2 displays the distribution of crop production per hectare across technology adoption groups. 
For millet, the two common technology choices are “no technology adoption” (75%) and “only 
fertilizer use” (21.4%). In terms of millet yield, the mean millet output per hectare is greater 
when fertilizer is adopted (530 kg/ha) compared to the situation where no improved inputs are 
used (424 kg/ha). For sorghum, almost all producers do not use any technologies (93%). For 
maize production, the most productive technology in the sample is fertilizer. In the rice system, 
the most productive technology is the joint use of certified seeds and inorganic fertilizers. As 
with maize, fertilizer adoption seems to be the best choice for groundnut farmers.  
Table 2- 2 Crop yield across technology adoption groups in Senegal 
 
No technology 
adoption 
Only CS 
adoption 
Only CF 
adoption 
Both technology 
adoption 
Full sample 
Millet 
423.58  
(393.19) 
312.27 
(301.22) 
529.99 
(406.05) 
489.48  
(422.27) 
445.46 
(397.65) 
Sorghum 
522.93  
(576.08) 
464.27 
(458.1) 
499.78 
(323.59) 
1777.22 
(1191.35) 
525.41 
(572.74) 
Maize 
559.84  
(718.48) 
458.16 
(497.91) 
788.04 
(826.18) 
771.65  
(692.63) 
647.57 
(756.57) 
Rice 
1152.94 
(1647.23) 
595.42 
(508.79) 
2010.28 
(2105.68) 
3347.88 
(2463.43) 
2254.31 
(2332.57) 
Cowpeas 
212.05  
(305.26) 
260.83 
(307.33) 
316.38 
(600.43) 
128.7  
(19.71) 
219.57 
(315.42) 
Groundnut 
583.85  
(753.37) 
570.56 
(835.19) 
728.2  
(663.5) 
586.84  
(545.55) 
605.33 
(739.97) 
Source: PAPA data (2017). 
2.5.2. Variables used in the adoption model 
For the empirical part of this paper, we applied the theoretical model to study the joint 
technology adoption for groundnut production (the main cash crop in Senegal) and rice 
production (the main staple in the country). The adoption models include several explanatory 
variables based on economic theory and empirical literature on technology adoption. The most 
common factors used in the literature of technology adoption include farm and households’ 
characteristics, and risk-related or transaction costs factors (Abay et al., 2018; D’souza, 
Cyphers, & Phipps, 1993; Feder et al., 1985; Gebremedhin & Swinton, 2003; Isham, 2002; 
Kassie, Jaleta, Shiferaw, Mmbando, & Mekuria, 2013; Kassie, Shiferaw, & Muricho, 2011; 
Lee, 2005; Marenya & Barrett, 2007; Neill & Lee, 2001; Teklewold et al., 2013). For the 
estimation of the farm household-specific production risk parameters, we also include variables 
such as rainfall, temperature, and soil quality index. The description and summary statistics 
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(mean and standard deviation) of the variables used in the econometric models are given in 
Table 2- 3. 
Table 2- 3:  Definitions and summary statistics of variables used in the analysis 
   Rice producers Groundnut producers 
 Variable Description Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. 
Technology adoption 
tech_none No technology 0.33 0.47 0.61 0.49 
tech_CS Certified seed only 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.36 
tech_CF Fertilizer only 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37 
tech_both CS and CF adoption 0.44 0.50 0.08 0.27 
Outcome profit_ha Total gross crop income (1000 FCFA/ha) 216.71 265.12 108.65 148.95 
Production inputs 
x1_land Land use (ha) 2.68 5.65 5.52 4.77 
x2_fert Fertilizer use (ha) 436.79 1944.65 179.91 482.66 
x3_rainfall Total rainfall (mm) 781.63 407.03 652.70 245.15 
x4_temp Temperature (degree C) 35.47 2.26 35.19 1.07 
SQI Soil quality index 0.25 0.06 0.28 0.06 
profit_dum Share of negative profit 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.21 
Household variables 
Gender Gender (1=Female) 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.23 
Age Age (years) 52.75 12.42 53.15 13.49 
education Education (1=Yes) 0.45 0.50 0.38 0.48 
Hhsize Household size 9.46 5.08 10.58 5.63 
wealth_index Wealth index 3.10 1.74 3.06 1.77 
livestock_act Livestock income dummy 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.48 
non_farm_act Off-farm income dummy 0.34 0.47 0.26 0.44 
farmsize Land holding (ha) 3.45 6.87 6.92 8.99 
organization Farmer organization 0.27 0.44 0.10 0.29 
extension Extension services 0.30 0.46 0.09 0.29 
extension_need Extension services (need) 0.86 0.35 0.75 0.44 
insurance_need Agricultural insurance (need) 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.49 
credit_received Credit access 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.19 
Infrastructures and locations 
distance2market Distance to market (km) 15.05 12.27 12.31 10.29 
distance2road Distance to road (km) 16.19 16.85 8.27 9.49 
zone_vfs Distance to the regional city 68.11 48.54 45.28 31.09 
zone_vfs AEZ: Basin 0.26 0.44 0.02 0.14 
zone_bassin AEZ: Casamance 0.01 0.12 0.58 0.49 
Sample size 1462 1462 3257 3257 
Source: PAPA, 2017. 
 
It shows that 33 percent of rice producers do not use any fertilizers or improved seeds, whereas 
for groundnut production, only 39 percent of producers use at least one of these inputs. Rice 
households manage lower total land area (2.7 ha) on average compared to groundnut 
households (5.5 ha).  Table 2- 3 also shows that on average, a household’s head in the sample is 
about 53 years old and is generally a man. At least 27 percent of rice households have a member 
that belongs to a farmer organization, while only 10 percent of groundnut households have a 
member in a farmer organization. In terms of access to extension services and credit, results 
also show a greater proportion among rice producers than groundnut producers. In general, rice 
producers have a better access to services than groundnut producers. Regarding the overall 
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household wealth indicator4, households in the two samples have very close scores (on average 
3 over 6). Concerning access to infrastructures, groundnut households seem to be closer than 
rice households, on average. 
 Results and discussion  
This section presents results based on our econometric specification. As presented in section 
2.4, the study proceeds in two steps. The first step estimates the moments of crop profit (gross 
crop income) per hectare that are used to characterize production risk. That production risk is 
an input for the second step which focuses on the drivers of bivariate technology adoption in 
Senegal. This second step is the main interest of this study. Therefore, we directly present the 
results for that step. The results of the first step are displayed as supplementary materials at the 
end of the chapter (see Table A2- 1 and Table A2- 2). However, it is worth noting that results from 
the first step show that the hypothesis of symmetric input effects of profit distribution is 
strongly rejected among rice producers and groundnut producers in Senegal. Moreover, 
positive deviations from the profit mean are weakly related to inputs use. For partial moments, 
results also reveal a strong correlation between the 2nd and 3rd partial moments. A simple 
regression between these two variables displays an adjusted R-squared of 0.82 for the 
groundnut sample and 0.93 for the rice sample. To avoid multicollinearity, we do not include 
the third partial moment in the adoption equations. Multicollinearity between variance and 
skewness was also found in a similar context by Ogada et al. (2014). 
Before the estimation of the bivariate probit model, it is critical to address the potential 
endogeneity of three variables included in the model: farmer organization, extension services, 
and off-farm income. We follow the control function approach explained in Wooldridge 
(2015). The first step consists of a probit model to compute the generalized residuals. This 
residual is used as an additional covariate in the bivariate probit. As instruments, we use 
distance to road, distance to the regional city, and the household’s need for extension services 
 
4 The wealth index is computed as a count of a selected dummy variables related to household’s assets. The 
formula used is: 𝑊𝐼 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖
6
𝑖=1 , where D is a dummy variable, i stands for various dimensions considered. The 
dimensions included are : use of running water for cooking and drinking, access to electricity or solar power for 
light, quality of the roof (1 if the material used for the roof is either cement, tile, slate or metal sheet, 0 
otherwise), quality of the wall (1 if the wall is made of cement, 0 otherwise), quality of the floor (1 if the floor is 
tiled, cement, or carpet, 0 else) and number of rooms available for household’s members (1 if the ratio of 
household size to the number of rooms is less than or equal to 2, zero otherwise). 
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and for agricultural insurance. Results from these probit models are presented in the appendix 
(Table A2- 3). 
Two model specifications are considered and compared: (i) Standard Bivariate Probit (BVP), 
(ii) Extended Bivariate Probit (BVP-E) which identify predictors for the correlation 
parameters. These models are estimated using the package GJRM by Marra & Radice (2017) 
under the free statistical software R (Team & others, 2013). 
2.6.1. Joint adoption of rice certified seeds and chemical fertilizers 
Table 2- 4 presents the results of the two models in the competition (BVP and BVP-E) for rice 
technology adoption. Estimated coefficients for the two models are very similar. The main 
difference is about the impact of expected profit on the probability of adopting fertilizer which 
is only significant in the second model. The fact that estimates are similar across model 
specifications show that the choice of a BVP or a BVP-E has little impact on the direct effect 
of a covariate. However, since in a bivariate probit model the impact of a covariate depends on 
the direct effect and the indirect effect, which is a function of the correlation between the two 
marginal distributions (Greene, 2012). Therefore, if the hypothesis of heterogeneous 
correlation across households is accepted, the BVP-E model may generate more reliable 
marginal effects. Discussion of the marginal effects will reveal whether if it is worth investing 
on more complex model such as BVP-E in our context. When a flexible BVP model is 
considered, results show that the main drivers of heterogeneous correlation between the 
decision to adopt rice certified seeds and that to adopt chemical fertilizers for rice are education, 
farm size, and profit variance. The first two covariates have a negative coefficient, which 
reveals that households whose heads were educated display lower dependency between the two 
decisions. Similar results for households with larger farm size. On the other hand, the expected 
profit variance has a positive impact on the dependence between the two decisions. This reveals 
certified seeds and chemical fertilizers are more interrelated in the presence of production risk. 
Regarding the standard BVP model, one important aspect is whether the correlation parameter 
is significant. Results show that the correlation between the two technology adoption decisions 
for rice is positive, quite high (0.63), and statistically significant. This means that the two 
decisions are not independent if BVP is the correct specification. The complementarity between 
certified seed and chemical fertilizer is not uncommon in the literature (Abay et al., 2018; 
Kassie et al., 2013; McGuirk & Mundlak, 1991; Ogada et al., 2014; Singh & Kohli, 2005; 
Teklewold et al., 2013). For the heterogeneous dependency specification, the predicted average 
 
25 
 
correlation is about 0.73 and highly significant. Therefore, the average correlation from the 
heterogeneous correlation’s model is higher than when the standard model is used. 
Table 2- 4 Bivariate probit estimates for rice technology adoption 
 Standard BVP Extended BVP 
 Certified seed Fertilizer Certified seed Fertilizer Correlation 
Head gender (1=Female) 0.44 (0.365) 
0.564** 
(0.237) 
0.395 (0.35) 
0.61*** 
(0.235) 
  
Head’s age (years) -0.008** (0.003) -0.001 (0.005) -0.007** (0.003) -0.002 (0.004)   
Education 0.601** (0.241) 
0.694*** 
(0.207) 
0.579** (0.228) 
0.716*** 
(0.197) 
-0.353** (0.172) 
Household size 0.057*** (0.018) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.052*** (0.017) 
0.066*** 
(0.02) 
  
Wealth index (0/6) -0.157** (0.068) -0.101 (0.062) -0.148** (0.064) -0.092 (0.061)   
Livestock income dummy 1.049*** (0.25) 
1.251*** 
(0.248) 
1.024*** (0.232) 
1.298*** 
(0.241) 
  
Off-farm income dummy -0.163 (0.104) 
-0.274** 
(0.116) 
-0.144 (0.1) 
-0.306*** 
(0.107) 
  
Land holding (ha)  0.001 (0.011) -0.01 (0.01) -0.003 (0.011) -0.004 (0.013) -0.099*** (0.027) 
Organization membership 0.537*** (0.123) 
0.518*** 
(0.142) 
0.536*** (0.123) 
0.557*** 
(0.132) 
0.367 (0.342) 
Extension services  0.476*** (0.146) 0.38* (0.215) 0.46*** (0.14) 
0.439** 
(0.196) 
  
Access to credit 1.013*** (0.339) 
0.565* 
(0.316) 
0.958*** (0.33) 
0.605* 
(0.317) 
  
distance to market, KM 0.007 (0.009) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
0.008 (0.009) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
  
AEZ: VFS -0.532 (0.387) 0.224 (0.459) -0.534 (0.377) 0.176 (0.453)   
Profit mean 0.014* (0.007) 0.014 (0.009) 0.012* (0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
  
Profit Variance (Lower)     0.015*** (0.005) 
Profit variance (Upper)     0.033*** (0.009) 
Organization membership (res) 0.968* (0.586) 0.574 (0.579) 0.956* (0.539) 0.667 (0.575)   
Extension services (res) -0.464** (0.225) -0.448* (0.25) -0.469** (0.217) 
-0.454** 
(0.23) 
  
Off-farm income dummy (res) 2.71*** (0.813) 
4.02*** 
(0.74) 
2.609*** (0.77) 
4.106*** 
(0.709) 
  
Constant -4.745*** (1.507) 
-5.626*** 
(1.277) 
-4.513*** (1.399) 
-5.935*** 
(1.25) 
0.741*** (0.24) 
Correlation 0.632   0.726     
Correlation (Lower) 0.49   0.55    
Correlation (Upper) 0.732   0.846    
Log-Likelihood -1177.981   -1147.594    
Degree of freedom 37   42    
Akaike criteria 2429.962   2379.189    
Schwartz criteria 2625.601   2601.266    
Sample size 1462   1462     
Notes: This table presents the estimates of the two bivariate probit models using the sample of rice producers. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the Communes level (116 communes are present in total in the sample) in parentheses. 
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
To select the best model specification, we used AIC and BIC. The results show that the 
extended BVP has the lowest values of AIC and BIC. This suggests that the model BVP-E fits 
better the data at hand than the BVP. Concerning endogeneity of farmer organization, extension 
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services, and off-farm income, results show that for the adoption of certified seeds, all these 
factors are endogenous. For the decision to use inorganic fertilizers, farmer organization seems 
to be exogeneous. Since estimates from a bivariate model could not be interpreted directly, 
Table 2- 5 reports the marginal effects of covariates on marginal technology adoptions and joint 
technology adoption. 
Table 2- 5 shows that there is a very small difference between marginal effects from the two 
model specifications. Therefore, from an empirical point of view, there is no new insight from 
the more complicated model specification (BVP-E compared BVP) for rice technology 
adoption. In other words, there is not much information provided to policymakers by adopting 
the most general bivariate probit instead of the standard model. However, opposite results may 
be found in other contexts. Consequently, one has to check that before using the standard 
bivariate probit.   
Regarding marginal effects, results reveal that several factors has a significant effect on 
technology adoption among rice-producing households. Expected higher agricultural profit 
enhance the probability of adoption of rice certified, inorganic fertilizer and joint adoption of 
inorganic fertilizer and improved maize variety. Similarly, increased access to livestock income 
of 1 percent results in an increase in the probability of certified seed adoption by 0.27 percent, 
inorganic fertilizer adoption by 0.29 percent, and joint adoption of 0.26 percent.  
Increased access to agricultural extension services is critical in promoting the adoption of 
certified seeds, the adoption of inorganic fertilizer, and their joint adoption. Our results show 
that a 1 percent increase in farmers’ access to extension services strongly increases the 
probability of CS adoption by 0.1 percent, CF adoption by 0.12 percent, and their joint adoption 
by 0.11 percent. This is consistent with the findings of Feder et al. (1985), Olwande, Sikei, & 
Mathenge (2009), and Kassie et al. (2013). 
Another policy instrument is a farmer organization, which is found here to positively affect 
rice technology adoption in Senegal. Indeed, a 1 percent increase in farmers’ participation in 
an organization strongly increases the probability of CS adoption by 0.13 percent, CF adoption 
by 0.14 percent, and the joint adoption of the two technologies by 0.13 percent. Similar results 
are found in the literature (Abay et al., 2018; Kassie et al., 2013; Kassie, Zikhali, Manjur, & 
Edwards, 2008; Teklewold et al., 2013; Wollni, Lee, & Thies, 2010). 
Access to credit is also revealed to have a strong relationship with rice technology adoption. 
Improvement of credit access index by one percent improves significantly the three 
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probabilities under consideration, especially the probability of joint adoption of CS and CF. 
The marginal effects of the different levels of education variables are very high, positive and 
significant. These results suggest that households whose heads were educated, either formal 
education or education in local languages, have a higher likelihood to adopt technologies for 
rice production. These results corroborate those of Gerhart (1975), Ogada et al. (2014), and 
Thuo et al. (2011). 
Table 2- 5 Marginal effects of covariates on the probability of technology adoption for rice 
 Standard BVP Extended BVP 
 Certified seed Fertilizer Joint adoption Certified seed Fertilizer Joint adoption 
Head gender (1=Female) 
0.116*** 
(0.023) 
0.126*** 
(0.042) 
0.116*** 
(0.035) 
0.116*** 
(0.024) 
0.124*** 
(0.043) 
0.105*** 
(0.037) 
Head’s age (years) 
-0.001** 
(0) 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.001**  
(0) 
-0.001 
 (0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
Education 
0.15*** 
(0.017) 
0.164*** 
(0.031) 
0.154*** 
(0.025) 
0.15*** 
(0.017) 
0.165*** 
(0.031) 
0.148*** 
(0.028) 
Household size 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
Wealth index (0/6) 
-0.03*** 
(0.005) 
-0.034*** 
(0.009) 
-0.037*** 
(0.008) 
-0.028*** 
(0.005) 
-0.033*** 
(0.009) 
-0.035*** 
(0.008) 
Livestock income dummy 
0.266*** 
(0.021) 
0.29*** 
(0.038) 
0.271*** 
(0.031) 
0.269*** 
(0.021) 
0.294*** 
(0.038) 
0.262*** 
(0.037) 
Off-farm income dummy 
-0.05*** 
(0.013) 
-0.053** 
(0.023) 
-0.046** 
(0.02) 
-0.052*** 
(0.013) 
-0.054** 
(0.022) 
-0.041** 
(0.021) 
Land holding (ha)  
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
0  
(0.001) 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
-0.001  
(0.002) 
-0.001 
 (0.001) 
Organization membership 
0.122*** 
(0.015) 
0.136*** 
(0.027) 
0.133*** 
(0.022) 
0.127*** 
(0.015) 
0.142*** 
(0.027) 
0.133*** 
(0.023) 
Extension services  
0.099*** 
(0.015) 
0.112*** 
(0.028) 
0.115*** 
(0.022) 
0.104*** 
(0.015) 
0.118*** 
(0.028) 
0.113*** 
(0.023) 
Access to credit 
0.184*** 
(0.029) 
0.214*** 
(0.054) 
0.233*** 
(0.043) 
0.181*** 
(0.031) 
0.216*** 
(0.055) 
0.226*** 
(0.043) 
distance to market, KM 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
AEZ: VFS 
-0.037 
(0.031) 
-0.059  
(0.064) 
-0.099** 
(0.043) 
-0.042  
(0.034) 
-0.07  
(0.064) 
-0.109** 
(0.046) 
Profit mean 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Notes: This table presents the estimates of the two bivariate probit models using the sample of rice producers. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the Communes level (116 communes are present in total in the sample) in parentheses. 
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Conversely, a negative marginal effect was associated with off-farm income. On average, 
farmers who generated an off-farm income had a 0.05 percent lower probability of using CS 
and CF, and 0.04 percent lower probability to adopt the two technologies. Similar results were 
found by Thuo et al. (2014) for groundnut production in Senegal and by Rahim, Ruben, & van 
Ierland (2005) in the Sahel context. Therefore, in Senegal, off-farm activities and rice 
production activity are not complementary (Thuo et al., 2014). 
The household wealth index is found to decrease the probability of adopting rice technologies. 
This result suggests that wealthier households do not seem to use their endowments to buy 
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improved technologies. On the other hand, the age of the heads of households has a negative 
effect on the adoption of certified rice seeds and on the joint adoption. In other words, 
households whose heads are old are less likely to adopt certified seed and to jointly adopt 
certified seed and chemical fertilizer. 
2.6.2. Joint adoption of groundnut certified seeds and chemical fertilizers 
Table 2- 6 presents the results of standard and extended bivariate probit of technology adoption 
for groundnut production in Senegal. Unlike results for rice technology adoptions, the 
correlation parameter is quite low (0.18), but significant. On the other hand, when the more 
flexible specification of the dependence between the two technologies is used (BVP-E), results 
reveal farmer organization, agroecological zone, and variance of the total household profit per 
hectare as main drivers of decisions dependence among groundnut producers. All these factors 
have a positive impact on the joint distribution of certified seeds and inorganic fertilizer 
adoptions. In other words, households that are members of farmer organizations and those who 
are in the Groundnut Basin are more likely to jointly use the two technologies than others. 
Similarly, households that expect negative or positive deviations from the profit mean tend to 
adopt both technologies with a higher correlation. As for the rice study case, production risk is 
a key determinant of the dependence between technology choices. 
In terms of the best model to use, AIC favors the flexible model specification, while the 
smallest BIC is found for the most restrictive model. For a parsimonious reason, the restricted 
BVP model is preferred. Considering this model (BVP), the correlation is positive and 
significant, therefore, one could not reject the hypothesis of dependency between the two 
decisions to adopt improved inputs for groundnut production. In order to get an economically 
meaningful interpretation of findings, Table 2- 7 reports the marginal effects of covariates on 
technology adoption decisions. 
Expected higher agricultural profit enhanced the probability of adoption of groundnut certified, 
inorganic fertilizer and joint adoption of inorganic fertilizer and improved maize variety. More 
variable agricultural profit per hectare seems also to have a positive impact on technology 
adoption. This means that households that expect more volatile returns are more likely to adopt 
technologies in order to increase the expected return. 
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Table 2- 6 Bivariate probit estimates for groundnut technology adoption 
 Standard BVP Extended BVP 
 Certified seed Fertilizer Certified seed Fertilizer Correlation 
Head gender (1=Female) -0.097 (0.2) -0.896*** (0.214) -0.059 (0.195) -0.951*** (0.215)   
Head’s age (years) 0.001 (0.011) 0.045*** (0.011) 0 (0.011) 0.048*** (0.011)   
Education -0.035 (0.344) -1.231*** (0.299) 0.007 (0.334) -1.33*** (0.302)   
Household size 0.011 (0.03) -0.105*** (0.028) 0.015 (0.029) -0.114*** (0.028)   
Wealth index (0/6) -0.09*** (0.029) 0.026 (0.029) -0.078*** (0.028) 0.02 (0.029)   
Livestock income dummy -0.127 (0.417) -1.453*** (0.39) -0.023 (0.404) -1.61*** (0.393)   
Off-farm income dummy 0.043 (0.077) -0.049 (0.078) 0.049 (0.076) -0.051 (0.079)   
Land holding (ha)  0.024 (0.021) 0.096*** (0.02) 0.019 (0.02) 0.105*** (0.02)   
Organization membership 0.156 (0.117) 0.093 (0.118) 0.155 (0.111) 0.102 (0.116) 0.224* (0.131) 
Extension services  0.081 (0.106) 0.366** (0.144) 0.059 (0.101) 0.36** (0.141)   
Access to credit 0.363 (0.572) -2.067*** (0.555) 0.42 (0.558) -2.242*** (0.564)   
distance to market, KM -0.023*** (0.007) 0.031*** (0.008) -0.022*** (0.007) 0.033*** (0.008)   
AEZ: Basin 0.665 (0.896) 4.311*** (0.836) 0.492 (0.864) 4.633*** (0.842) 0.484*** (0.126) 
Profit mean 0.045*** (0.013) 0.093*** (0.016) 0.041*** (0.012) 0.083*** (0.015)   
Profit variance (Lower) 0.033*** (0.006) 0 (0.004) 0.032*** (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.019*** (0.005) 
Profit variance (Upper) 0.012*** (0.004) 0.003 (0.002) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.003) 
Constant -1.713 (1.885) 4.238** (1.754) -1.969 (1.843) 4.796*** (1.771) -0.512*** (0.154) 
Correlation 0.177   0.061     
Correlation (Lower) 0.085   -0.105    
Correlation (Upper) 0.266   0.239    
Log-Likelihood -3161.892   -3149.331    
Degree of freedom 41   45    
Akaike criteria 6405.784   6388.661    
Schwartz criteria 6655.415   6662.646    
Sample size 3257   3257     
Notes: This table presents the estimates of the two bivariate probit models using the sample of groundnut producers. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the Communes level (288 communes are present in total in the sample) in parentheses. Significance: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
As for rice technology adoptions, increased access to agricultural extension services is critical 
in promoting the adoption of CS and/or CF. Our results show that a 1 percent increase in 
farmers’ access to extension services strongly increases the probability of CS adoption by 0.03 
percent, CF adoption by 0.08 percent, and their joint adoption by 0.03 percent. Therefore, the 
impact of extension workers is more critical for fertilizer adoption. 
Regarding farmer organization, which is a central institution in a rural area, results showed a 
positive effect on groundnut technology adoption in Senegal. Similar results are found for 
households’ heads age and farm size. As for extension services, larger farm size has a higher 
marginal effect on fertilizer adoption (0.023) compared to certified seeds (0.01) or joint 
adoption (0.008). 
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Table 2- 7 Marginal effects of covariates on the probability of technology adoption for groundnut 
 Standard BVP Extended BVP 
 Certified seed Fertilizer Joint adoption Certified seed Fertilizer Joint adoption 
Head gender (1=Female) 
-0.069** 
(0.033) 
-0.204*** 
(0.035) 
-0.073*** 
(0.017) 
-0.069** 
(0.032) 
-0.204*** 
(0.034) 
-0.065*** 
(0.015) 
Head’s age (years) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.01*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.01*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Education 
-0.073** 
(0.044) 
-0.274*** 
(0.044) 
-0.092*** 
(0.022) 
-0.078** 
(0.043) 
-0.28*** 
(0.043) 
-0.085*** 
(0.02) 
Household size 
-0.003  
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004  
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Wealth index (0/6) 
-0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Livestock income dummy 
-0.105** 
(0.055) 
-0.328*** 
(0.055) 
-0.116*** 
(0.027) 
-0.101** 
(0.053) 
-0.341*** 
(0.053) 
-0.105*** 
(0.024) 
Off-farm income dummy 0.007 (0.014) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
0 (0.007) 0.007 (0.013) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
0 (0.006) 
Land holding (ha)  
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Organization membership 
0.039**  
(0.02) 
0.029 
(0.021) 
0.019**  
(0.01) 
0.039**  
(0.02) 
0.032  
(0.02) 
0.017** 
(0.009) 
Extension services  0.037** (0.02) 
0.086*** 
(0.02) 
0.033*** 
(0.01) 
0.034** (0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.019) 
0.027*** 
(0.009) 
Access to credit 
-0.031  
(0.078) 
-0.437*** 
(0.079) 
-0.123*** 
(0.039) 
-0.046  
(0.076) 
-0.446*** 
(0.076) 
-0.117*** 
(0.035) 
distance to market, KM 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 (0) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0) 
AEZ: Basin 
0.376*** 
(0.116) 
0.991*** 
(0.116) 
0.365*** 
(0.059) 
0.381*** 
(0.112) 
1.01*** 
(0.112) 
0.33*** 
(0.053) 
Profit mean 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.023*** 
(0.002) 
0.01*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.02*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Profit variance (Lower) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** (0) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0) 
Profit variance (Upper) 
0.003***  
(0) 
0.001***  
(0) 
0.001***  
(0) 
0.003***  
(0) 
0.003***  
(0) 
0.001***  
(0) 
Notes: This table presents the estimates of the two bivariate probit models using the sample of groundnut producers. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the Communes level (288 communes are present in total in the sample) in parentheses. Significance: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Access to credit, surprisingly, is revealed to have a negative and significant relationship with 
groundnut technology adoption. Farm households that have access to credit seem to invest less 
on technology adoption and on fertilizer. In the same direction, the marginal effects of 
education are very high, negative, and significant. The highest effect (0.28) is found for 
fertilizer adoption. These results suggest that households whose heads are educated, either 
formal education or education in local languages, are less likely to buy fertilizers for groundnut. 
This result may be related to the fact that farmers could get appropriate yield for this commodity 
without fertilizer. Therefore, there is little incentive to adopt fertilizer. On the other hand, most 
farmers prefer to use their past production as seeds for the next season. Descriptive statistics 
do not reveal any big yield gap between the use of self-produced seeds and certified seeds. 
Consequently, more educated households would prefer to produce groundnut without the use 
of improved inputs. Therefore, there is a need for policymakers to investigate the value-added 
of improved inputs for groundnut proposed to farmers. 
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Results also show that gender, household size, household wealth, and livestock income are also 
revealed to negatively and significantly affect groundnut technology adoption. Unlike results 
found for the rice model, women-headed households have lower probability to adopt groundnut 
technologies than male-headed households. Likewise, larger households used to adopt 
technologies less than smaller ones. Contrary to the result for rice, being involved in livestock 
activities tend not to be complementary to groundnut production, at least in terms of adoption 
technology. Conversely, participating in off-farm activities does not have any significant 
impact on groundnut related technology adoptions as far as certified seeds and chemical 
fertilizers are concerned. 
 Conclusion   
In this paper, we describe agricultural technology adoption patterns in Senegal and identify 
their determinants using a flexible bivariate probit. The most recent farm survey data collected 
in 2017 in Senegal is used for this purpose. The descriptive statistics reveal that the adoption 
rate depends on technologies and crops under consideration. Only 7 percent of sorghum 
producers have used improved inputs (certified seeds and/or chemical fertilizers) compared to 
14 percent for cowpeas producers, 25 percent for millet, 39 percent for groundnut, and 67 
percent for rice producers. For millet and maize, the most popular technology is certified seeds, 
while for the rice production, the joint adoption of certified seeds and chemical fertilizers is the 
most common choice. In the groundnut system, the major cash crop in Senegal, improved 
inputs choice is more heterogeneous; respectively 41 percent, 39 percent, and 20 percent of 
adopters have used chemical fertilizers, certified seeds, and the two technologies respectively. 
In terms of quantity of chemical fertilizers used per hectare, results reveal that rice producers 
have the highest rate of fertilizer application in the sample (192 kg/ha) followed by maize 
producers (63 kg/ha), and 20 kg/ha for groundnut and millet producers. For cowpeas and 
sorghum, the intensity of fertilizers is very low and is less than 5 kg per hectare. 
Our econometric results show that the decision to adopt certified seeds and that to adopt 
chemical fertilizers are not independent in the context of Senegal, but the two technologies are 
complementary. Therefore, our choice to use a multivariate model is appropriate. On the other 
hand, the use of a more flexible bivariate probit fits better the data, especially for rice samples. 
Consequently, the hypothesis of a constant correlation between two decisions (probability 
distributions) needs to be tested. As drivers of the dependence between the decisions to adopt 
certified seeds and chemical fertilizers for rice production are education, farm size, and 
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production risk. Regarding the drivers of technology adoption for rice and groundnut, the key 
factors identified include extension services,  farmer organization membership, credit access, 
education level of the household head, size of the farm operated by the household, livestock 
activity, off-farm activity, household size, age of household head, production risks, and 
agroecological zones. 
These findings have some direct policy implications for Senegal. Firstly, it is important to 
promote complementary technologies, especially chemical fertilizer and certified seeds, as a 
package to facilitate their adoption. Especially for rice production, descriptive statistics show 
that farmers that adopted the two technologies were three times more productive than those 
who did not adopt any of these technologies. Due to households' limited financial capital, 
policymakers should ensure that the technologies are available and affordable to farm 
households. 
Furthermore, results show that farmer organization membership is central for agricultural 
technology adoption. In addition, extension services also encourage farmers to adopt advanced 
technologies. It would be interesting to directly associate research with extension in the same 
structure to increase efficiency by pooling resources and to better facilitate the scaling up of 
technologies. In the presence of market failure or absence of markets, these instruments 
(organization membership, extension services) facilitate the exchange of key information, 
influencing farmers’ behavior. There is a need for policymakers to promote and help rural 
farmers´ associations, as well as support extension services that disseminate information on 
agricultural technologies and best practices. 
Additionally, access to credit has a positive effect on the adoption of certified seeds and 
fertilizers. Removing credit constraints and easing access to inputs in the production areas are 
essential to increase the adoption of capital-intensive technologies. The heterogeneity of 
technology adoption across regions and agroecological zones calls for location-specific 
technology promotion policies. 
Production risks are found to influence both marginal technology adoption distribution and the 
joint distribution of technology adoption, policymakers need to design policies that account for 
uncertainty associated with agricultural activities. Solutions like agricultural insurance would 
be a good option to increase technology adoption in Senegal.  
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Supplementary materials 
Table A2- 1 Estimates of Full- and Partial-Moment Function of Senegalese Rice Production 
 𝜇1 𝜇2 𝜇3 𝜂2 𝜑2 𝜂3 𝜑3 
(Intercept) 
-1886.553*** 
(588.735) 
12.485*** 
(1.914) 
-67.012 
(417.809) 
10.428*** 
(1.787) 
6.662 
(4.838) 
15.641*** 
(2.681) 
9.993 
(7.257) 
x1_land 
-27.775*** 
(9.642) 
-0.273*** 
(0.041) 
0.801 (7.075) 
-0.263*** 
(0.036) 
0.021 
(0.066) 
-0.395*** 
(0.055) 
0.031 (0.1) 
x2_fert 0.07** (0.04) 0*** (0) -0.012 (0.023) 0.001*** (0) 0 (0) 0.001*** (0) 0 (0) 
x3_rainfall 
0.389*** 
(0.142) 
-0.003*** (0) -0.022 (0.067) -0.003*** (0) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** (0) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
x4_temp 
104.97*** 
(30.765) 
-0.177*** 
(0.049) 
5.08 (12.193) 
-0.123*** 
(0.046) 
-0.175 
(0.123) 
-0.185*** 
(0.068) 
-0.263 
(0.185) 
x11 0.065** (0.039)       
x12 0 (0)       
x13 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
      
x14 0.664** (0.262)       
x22 0 (0)       
x23 0*** (0)       
x24 -0.002 (0.001)       
x33 0** (0)       
x34 
-0.026*** 
(0.007) 
      
x44 
-2.828*** 
(0.805) 
      
tech_CS 0.762 (1.648) -0.012 (0.336) 
-33.33** 
(16.854) 
-0.074 (0.348) 
0.048 
(0.78) 
-0.111 (0.522) 
0.072 
(1.17) 
tech_CF 1.56 (1.077) -0.114 (0.19) 
-48.031** 
(25.058) 
-0.181 (0.194) 
0.091 
(0.437) 
-0.272 (0.291) 
0.136 
(0.656) 
tech_both 1.701 (1.238) -0.062 (0.212) 
-11.949 
(17.989) 
-0.066 (0.195) 
-0.072 
(0.484) 
-0.099 (0.292) 
-0.108 
(0.726) 
SQI 
21.228*** 
(8.097) 
2.743*** 
(0.971) 
-181.292 
(259.997) 
2.499** 
(1.063) 
0.598 
(2.16) 
3.749** 
(1.595) 
0.897 
(3.239) 
profit_dum 
-19.486*** 
(1.385) 
-1.335*** 
(0.274) 
-54.566 
(33.399) 
-1.017*** 
(0.334) 
-0.941 
(0.606) 
-1.525*** 
(0.501) 
-1.411 
(0.91) 
zone_vfs -0.671 (2.916) 
-0.395** 
(0.207) 
44.195 (65.61) 
-0.398** 
(0.213) 
0.032 
(0.45) 
-0.598** 
(0.319) 
0.047 
(0.675) 
R-Sq adjusted 0.414 0.243 -0.001 0.244 0.244 0.244 0.244 
Fisher Statistics 52.688 47.789 0.826 23.431 23.431 23.431 23.431 
Sample size 1462 1462 1462 890 572 890 572 
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Table A2- 2 Estimates of Full- and Partial-Moment Function of Senegalese Groundnut Production 
 𝜇1 𝜇2 𝜇3 𝜂2 𝜑2 𝜂3 𝜑3 
(Intercept) 
66.897 
(168.743) 
11.135*** 
(1.821) 
280.848 
(406.34) 
12.733*** 
(1.723) 
-4.651 
(4.899) 
19.099*** 
(2.585) 
-6.977 
(7.349) 
x1_land 
-4.605*** 
(1.317) 
-0.078*** 
(0.011) 
-5.18*** 
(1.941) 
-0.065*** 
(0.012) 
-0.032 
(0.026) 
-0.098*** 
(0.018) 
-0.049 
(0.04) 
x2_fert 
-0.008 
(0.034) 
0*** (0) 0.019 (0.013) 0** (0) 0 (0) 0** (0) 0 (0) 
x3_rainfall 
0.18*** 
(0.048) 
-0.001*** (0) 
-0.213*** 
(0.08) 
-0.001*** (0) 0 (0.001) -0.002*** (0) 0 (0.001) 
x4_temp 
-4.802 
(9.341) 
-0.206*** 
(0.046) 
-0.774 
(12.362) 
-0.25*** 
(0.043) 
0.124 
(0.127) 
-0.375*** 
(0.065) 
0.186 
(0.19) 
x11 
0.032*** 
(0.004) 
      
x12 0*** (0)       
x13 0.001*** (0)       
x14 
0.094*** 
(0.036) 
      
x22 0 (0)       
x23 0*** (0)       
x24 0.001 (0.001)       
x33 0 (0)       
x34 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
      
x44 0.196 (0.259)       
tech_CS 0.909 (0.571) 
0.406*** 
(0.129) 
51.375 
(34.495) 
0.345** 
(0.139) 
0.218 
(0.314) 
0.518** 
(0.208) 
0.327 
(0.471) 
tech_CF 0.572 (0.552) 0.091 (0.116) 
10.539** 
(5.566) 
-0.082 
(0.137) 
0.438** 
(0.249) 
-0.123 
(0.205) 
0.658** 
(0.374) 
tech_both 
2.596*** 
(0.731) 
0.808*** 
(0.126) 
59.715** 
(24.326) 
0.729*** 
(0.136) 
0.187 (0.3) 
1.094*** 
(0.204) 
0.28 (0.45) 
SQI 
-1.321 
(3.607) 
1.387** 
(0.799) 
-207.678 
(137.338) 
0.53 (0.841) 
2.824 
(1.917) 
0.794 (1.262) 
4.236 
(2.875) 
profit_dum 
-10.08*** 
(0.522) 
-2.142*** 
(0.186) 
-48.277** 
(22.536) 
-1.893*** 
(0.226) 
-0.57 
(0.422) 
-2.839*** 
(0.339) 
-0.856 
(0.633) 
zone_bassin 
-2.313*** 
(0.656) 
-0.999*** 
(0.117) 
-49.196** 
(24.084) 
-0.909*** 
(0.123) 
-0.179 
(0.293) 
-1.364*** 
(0.184) 
-0.268 
(0.44) 
R-Sq 
adjusted 
0.188 0.084 0.013 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 
Fisher 
Statistics 
38.765 30.993 5.255 16.143 16.143 16.143 16.143 
Sample size 3257 3257 3257 2109 1148 2109 1148 
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Table A2- 3 First stage estimates for addressing potential endogeneity (probit model). 
 Rice sample Groundnut sample 
 
Farmer 
organization 
(0,1) 
Extension 
services (0,1) 
Off-farm 
activity (0,1) 
Farmer 
organization (0,1) 
Extension 
services (0,1) 
Off-farm 
activity (0,1) 
Head gender 
(1=Female) 
0.053 (0.127) -0.091 (0.134) 
0.338*** 
(0.121) 
0.089 (0.155) 0.133 (0.14) 0.155 (0.108) 
Head’s age (years) -0.003 (0.003) -0.005 (0.003) 0 (0.003) -0.006** (0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003* (0.002) 
Education 0.06 (0.08) -0.056 (0.084) 
0.268*** 
(0.077) 
0.426*** (0.069) 
0.247*** 
(0.067) 
0.125** 
(0.052) 
Household size 0.024*** (0.008) 0.013* (0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.026*** (0.005) -0.003 (0.006) 0.008* (0.005) 
Wealth index (0/6) -0.029 (0.023) 
0.103*** 
(0.025) 
-0.041* (0.024) -0.026 (0.02) 0.012 (0.019) 
0.039*** 
(0.015) 
Livestock income 
dummy 
0.114 (0.082) 
0.224*** 
(0.086) 
0.434*** 
(0.077) 
0 (0.069) 0.089 (0.067) 
0.44*** 
(0.051) 
Land holding (ha)  0.006 (0.005) -0.002 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006) 0.006* (0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.018*** 
(0.005) 
Access to credit 0.57*** (0.122) 0.184 (0.131) -0.085 (0.132) 0.877*** (0.127) 0.038 (0.159) -0.006 (0.13) 
distance to market, 
KM 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.018*** (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
Distance to road (km) 0.012*** (0.002)    0.007* (0.004) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Distance to the 
regional city (km) 
     -0.001 (0.001) 
  0.418*** (0.076)    0.266*** (0.068) 0.067 (0.066) -0.12** (0.052) 
  0.203* (0.114)    0.275*** (0.091) 0.802*** (0.11) 0.13** (0.06) 
AEZ: VFS 0.521*** (0.103) 
1.329*** 
(0.107) 
-0.369*** 
(0.115) 
   
AEZ: Basin    -0.73*** (0.077) 
-0.261*** 
(0.075) 
-0.498*** 
(0.06) 
Log Likelihood -766.049 -766.049 -766.049 -866.109 -866.109 -866.109 
Sample size 1462 1462 1462 3257 3257 3257 
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Introduction 
Improved technology adoption is central to crop production. Appropriate technologies use can 
help improve farmers’ welfare, especially through productivity and efficiency. Many studies 
have analyzed the relationship between improved inputs use and efficiency (Kalirajan and 
Shand 2001; Alene and Hassan 2006), productivity (Crost et al. 2007; Abate et al. 2015; Battese 
et al. 2017) or welfare (Amare et al. 2012; Bezu et al. 2014). Most of these studies considered 
only one improved input and quantified the impact on yield, income, efficiency, or poverty. 
However, some agricultural technologies were revealed to be complementary (Ogada et al. 
2014; Abay et al. 2018). This is why technologies are generally proposed as a package. Indeed, 
the introduction of an agricultural innovation without the appropriate agronomic practices will 
limit its impact. Therefore, when farmers are exposed to such complementary technologies 
(multiple choices), it would be interesting to compare the impact of the different technology 
options. Thus, such analysis will offer a larger view for discussing policy options. 
This article’s objective is to analyze the impact of three technologies that are critical 
for rice production: irrigation, certified seeds, and chemical fertilizers in the rice. As stated 
previously, the aim will be to consider the impact of individual technology use as well as the 
combination of the three technologies on technical efficiency and land productivity in Senegal. 
These technologies are important for the country since a lot of investments (irrigation 
equipment, input subsidies, etc.) were made by the Senegalese government to reach self-
sufficiency for rice. In fact, the 2014–2017 National Program for Self-Sufficiency in Rice 
(PNAR) was specifically formulated to achieve this goal. Over recent years (2013–2016), the 
country’s rice production has experienced a 160% increase. 
Senegal has dedicated crucial efforts to boosting agricultural production, mainly 
through area expansion and productivity intensification. These have relied on the assumption 
that local rice can compete with imports in terms of quality and quantity (Fiamohe et al. 2018). 
Rice cultivation in Senegal is based on five major rice-producing systems (irrigated, rainfed, 
mangrove, upland, and lowland). Unlike irrigation, the other rice cropping systems depend on 
rainfall, are less intensive, and use fewer inputs, inducing lower yields (1–2 t/ha). Rice 
produced is mainly intended for self-consumption. Irrigated rice cropping is characterized by 
an intensive system with total water control, mechanization of most production and post-
harvest operations, and the systematic use of fertilizers inducing higher yields, between 5 and 
6.5 t/ha. As a comparison, the average West African rice yield for the same years is 1.82 tons, 
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but the Senegalese rice system is still characterized by poor value addition, impeding the 
country from realizing its income and employment generation potential.  
The rice system in the Senegal River valley is based on small and medium-sized family 
farms varying between 0.25 and 1 ha. It is practiced in the Senegal River valley (45,000 ha on 
an annual average) and the Anambe basin in the south of the country (4,500 ha). Rice 
production (irrigated) in the Senegal River valley is between 47% and 75% of domestic 
production, depending on the years. Of this production, 69% is marketed, of which one-third 
represents in-kind payments for input credits (FNDASP, 2017). This reveals a rise in the flow 
of rice from the valley to the consumption basins (major cities in the country including Saint 
Louis, Touba, Thies, and Dakar). 
Therefore, it is well known that irrigation is central to the country’s self-sufficiency 
program. In addition, access to inputs, especially inorganic fertilizers, is facilitated for 
parastatal agencies. Moreover, there is a complementarity among irrigation, certified seeds, 
and fertilizer use. The combination of these three technologies by a farmer may create some 
differences in farming; thus, there may exist heterogeneous production behavior across 
different groups of farmers. Therefore, improved inputs use is expected to shift the production 
frontier upward for adopters. Consequently, the first objective of this study is to test the 
existence of heterogeneous rice production frontiers in the sample due to technological choices. 
The second objective is to analyze technical efficiency across farmers in the presence of 
potentially heterogeneous production frontiers. The last objective is to assess the impact of 
technological choices on rice production per hectare. 
This article contributes to the literature on the impact of technology adoption on 
efficiency in several aspects. First, unlike in many studies, three common rice technologies are 
considered (irrigation, certified seeds, and chemical fertilizer). Second, we assume that the 
production frontier is different across farmers, based on technology choices. This assumption 
is tested using the meta-frontier stochastic frontier as proposed by Huang et al. (2014). This 
framework explicitly separates the overall farm efficiency into managerial efficiency and the 
technology gap. Managerial efficiency is the farm-specific technical efficiency relative to its 
group-specific frontier of production. On the other hand, the technology gap measures the 
distance between the group-specific frontier of production and the best available technology 
frontier (meta frontier) in the economy under consideration. The third main contribution of this 
article is the use of an impact evaluation approach that accounts for potential multinomial 
selection processes where the expected benefits of technology choices induce the adoption 
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decisions. We specifically use a multinomial endogenous treatment effects model proposed by 
Deb and Trivedi (2006a, b) to account for selection bias due to both observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity and to assess the differential impacts of the adoption of a single technology as 
well as a combination of them. Fourth, this article uses a recent survey representative of 
irrigated and rainfed rice production in Senegal. 
The article is organized as follows. The first section describes the methodology of the stochastic 
meta frontier used, the second presents the data, and the third provides the empirical results. 
The final section presents the conclusion. 
 Conceptual framework 
3.2.1.  Sample selection and efficiency analysis 
The assessment of the adoption of best farming practices or improved inputs on farmers’ 
performances (yield, productivity, efficiency, income, etc.) has been the main target of 
economists for decades (Birkhaeuser et al. 1991; Adesina and Zinnah 1993; Feder et al. 2003). 
Regarding the impact on productivity or efficiency, one of the most-used approaches is the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck 1977). In 
this framework, the common approach consists of assuming a homogeneous function of 
production for all farmers to be estimated. Then, efficiency or productivity scores are derived. 
The last step is to compute certain statistics (mean, median, or other quantiles) to test 
differences among farmer groups. 
However, the issue of selection bias was raised in the SFA literature (Sipilainen and 
Oude Lansink 2005; Solis et al. 2007; Kumbhakar et al. 2009; Greene 2010) since farmers self-
selected into different groups. The decision to belong to a selected group may be affected by 
observable factors as well as unobservable factors (Villano et al. 2015). Still, one has to decide 
which aspects of the framework are affected by this type of endogeneity. Three options are 
available: selection on the production function, selection on the inefficiency term, or selection 
on the noise term. 
The first authors that raised and accounted for sample selection bias in an SFA 
framework used ad-hoc approaches such as the Heckman model (Bradford et al. 2001; 
Sipilainen and Oude Lansink 2005; Solis et al. 2007) or propensity scores matching (PSM) 
(Mayen et al. 2010). In a linear framework, the Heckman model works well, but in a non-linear 
setting such as the stochastic frontier framework, its application is not straightforward (Greene 
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2010). As was shown in the meta-frontier framework (Battese et al. 2004; O’Donnell et al. 
2008; Huang et al. 2014), one could not directly compare efficiency scores across groups of 
farmers when they do not operate under the same production frontier. Consequently, the use of 
the PSM approach is limited in this context.  On the other hand, Greene (2010) proposed a 
theoretically robust approach that assumes that the selection bias affects only the noise term in 
the SFA model. Similarly, but with different assumptions, Kumbhakar et al. (2009) suggested 
a theoretical model in which the selection bias affects the level of farm inefficiency. Even 
though the last two approaches are theoretically well formulated, they have some limitations. 
According to Mayen et al. (2010), they assume different technologies across groups without a 
formal test for differences in technology. In addition, they are computationally demanding or 
may suffer from what Mayen et al. (2010) called a “common vexing occurrence” issue. 
Therefore, we follow the simple approach proposed by Rao et al. (2012). The main objectives 
of this approach are to (i) consistently estimate the production frontier for each group of 
farmers, (ii) test the differences in technology use, (iii) estimate technical efficiency or 
productivity scores, and (iv) assess treatment effects of technology choices on outcomes 
accounting for selection bias. The first three objectives are reached using the meta-frontier 
framework as extended by Huang et al. (2014). This framework explicitly assumes (and tests) 
that each group of farmers may have its own production frontier, and if this is the case, there 
is a meta frontier of production that envelopes all individual frontiers. If the assumption of 
heterogeneous frontiers is not rejected, three efficiency scores are proposed: technical 
efficiency (managerial efficiency), technological efficiency, and meta-technical (overall) 
efficiency. The managerial efficiency is the farm-specific technical efficiency relative to the 
group-specific frontier of production. This efficiency score is comparable only within groups 
of farmers. On the other hand, the technological efficiency measures how close individual 
frontiers are to the meta frontier, which is the best available technology frontier in the economy 
under consideration. The overall technical efficiency is by construction the product of the first 
two efficiency scores. For the last target, since our treatment variable is multinomial, we use a 
multinomial endogenous treatment effects model (Deb and Trivedi 2006b) to account for 
selection bias due to both observed and unobserved heterogeneity and to assess the differential 
impacts of the adoption of a single as well as multiple improved technologies. The next sections 
briefly present the two approaches used for empirical estimations. 
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3.2.2.  Meta Stochastic Production Frontier framework 
The objective of this study is to analyze the technical efficiency of rice producers in Senegal 
in the presence of technology heterogeneity. As explained previously, the meta stochastic 
frontier approach (MSFA) is adopted. 
A two-step approach is used to estimate the meta frontier. The first step estimates the group-
specific frontiers and the second step constructs the frontier boundary of all individual frontiers. 
This methodology has been first proposed by Battese et al. (2004) and O’Donnell et al. (2008). 
Their approach had been extended recently by Huang et al. (2014). 
Let’s consider J production systems and that each system has 𝑁𝑗farms. Wang (2002) proposed 
a more general framework of the stochastic frontier that accounts for inefficiency and 
production risk (variance). 
𝒀𝒊𝒋 = 𝒇
𝒋(𝑿𝒋𝒊)𝒆
𝑽𝒋𝒊−𝑼𝒋𝒊, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁𝑗;  j=1, 2, …, J                                        (3.1) 
With             𝑽𝒋𝒊~𝑵(𝟎, 𝝈𝒗
𝟐);                 𝑼𝒋𝒊~𝑵
+(𝝁𝒊, 𝝈𝒖
𝟐) 
Where 𝒀𝒊𝒋 and 𝑿𝒋𝒊, denote respectively the rice output and input vector of the 𝒊
𝒕𝒉 production 
unit in the 𝒋𝒕𝒉 group, and 𝒇𝒋 the individual group-specific production technology. Following 
the standard SFA modeling, the random error terms are represented by 𝑽𝒋𝒊 (which is assumed 
to be independent and identically distributed with mean zero and variance 𝝈𝒗
𝟐), and 𝑼𝒋𝒊 are 
non-negative random errors that account for technical inefficiency (which follows a truncated-
normal/half-normal distribution). Due to the cross-section data used and for the sake of 
simplicity, we consider only a half-normal distribution. In this study, after estimating group-
specific production frontiers, we test whether the various groups share homogenous 
technology, using a likelihood ratio test. Therefore, depending on the model specification 
supported by data, heteroscedastic inefficiency (𝝈𝒖), or production’s risk (𝝈𝒗) will be modeled 
as a function of a set of environmental variables, 𝒁𝒋𝒊, specific to each group of farmers. 
In the empirical section, we adopted the following Cobb-Douglas stochastic production frontier 
function: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖
𝑘
𝑘 + 𝒗𝒊 − 𝒖𝒊         (3.2) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the log of the rice output, 𝑥𝑖 
𝑘is the log of the input k. 
The technical efficiency of each farm within its group is computed as: 
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𝑻𝑬𝒊
𝒋
=
𝒀𝒋𝒊
𝒇𝒋(𝑿𝒋𝒊)𝒆
𝑽𝒋𝒊
= 𝒆−𝑼𝒋𝒊      (3.3) 
After estimating the group production frontiers, the common meta stochastic frontier, 𝒇𝑴(𝑿𝒋𝒊), 
is estimated using the group-specific frontiers, 𝒇𝒋(𝑿𝒋𝒊), and is expressed as: 
𝒇𝒋(𝑿𝒋𝒊) = 𝒇
𝑴(𝑿𝒋𝒊)𝒆
−𝑼𝒋𝒊     (3.4) 
Where all comments related to (3.1) are applicable to (3.4). Once the meta-frontier is estimated, 
the inefficiency score 𝑼𝒋𝒊 will measure the gap between the group-specific technology 
boundary and the best available technology boundary. This gap is known as the technology gap 
ratio (TGR) and is defined as: 
𝑻𝑮𝑹𝒊
𝒋
=
𝒇𝒋(𝑿𝒋𝒊)
𝒇𝑴(𝑿𝒋𝒊)
= 𝒆−𝑼𝒋𝒊 ≤ 𝟏                    (3.5) 
For any selected farm, its performance can be decomposed into three different statistics: (i) the 
technology gap ratio (𝑻𝑮𝑹𝒊
𝒋
=
𝒇𝒋(𝑿𝒋𝒊)
𝒇𝑴(𝑿𝒋𝒊)
) which is the distance between the farm-specific frontier 
and the meta frontier, (ii)  the technical efficiency score (𝑻𝑬𝒊
𝒋
=
𝒇𝒋(𝑿𝒋𝒊)𝒆
−𝑼𝒋𝒊
𝒇𝒋(𝑿𝒋𝒊)
= 𝒆−𝑼𝒋𝒊) which is 
the farm efficiency score relative to its production frontier, and (iii) the meta technical 
efficiency (𝑴𝑻𝑬𝒋𝒊 =
𝒀𝒋𝒊
𝒇𝒋(𝑿𝒋𝒊)𝒆
𝑽𝒋𝒊
= 𝑻𝑮𝑹𝒊
𝒋
× 𝑻𝑬𝒊
𝒋
) of the farm, which is the overall performance 
with respect to the meta-frontier. Therefore, in the meta-frontier stochastic framework, the 
overall efficiency of a decision-making unit relative to the best technology available is a 
product of the technology adoption choice by that unit (TGR) and its ability to better use that 
technology. 
3.2.3.  The multinomial endogenous treatment effects model 
We model farmers' technology choices (irrigation, certified seed, and fertilizer) and their 
impact on outcome variables using a multinomial endogenous treatment effect model as 
proposed by Deb and Trivedi (2006a, b). The main advantage of this approach as an impact 
evaluation setting is that it accounts for selection bias due to both observed (through the farm 
or household characteristics) and unobserved heterogeneity (via latent variables). This 
approach specifies a joint distribution of endogenous multivalued treatment and outcome using 
observed and unobserved characteristics to link treatment and outcome equations.  
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The framework proposed by Deb and Trivedi (2006a, b) has two components: treatment 
equation and outcome equation; these equations are linked by unobserved and observed 
characteristics. Let 𝑑𝑖𝑡 be binary variables representing the observed market choice (treatment) 
by farmer i and C the number of possible choices. 
𝑑𝑖𝑡(𝑇𝑖) = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡   (t = 0,1,2, … , C)
0,                               𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
          (3.6) 
The probability of treatment can be represented as: 
𝑃𝑟[𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑧𝑖, 𝑙𝑖] = 𝑧′𝑖𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑘
𝑇
𝑘=1
+ 𝑖𝑡     (3.7) 
𝑖𝑡 is the error term, and 𝑃𝑟[𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑧𝑖, 𝑙𝑖] is supposed to be a multinomial logistic function g, z 
denotes exogenous covariates with their associated coefficients 𝛼𝑡,  𝑙𝑖𝑘 which stand for 
unobserved characteristics (unobserved heterogeneity) common to individual i’s choice and 
outcome such as motivation or level of information. 𝑙𝑖𝑘 are assumed to be independent of 𝑖𝑡. 
We also assume that t=0 denotes the control group (no technology adoption). 
For the model to be identified, a set of restrictions are imposed. First, we impose 𝛿𝑡𝑘 = 0 ∀ 𝑡 ≠
𝑘, i.e. each market regime choice is affected by a unique unobserved factor. In addition, we 
assume that  𝛿𝑡𝑡 = 1, which implies that the scale of effects of unobserved factor is normalized 
and equal to 1 in the treatment equation. See Deb and Trivedi (2006a, b). 
The outcome equation is as follows 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥′𝑖𝛽 + ∑ 𝜃𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
 ∑ 𝜋𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑡 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝜖𝑖    (3.8) 
Where 𝜖𝑖  is the error term, 𝑦𝑖 is supposed to follow a normal density distribution f, x denotes 
exogenous covariates with associated coefficients 𝛽, 𝜃𝑡 are the treatment effects relative to the 
control. The outcome  𝑦𝑖  is affected by unobserved characteristics 𝑙𝑖𝑡 that affect selection into 
treatment.  If 𝜋𝑡 is positive (negative), treatment and outcome are positively (negatively) 
correlated through unobserved characteristics, i.e., there is positive (negative) selection. 
In practice, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 are non-observed. Following  Deb and Trivedi (2006a, b) we assume that they 
are i.i.d and drawn from a normal distribution and their joint distribution h can be integrated 
out of the joint density distribution  of selection and outcome variables as follows: 
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𝝎(𝑦𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = ∫{𝒇(𝑦𝑖, |𝑥𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡) ∗ 𝒈(𝑧𝑖, 𝑙𝑖)} 𝒉(𝑙𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑡          (3.9) 
For a given specification of f, g and h, the integral (3.9) do not have a closed solution form. 
Then, the full estimation of equations (3.7) and (3.8) is based on a simulation-based estimation 
framework. This method finds the values of parameters that maximize the simulated log-
likelihood function associated with a joint density distribution of selection and outcome 
variables (equation 3.9). For a large number of simulations (S), the maximization of the 
simulated log-likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the log-likelihood (Train 2009). The 
simulated log-likelihood function of 𝝎(𝑦𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) is:  
𝐥𝐧 𝑳(𝑦𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖)  = ∑ 𝐥𝐧 ?̂?(𝑦𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖)
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏
= ∑ ln (
1
𝑆
∑{𝒇(𝑦𝑖, |𝑥𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑠) ∗ 𝒈(𝑧𝑖, 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑠)}
𝑆
𝑠=1
)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑠  is the s
th draw (from a total S draws) of a pseudo-random number from the density 
h. 
Since our outcome variable is continuous, we assume that it follows a normal (Gaussian) 
distribution function. The resulting model was estimated using a Maximum Simulated 
Likelihood (MSL) approach using the Stata command mtreatreg proposed by Deb (2009). 
 Data presentation and descriptive results 
3.3.1.  Data presentation 
Data used in this study were collected under the PAPA5 project, which is an initiative of the 
Government of Senegal funded by USAID-Senegal as part of the “Feed the Future” initiative. 
It was implemented over a period of three years (2015–2018) by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and rural facilities with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
Data from two surveys (rainfed and irrigated crop systems) were used to construct these 
rice production data. The first survey was representative of the rainfed cropping system in 
Senegal (42 of 45 departments in the country). A total of 4,533 farm households were 
interviewed, among them 851 rice farming households.  
 
5 Official website of the project is http://www.papa.gouv.sn/. 
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The second survey collected information on irrigated rice in the two agroecological 
zones where irrigation is mainly practiced (Senegal River valley and Anambe basin). Irrigated 
rice production accounts for about 70–75% of the country’s total rice production. Most farmers 
surveyed were involved in rice production, for a total of 630 rice producers over the 730 farm 
households surveyed. The Senegal River valley (SRV) is the largest irrigation zone, with about 
75% of irrigated rice production. Therefore, the sampling takes into consideration the 
differentiation in sampling size from the two targeted zones (75% of the sample size from SRV 
and 25% from the Anambe basin (AB). 
The initial sample size was 1,465 rice-farming households. We removed those households that 
had cultivated fewer than 0.01 hectares (10 observations) and more than 15 hectares (10 
observations), which are almost the first (0.02 ha) and the 99th centiles (12.4 ha) of the 
cultivated area. 
3.3.2.  Technology adoption and rice yield 
Table 3- 1 presents the sample distribution across technology choices along with the observed 
land productivity (average, median, and standard deviation). Results show that 33% 
(467/1,415) of rice producers in the sample did not adopt any of the three technologies under 
consideration. 
Table 3- 1: Technology adoption and rice yield (kg/ha) in Senegal 
  Observation Average yield Median yield Standard deviation 
Group 0 No technology in rainfed 467 1204 800 1696 
Group 1 Fertilizer use in rainfed 158 882 750 683 
Group 2 Fertilizer use in irrigated 130 3165 2679 2296 
Group 3 Fertilizer and certified seed in rainfed 120 1410 1020 1522 
Group 4 Fertilizer and certified seed in irrigated 497 3806 3500 2386 
Group 5 Other technology choices 43 815 800 567 
All Total 1415 2268 1233 2303 
Source: Authors' calculations based on PAPA data (2017). 
On the other hand, 35% of rice farmers practiced irrigation in combination with the other two 
improved inputs. This suggests that technology adoption is more frequent for irrigated rice than 
for rainfed rice production. One important observation is that very few rice farmers adopted 
solely certified seeds. One can conclude that farmers are aware of the complementarity between 
certified seeds and inorganic fertilizers. They can use fertilizer alone but seldom certified seeds 
alone. Regarding production per hectare, results show that irrigation-based production is the 
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most productive and that the use of certified and inorganic fertilizers increases land 
productivity. The average yield of irrigated rice is about three times higher than that of rainfed 
rice in Senegal. 
Table 3- 2: Rice yield (kg/ha) across regions of Senegal 
 Observation Average yield Median yield Standard deviation 
Ziguinchor 307 1507 930 1960 
Saint-Louis 364 4703 4541 2325 
Tambacounda 23 1317 933 1458 
Kaolack 4 188 200 63 
Thies 1 8000 8000   
Fatick 4 875 650 780 
Kolda 354 1337 971 1262 
Matam 95 3199 2800 1812 
Kaffrine 7 720 450 486 
Kedougou 63 980 900 665 
Sedhiou 193 766 667 517 
Total 1415 2267.86 1233 2303 
Source: Authors' calculations based on PAPA data (2017). 
Across regions (Table 3- 2), results show also that irrigation-oriented regions (Saint Louis and 
Matam) are the most productive. 
3.3.3. Definition and summary statistics for variables used 
Table 3- 3 describes all variables used in the econometric analysis along with a Kruskal Wallis 
test that checks whether the distribution of these variables is identical across the treatment 
groups.  
In the sample, the average cultivated area for rice stood at 1.2 ha. Farm households 
produced about 3.8 tons of rice per year, with an average yield of 2.3 tons/ha. They employed 
about seven workers and used about 290 kg of chemical fertilizers and 100 kg of seeds. Among 
rice-producing households, more than 50% produced only rice. Extension workers had visited 
about 30% of households. In approximately 27% of households in the sample, at least one 
member belonged to a farmers’ organization. 
The access to credit is very limited: only 8.7% of households had received credit during the 
production season. Most household heads were male (90%) and literate (45%), with an average 
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age of 53 years of age. About two out of five households in the sample own transport means 
(charrette, in French), while about 21% own an agricultural machine. 
Table 3- 3: Summary Statistics of most Variables used in the analysis 
  
Sample description 
Kruskal Wallis test 
over adoption level 
Variable Description Mean SD Chi-squared p-value 
Sexe Household head is male 0.900 0.300 3.874 0.423 
Hhsize Household size (persons) 9.371 5.018 23.611 0.000 
Age Household head's age 53.054 12.457 9.884 0.042 
HeadLiterate Household head is literate 0.443 0.497 7.599 0.107 
Organization Farmers organization 0.276 0.447 128.139 0.000 
extension_services Extension services 0.310 0.463 158.459 0.000 
Credit credit access 0.087 0.283 19.950 0.001 
Rice_only Rice specialization 0.536 0.499 213.120 0.000 
production_kg Rice production, tons 2.997 7.745 539.704 0.000 
production_kg_ha Rice yield, kg/ha 2.322 2.321 543.433 0.000 
Land Rice cultivated area, ha 1.248 1.593 161.234 0.000 
Labor labor (number of workers) 6.328 4.036 118.987 0.000 
Capital Agricultural capital (XOF 1000) 135.627 961.665 30.189 0.000 
lcap2 Dummy for zero capital value 0.223 0.417 16.660 0.002 
qte_fertilizer Fertilizer use, kg 289.945 628.462 982.299 0.000 
lfert2 Dummy for zero fertilizer use 0.339 0.474 914.841 0.000 
seed_kg Seed use, kg 99.980 147.358 151.237 0.000 
other_cost other cost (XOF 1000) 42.857 108.853 519.480 0.000 
Machine Agricultural equipment (1=yes) 0.215 0.411 22.861 0.000 
moyen_transport Transport equipment (1=yes) 0.380 0.486 100.837 0.000 
SQI Soil quality index 0.251 0.060 35.018 0.000 
temperature_2016 Tempature for  2016 (mean) 35.495 2.314 900.916 0.000 
temperature_deg_sd Tempature for 2016 (sd) 2.282 0.633 141.677 0.000 
rainfall_2016 Rainfall for 2016 (total) 781.970 410.664 889.286 0.000 
rainfall_mm_sd Rainfall for 2016 (sd) 104.749 47.683 899.294 0.000 
zone1 AEZ: Senegal River Valley 0.037 0.190 9.585 0.048 
zone2 AEZ: Ferlo 0.276 0.447 340.610 0.000 
zone3 AEZ: Casamance 0.077 0.267 29.057 0.000 
zone4 AEZ: Other 0.609 0.488 481.904 0.000 
Sample size 1361 1361     
Source: Authors' calculations based on PAPA data (2017). Notes: The Kruskal Wallis test is conducted for each variable in 
the Table based on technology adoption groups. 
Across technology adoption groups, the Kruskal Wallis H tests showed a statistically 
significant difference in all factors considered in Table 3- 3 except for gender and literacy rate 
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when considering a 5% level of significance. Therefore, some of these variables may explain 
their heterogeneous behavior regarding input choices. However, such tests do not account for 
comparability across groups, nor do they control for the effect of other covariates. 
Consequently, further analysis is required to establish causality. 
 Results and discussion 
3.4.1.  Rice production function estimates 
Results from the stochastic frontier models estimated on the sample of rice farms in Senegal 
are presented in Table 3- 4. A Cobb-Douglas specification with a half-normal distribution is 
used in this application. Seven inputs were considered: rice allocated area (ha); labor used for 
rice production measured as the number of workers; the value of agricultural equipment in the 
local currency; quantity in kg of chemical fertilizer; certified seeds used; non-certified seeds 
used; and overhead costs in local currency. Since our dataset shows a lot of zero values for 
some important inputs such as fertilizer quantity, value of agricultural capital, and other costs, 
we used the approach proposed by  Battese (1997) and adopted by several authors in the 
literature (Rao et al. 2012; Villano et al. 2015; Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai 2018). For these 
variables, the undefined logarithm is replaced by zero and a dummy variable is created to 
account for these zero values.  
Agroecological zone differences are accounted for by including a dummy for the 
Casamance zone. Using likelihood ratio tests, heteroscedastic specification in both inefficiency 
and idiosyncratic error are preferred. For the inefficiency variance, we include gender, age 
dummies (younger and older heads), literacy dummy, access to extension services, farmer 
organization, and credit. The production variance is explained by the rice cultivated area and 
the soil quality index. 
The log-likelihood of the pooled SFA is found to be less than that obtained by summing 
the log-likelihood for individual SFA (-1502 vs. -1327). Therefore, the hypothesis of 
homogeneous technology across farmers is rejected as having a high level of significance for 
rice production in Senegal, meaning that across groups, farmers operate under different 
frontiers of production. The meta-frontier approach is therefore appropriate. 
Across equations, land use has the highest elasticity. This finding suggests that farmers 
could be advised to use more land than what they presently use to increase production, 
especially for farmers who used only fertilizers in the irrigated system. The return to labor was 
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found to be insignificant for all groups of rice farmers. This result may be linked to the 
abundance of the labor force in developing countries. Similar results have been reported by 
Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai (2018) in Ghana. 
Table 3- 4: Parameters of group production frontiers, meta-frontier framework 
  Pooled Frontier 1 Frontier 2 Frontier 3 Frontier 4 Frontier 5 Meta-frontier 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Frontier 
Lland 0.719*** 0.768*** 0.503*** 0.977*** 0.707*** 0.899*** 0.823*** 
  (0.034) (0.062) (0.088) (0.121) (0.111) (0.033) (0.011) 
Llabor -0.059* -0.002 0.100 0.034 -0.145 0.016 -0.009 
  (0.030) (0.065) (0.084) (0.078) (0.097) (0.028) (0.009) 
Lcap 0.070*** 0.028 -0.008 0.066* 0.057 0.027* 0.033*** 
  (0.016) (0.035) (0.050) (0.039) (0.053) (0.016) (0.005) 
lcap2 0.776*** 0.205 0.291 1.008** 0.633 0.231 0.310*** 
  (0.177) (0.380) (0.548) (0.429) (0.589) (0.194) (0.052) 
Lfert 0.279***  0.240*** 0.201** 0.376*** 0.129*** 0.217*** 
  (0.027)  (0.079) (0.081) (0.059) (0.018) (0.010) 
lfert2 1.250***      0.412*** 
  (0.140)      (0.056) 
Lseed 0.025 0.113** 0.008 -0.161*** -0.068 -0.003 0.014*** 
  (0.018) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.010) (0.005) 
lother_cost 0.073*** 0.050 0.090* 0.004 0.087* -0.022** -0.006 
  (0.018) (0.045) (0.049) (0.051) (0.046) (0.009) (0.005) 
lother_cost2 0.325* 0.190 0.438 -0.530 0.774 -0.444*** -0.375*** 
  (0.176) (0.405) (0.428) (0.529) (0.482) (0.102) (0.053) 
SQI 0.161 3.833*** 0.307 -2.140** 1.474 0.273 1.401*** 
  (0.347) (0.771) (1.043) (0.936) (1.580) (0.448) (0.109) 
zone4 -0.816*** 0.051 -0.290** -0.455* -0.185 -0.958***   
  (0.057) (0.195) (0.144) (0.247) (0.147) (0.042)   
Extension services*       0.620*** 
        (0.111) 
Rice specialization*       0.999*** 
        (0.072) 
Farm size*       1.577*** 
        (0.136) 
Constant 5.573*** 4.861*** 5.315*** 7.476*** 4.623*** 8.222*** 4.876*** 
  (0.295) (0.605) (0.738) (0.955) (1.022) (0.224) (0.138) 
Inefficiency 
variance 
extension_services -0.240* -31.177 0.741 -0.565 0.363 -0.186   
  (0.128) (1,792.525) (0.660) (0.612) (0.376) (0.149)   
Organization 0.002 0.933* -0.081 -2.339 -0.108 -0.131   
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  (0.122) (0.560) (0.564) (2.107) (0.367) (0.143)   
Credit -0.605*** 0.520 0.672 -25.194 -1.542*** -0.218   
  (0.209) (1.376) (0.925) (1,247.476) (0.523) (0.176)   
HeadLiterate -0.099 -0.286 -0.072 1.139* 0.154 -0.269*   
  (0.108) (0.406) (0.376) (0.673) (0.361) (0.143)   
Sexe 0.043 -0.298 0.792 3.919 -0.136 -0.245   
  (0.176) (0.554) (0.689) (3.708) (0.448) (0.265)   
age45 -0.141 0.523 -0.251 -0.524 -0.388 -0.158   
  (0.118) (0.416) (0.422) (0.536) (0.384) (0.154)   
age65 -0.433*** -0.115 -0.414 -0.759 -0.710 -0.341*   
  (0.154) (0.501) (0.508) (0.914) (0.459) (0.194)   
Rice_only -0.385*** 0.043 1.207** 1.470 -0.497 -0.073   
  (0.114) (0.458) (0.535) (1.137) (0.390) (0.175)   
Constant 0.202 -1.305** -1.770 -5.810 0.670 0.746** -1.446*** 
  (0.206) (0.656) (1.165) (4.364) (0.434) (0.320) (0.049) 
Error 
variance 
Lland -0.313*** -0.277*** -0.011 -0.200 1.960*** 1.410***   
  (0.078) (0.101) (0.404) (0.183) (0.684) (0.398)   
SQI 5.374*** 2.000 -5.050 13.803*** -62.042*** -35.486*** 
  (1.222) (1.450) (4.188) (2.902) (24.019) (8.809)   
Constant -2.822*** -1.420*** -0.499 -4.627*** 10.673** 3.042* -5.303*** 
  (0.345) (0.386) (1.066) (0.807) (5.175) (1.553) (0.200) 
Log Likelihood -1502 -522.3 -138.0 -142.6 -110.1 -414.3 -154.9 
Wald Chi2 3197 397.6 185 215.0 4172 4702 37418 
Degree of freedom 11 9 10 10 10 10 13 
Observations 1,361 462 158 130 114 497 1,361 
Notes: ***, ** and *: 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Variable names with * stand for the corresponding 
region level average. Farm size represents a dummy for small size rice area (less or equal to 1 hectare). Frontier 1: “No 
technology in rainfed”, Frontier 2: “Fertilizer use in rainfed”, Frontier 3: “Fertilizer use in irrigated”, Frontier 4: “Fertilizer 
and certified seed in rainfed”, Frontier 5: “Fertilizer and certified seed in irrigated”. 
Our results confirmed also that the use of chemical fertilizer has a strong positive effect on the 
production frontier. Conversely, the elasticity of certified seeds was significantly positive for 
non-adopters, negative for the irrigated system when only fertilizers were adopted, and non-
significant for other groups. Based on our descriptive statistics, farmers preferred to adopt the 
full package or adopt only inorganic fertilizers. This finding suggests that only using certified 
seeds does not improve farm productivity. Agroecological dummies in the production frontiers 
were significant and negative, implying that rice productivity is heterogeneous across 
agroecological zones in Senegal. 
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3.4.2. Rice technical efficiency estimates 
presents a summary statistic of the group-specific technical efficiency, technology gap ratio, and 
meta-technical efficiency by technology adoption groups. The group-specific technical 
efficiency cannot be compared across groups because it is estimated with respect to different 
frontiers. This indicator reports the relative technical efficiency: the lower the score, the less 
efficient the farmers using their production technology. The technology gap ratio (TGR) 
measures how far the group-specific frontier is to the best available rice production frontier. A 
lower TGR score suggests that farmers operate on a lower frontier of production compared to 
the meta frontier. This can be compared across groups as the closest or farthest technology 
relative to the meta frontier. Finally, the meta-technical efficiency is the global efficiency score 
and is comparable across groups and farmers. 
Results show that the average relative technical efficiency is 74% for non-adopters, 
64% for the group of fertilizer adopters in the rainfed system, 73% for the group of fertilizer 
adopters in the irrigated system, and about 50% for full adopters (certified seeds and fertilizers) 
in rainfed and irrigated systems. This shows that traditional rice farmers have a better command 
of their technology than do modern rice farmers, especially when farmers had adopted both 
certified seeds and chemical fertilizer. Since fertilizer adopters seem to be more efficient than 
farmers that jointly adopted CS and CF, we may infer that the most challenging technology 
would be certified seeds (CS). These results reveal a significant knowledge gap among farmers. 
Modern technology adopters may need more information or training on these technologies to 
increase their efficiency. In terms of ranking technologies (TGR), on average, full adopters in 
irrigated systems seem to operate under a technology very close to the meta frontier (85%), 
followed by traditional rice producers (74%) and full adopters in rainfed systems (72%). As 
expected, improved inputs combined with irrigation for rice allow farmers to operate under the 
best available production frontier for rice. Nevertheless, these full adopters in irrigation may 
need to improve their productivity for some production factors in which traditional rice 
producers seem to perform better. 
Regarding the meta (overall) technical efficiency (MTE), results indicate that traditional rice 
producers in Senegal have the highest score of technical efficiency (55%), followed by full 
adopters in irrigation systems (44%) and full adopters in rainfed rice production (36%). The 
MTE score at the sample level stands at 45%, which suggests that rice production in Senegal 
could double with the same level of inputs if farmers were fully efficient. There is an urgent 
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need to design a good capacity-building program for rice farmers on rice production’s best 
practices. Issues relating to sowing techniques, proper use of plant protection products, the 
correct dosage of chemical fertilizers, and the correct period of their application should in 
particular be addressed. 
Recently, AfricaRice and the country’s agricultural research institute (ISRA) have 
introduced rice advice technology to improve the combination of input use with the technical 
itinerary. 
Table 3- 5 presents a summary statistic of the group-specific technical efficiency, technology 
gap ratio, and meta-technical efficiency by technology adoption groups. The group-specific 
technical efficiency cannot be compared across groups because it is estimated with respect to 
different frontiers. This indicator reports the relative technical efficiency: the lower the score, 
the less efficient the farmers using their production technology. The technology gap ratio 
(TGR) measures how far the group-specific frontier is to the best available rice production 
frontier. A lower TGR score suggests that farmers operate on a lower frontier of production 
compared to the meta frontier. This can be compared across groups as the closest or farthest 
technology relative to the meta frontier. Finally, the meta-technical efficiency is the global 
efficiency score and is comparable across groups and farmers. 
Results show that the average relative technical efficiency is 74% for non-adopters, 
64% for the group of fertilizer adopters in the rainfed system, 73% for the group of fertilizer 
adopters in the irrigated system, and about 50% for full adopters (certified seeds and fertilizers) 
in rainfed and irrigated systems. This shows that traditional rice farmers have a better command 
of their technology than do modern rice farmers, especially when farmers had adopted both 
certified seeds and chemical fertilizer. Since fertilizer adopters seem to be more efficient than 
farmers that jointly adopted CS and CF, we may infer that the most challenging technology 
would be certified seeds (CS). These results reveal a significant knowledge gap among farmers. 
Modern technology adopters may need more information or training on these technologies to 
increase their efficiency. In terms of ranking technologies (TGR), on average, full adopters in 
irrigated systems seem to operate under a technology very close to the meta frontier (85%), 
followed by traditional rice producers (74%) and full adopters in rainfed systems (72%). As 
expected, improved inputs combined with irrigation for rice allow farmers to operate under the 
best available production frontier for rice. Nevertheless, these full adopters in irrigation may 
need to improve their productivity for some production factors in which traditional rice 
producers seem to perform better. 
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Regarding the meta (overall) technical efficiency (MTE), results indicate that traditional rice 
producers in Senegal have the highest score of technical efficiency (55%), followed by full 
adopters in irrigation systems (44%) and full adopters in rainfed rice production (36%). The 
MTE score at the sample level stands at 45%, which suggests that rice production in Senegal 
could double with the same level of inputs if farmers were fully efficient. There is an urgent 
need to design a good capacity-building program for rice farmers on rice production’s best 
practices. Issues relating to sowing techniques, proper use of plant protection products, the 
correct dosage of chemical fertilizers, and the correct period of their application should in 
particular be addressed. 
Recently, AfricaRice6 and the country’s agricultural research institute (ISRA)7 have 
introduced rice advice technology to improve the combination of input use with the technical 
itinerary. 
Table 3- 5: Rice production efficiency scores by farmers’ groups (mean and standard deviation) 
 
Sample size 
Group specific 
Technical Efficiency 
Technology gap 
ratio 
Meta (overall) 
Technical Efficiency 
No adoption 462 0.742 (0.121) 0.742 (0.117) 0.551 (0.125) 
CF adoption in rainfed system 158 0.637 (0.164) 0.489 (0.15) 0.313 (0.129) 
CF adoption in irrigated system 130 0.731 (0.215) 0.458 (0.164) 0.333 (0.16) 
CF and CS adoption in rainfed system 114 0.521 (0.255) 0.719 (0.152) 0.364 (0.188) 
CF and CS adoption in irrigated system 497 0.518 (0.241) 0.848 (0.072) 0.437 (0.204) 
Total 1361 0.629 (0.223) 0.722 (0.18) 0.445 (0.188) 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. CF stands for chemical fertilizer, and CS for certified seeds. 
 
The study reveals that efforts to fill the efficiency gap identified for farmers’ groups are 
not identical across groups. For traditional rice producers, there is room to increase the relative 
 
6 The Africa Rice Center (AfricaRice), http://www.africarice.org,  is a leading pan-African rice research 
organization committed to improving livelihoods in Africa through strong science and effective partnerships. 
AfricaRice is a CGIAR Research Center—part of a global research partnership for a food-secure future.  
7 The Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research (ISRA, in French), https://www.isra.sn, is an applied scientific 
and technical research institute. A public scientific institution, it was created in 1974 to design, organize, and 
carry out all research relating to the rural sector in Senegal. 
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technical efficiency by 25 percentage points and to shift the production frontier by about 25 
percentage points. For full adopters of improved inputs, the challenge is more related to their 
managerial skills. For households that adopted only fertilizers in both systems (rainfed and 
irrigation), results reveal a huge technology gap to fill. To sum up, policymakers need to adjust 
interventions for each group of farmers depending on where the highest gap is identified. 
3.4.3. Technology choice, factors mix and land productivity 
From the meta frontier framework, one could analyze different scenarios of technology choices 
and its implications on land productivity. For example, we could identify the technology choice 
that would generate the highest yield for each group of farmers. In our context, five individual 
rice production frontiers and one reference rice technology (meta frontier) are available. Table 
3- 6 gives the number of observations in each group of farmers and the predicted rice production 
per hectare for various groups of farmers using a selected rice technology. Figures in bold are 
the predicted yield for each group of farmers (rows) using their observed technology choice. 
Other figures give the “counterfactual” potential yield had they made another technology 
choice. For each row (group of farmers), if the number in bold is higher than the other numbers 
in that row, it is concluded that the farmers in this group made the best choice of technologies 
given their mix of factors of production. Otherwise, another choice of production frontier 
would have been more optimal based on their factors mix in terms of yields per hectare. This 
analysis did not consider the potential cost of another input or of switching to another 
technology (learning curve). Where possible, we will briefly discuss the potential increase or 
decrease in cost among the different choices and the existence of a significant cost of mastering 
the destination technology. More detailed analyses could be carried out using our results as a 
starting point. The last column gives the expected yield if farmers were using the reference 
technology. 
Results show that non-adopters would have gained about 487 kg per hectare if they had 
applied certified seeds and fertilizers in an irrigated context. However, it should be noted that 
there are more barriers when switching from a traditional technology to the most advanced 
technology in another production system (rainfed vs. irrigated). This technology is very 
expensive, and the learning and transitioning cost remain a huge challenge. On the other hand, 
the other three technology options (frontiers 2, 3, and 4) generate barely half the yield of their 
initial choice. Thus, it can be concluded that non-adoption of an improved input is the best 
feasible choice for these farmers. 
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For farmers that had initially adopted fertilizer in the rainfed system, they would reach higher 
rice yield by combining fertilizer with certified seeds or/and irrigation. If the cost is affordable, 
three better choices are available to them. The potentially simpler choice would be to jointly 
adopt certified seeds and fertilizer for a yield gain of 433 kg per hectare. However, these 
farmers would reach 2.5 times their current yield by producing irrigated rice using fertilizer 
and certified seeds. Despite the huge yield gain for this group in shifting from their current 
choice to the full package, it should be noted that this group gets only half the yield of current 
irrigated rice farmers making an identical choice. This shows the importance of the mix of 
factors of production in the level of yield reachable. 
Table 3- 6: Predicted rice yield across technologies and group of farmers 
  
Sample  
size 
Frontier 1 Frontier 2 Frontier 3 Frontier 4 Frontier 5 
Meta 
frontier 
Non-adopters 462 1147 (383) 557 (353) 650 (249) 388 (152) 1634 (498) 1539 (419) 
Fertilizer adopters (1) 158 1014 (345) 1287 (701) 1836 (838) 1721 (771) 3253 (1754) 2707 (1448) 
Fertilizer adopter (2) 130 1278 (457) 2968 (1264) 3927 (1591) 3549 (1239) 7773 (2063) 9290 (3166) 
Certified seeds and fertilizer adopters 
(1) 
114 1188 (309) 1676 (707) 2315 (1064) 2476 (998) 3945 (1771) 3462 (1441) 
Certified seeds and fertilizer adopters 
(2) 
497 1192 (328) 2706 (1176) 3853 (1408) 3647 (1250) 7240 (2424) 8719 (3400) 
All rice farmers 1361 1164 (367) 1750 (1334) 2410 (1798) 2210 (1721) 4649 (3160) 5198 (4159) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Figures in bold represent the expected yield based on 
the current choice of technology. (1) stands for rainfed system, and (2) represents irrigation-based 
system. 
For fertilizer adopters in the irrigated production system, results reveal that they could 
expect higher rice production only by adding certified seeds to their current choice. 
Importantly, this choice would result in doubling their potential yield from a current 3.9 metric 
tons per hectare to 7.8 metric tons per hectare. In addition, this potential yield is the highest 
predicted using this technology. This suggests that this group of farmers has on average a better 
factors mix to produce rice using this technology. Since the targeted technology is not too 
different from their current technology, and the additional cost is not critical, it would be good 
for these farmers to opt for this technology choice. 
In the group of farmers that jointly adopted certified seeds and fertilizer, they would 
get 60% higher yield if they were using the same technology in the irrigated instead of the 
rainfed system. Even if the expected gain is substantial, the change from rainfed to irrigated 
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production requires huge costs and skills that may outweigh the gain in the short term. 
However, if the government could facilitate this transition, the expected gain for these farmers 
is certain. 
For irrigated rice producers that had already adopted certified seeds and fertilizer, 
results show that they could not make a better choice among the five options considered here. 
It seems to appear that farmers in this group selected a mix of factors of production that better 
fit the technology they used. This is the only group that could not make a better choice if 
alternative technologies were costless.  
When it comes to the meta frontier (reference technology), as expected, farmers would get 
higher potential yield compared to their current yield. However, with respect to the five 
individual production frontiers analyzed earlier, two trends emerge: (i) the groups of farmers 
that have the highest yield along the reference frontier, and (ii) the groups with the highest rice 
yield with one of the individual frontiers. Indeed, the meta frontier allows farmers in the 
irrigated system to reach higher rice production per hectare, while farmers in the rainfed system 
would reach the maximum rice yield by transitioning to irrigated rice. 
3.4.4.  The treatment effect of technology adoption on efficiency scores 
The previous sections directly compare the overall efficiency (MTE) and predicted yields of 
rice production across groups of farmers. Even though the meta-frontier framework assumes a 
different production frontier for each group of farmers, it is difficult to interpret observed 
differences across groups as caused only by the technology choice. In fact, farmers are not 
randomly assigned to treatment groups. Some of the factors determining technology adoption 
may also influence efficiency and productivity. Therefore, as discussed in the Technology 
Adoption and Rice Yield section, we estimate a multinomial endogenous treatment effects 
model.  
Because we are primarily interested in the effects of the use of improved inputs on rice technical 
efficiency and predicted yields, we do not discuss the determinants of farmers’ choices. The 
estimation results are provided as supplementary materials at the end of the article. It is worth 
noting that in the selection equation, various factors affecting technology adoption were 
considered, including gender, family size, transport means, education, access to extension 
services, access to credit, farm size, soil quality index, farmer organization membership, and 
access to mechanization. We also controlled for heterogeneity among farmers in the outcome 
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equation by accounting for, among others, gender, education, farmer organization, extension 
services, credit, average rainy season temperature for 2016, average rainfall during the wet 
season for 2016, quantity of fertilizer used per hectare, quantity of certified seed used per 
hectare, value of agricultural equipment per hectare, farm size, soil quality, and agroecological 
zones fixed effects.  
 
Table 3- 7: Treatment effects of technology choices 
 
Technical Efficiency 
Group specific 
yield (kg/ha) 
Meta yield 
(kg/ha) 
CF adoption in rainfed system -0.338***(0.006) -439***(142) 1,000***(80) 
CF adoption in irrigated system -0.163***(0.011) -1,716***(213) 502***(159) 
CF and CS adoption in rainfed system -0.155***(0.007) 832***(119) 338**(135) 
CF and CS adoption in irrigated system -0.097***(0.011) 2,307***(185) 639***(135) 
Notes: The baseline is farm households that did not adopt any improved inputs in the rainfed system. The sample size is 1 361 
households and 1 000 simulation draws were used. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 
Table 3- 7 presents the estimates of the impact of rice technology choices on technical 
efficiency, predicted yield from individual frontiers of production, and predicted rice yield 
using the meta frontier (reference technology). 
As already observed in Table 3- 5, results show that farmers that used improved inputs 
(certified seeds, fertilizer, or irrigation) were less efficient than non-adopters of those inputs. 
The treatment effects of use of improved inputs are negative on rice production technical 
efficiency. Even though the efficiency gap decreases from the simple choice of fertilizer to the 
combined choice of irrigation, fertilizer, and certified seeds, the conclusion is that there is a 
knowledge gap among rice farmers. Adopting fertilizers is 34 percentage points and 16 
percentage points less efficient than no technology adoption strategy respectively in rainfed 
and irrigated systems. The joint adoption of certified seeds and fertilizer has a negative impact 
of 16 percentage points in the rainfed system and 10 percentage points in the irrigated system. 
Regarding the expected land productivity of rice production from the use of each 
technology choice, results show that the joint adoption of certified seeds and fertilizer in rainfed 
or irrigated fields have a higher expected yield than the “no adoption” choice. Results also 
reveal that an irrigation system is a superior technology. On the other hand, the adoption of 
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fertilizer did not really affect the land productivity when selection bias was controlled for. 
These results show that in the two rice production systems, it is critical for farmers to adopt the 
two proposed technologies (certified seeds and chemical fertilizer) to expect higher yield 
compared to the reference technology (no technology adoption). The expected productivity 
gain from such adoption is 840 kg/ha in the rainfed system and 2,574 kg/ha for the irrigated 
system. If the mix of factors of production remains unchanged, farmers that have currently 
adopted only fertilizer in rainfed or irrigated systems should give up such a choice. Ceteris 
paribus, farmers performed better than farmers in the reference group. 
On the other hand, if all farmers were using the reference rice technology, the use of improved 
inputs would have a positive effect on rice yield. These results clearly reveal the positive impact 
of improved inputs on rice production per hectare if farmers were using the right technology 
and the right factors mix. Technology and factors mix are crucial to get the maximum benefits 
of a production technology. Using the best technology with the wrong factor mix would lead 
to a lower productivity. Therefore, it is important to identify clearly what is the right factor mix 
of each technology choice. One interesting pattern of the results is that the best technology 
choice depends upon the system of production considered. In the rainfed system, the best 
improved inputs choice is to use only fertilizer. This result certainly means that water control 
(irrigation) is an important factor in the adoption of certified seeds. As far as irrigated rice 
production is concerned, the joint adoption of certified seeds and fertilizers is the most 
interesting choice to be made by the rice growers. This confirms the correlation between water 
control and the use of certified seeds. Another result of this work is that with the production 
technology, the use of fertilizers in rice production in Senegal is sufficient to obtain the best 
possible yield. 
 Conclusion 
In Senegal, as in many developing countries, rice plays a central role in the diet. In addition, 
the major share of rice consumption in Senegal is satisfied by imports. Therefore, one of the 
most important objectives for the country’s successive governments is to implement policies 
that lead to rice self-sufficiency. Among other policies to pursue are the promotion of irrigated 
rice access to good quality inputs, especially through subsidies. Thus, this article contributes 
to the debate on the relationship between farm inputs and farm productivity by using a recent 
farm household survey to analyze the level of technical efficiency in the rice sector. A special 
focus was put on the role of the most important technologies used for rice production, especially 
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irrigation, certified seeds, and inorganic fertilizer. On the methodological side, this study 
applies the most advanced and appropriate techniques to analyze technical efficiency by 
accounting for heterogeneous rice production frontiers (meta-frontier framework) and selection 
bias in a multinomial setting (multinomial endogenous treatment effects model). These 
approaches allowed for the estimation of the unbiased and consistent impact of technology 
choices on rice yield and technical efficiency.  
The estimates revealed both the presence of heterogeneous production frontiers and 
selection bias. The estimated technical efficiency was very low, suggesting that with the right 
policies, the country’s rice production could double with any additional investment in inputs. 
Across groups, the traditional rice system is the most efficient. A huge technological gap was 
also observed, especially for farmers that partially adopt improved inputs (certified seeds and 
inorganic fertilizer). In terms of impact on yield, results show that the most productive choice 
for farmers is to adopt certified seeds and fertilizer in the irrigated system. However, if all 
farmers were using the reference rice technology, it was found that the use of improved inputs 
would have a positive effect on rice yield. Regarding current input choice by farmers, results 
reveal that most farmers made a wrong technology choice, except farmers using an irrigated 
system who had adopted both certified seeds and fertilizers. 
A number of policy implications can be drawn from the findings of this study. First, results 
suggest that public policies aimed at increasing rice production to cover the local rice demand 
should support innovations that increase farmers’ skills in terms of technology management 
and best practices of rice production based on local experience. The positive impact of 
irrigation on rice yield is an additional motive for the government to continue implementing 
irrigation-related policies and to make irrigation more accessible to farmers. On the other hand, 
as shown in many studies, certified seeds and inorganic fertilizers are complementary inputs, 
so policymakers should promote them as a package for a maximum impact and facilitate 
farmers’ access through input credits or the promotion of contract farming. Finally, technology 
choice is a serious challenge for farmers, as most of them did select the wrong improved inputs. 
Therefore, there is a need to assist them in selecting the right improved inputs based on their 
other factors mix.  
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Supplementary materials 
Table A3- 1: Determinants of rice technology choices (multinomial logit model) 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Group 0: “No technology in 
rainfed” (the reference group), Group 1: “Fertilizer use in rainfed”, Group 2: “Fertilizer use in irrigated”, Group 3: “Fertilizer 
and certified seed in rainfed”, Group 4: “Fertilizer and certified seed in irrigated”. 
  
 Technology choices 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
HeadLiterate -0.018 -0.641*** -0.361 -0.496*** 
  (0.199) (0.236) (0.235) (0.186) 
Sexe 0.221 0.211 -0.473 0.915*** 
  (0.357) (0.349) (0.354) (0.313) 
hhsize 0.021 -0.075*** 0.015 -0.056*** 
  (0.021) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) 
extension_services 0.284 1.284*** 1.269*** 1.924*** 
  (0.307) (0.264) (0.282) (0.215) 
organization 0.278 1.419*** 0.938*** 2.215*** 
  (0.312) (0.313) (0.304) (0.259) 
credit 0.906 2.241*** 2.445*** 2.977*** 
  (0.647) (0.591) (0.573) (0.542) 
moyen_transport 0.700*** 2.026*** 0.943*** 1.849*** 
  (0.211) (0.242) (0.253) (0.197) 
Rice_only -0.418* 2.705*** 0.494* 2.540*** 
  (0.249) (0.318) (0.300) (0.222) 
machine -0.157 0.735** 1.131*** 0.427 
  (0.247) (0.309) (0.280) (0.260) 
land 1.045*** 0.830*** 1.098*** 1.166*** 
  (0.163) (0.187) (0.170) (0.166) 
SQI -3.497** -3.581* -1.370 -7.894*** 
  (1.738) (1.920) (1.952) (1.532) 
Constant -1.702*** -3.343*** -2.995*** -2.609*** 
  (0.580) (0.691) (0.580) (0.521) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 
Log-Likelihood -1382 -1382 -1382 -1382 
Wald chi2 (44) 572.8 572.8 572.8 572.8 
Observations 1,361 1,361 1,361 1,361 
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Table A3- 2: Determinants of technical efficiency and rice yield (results of outcome equations) 
  
Technical 
efficiency 
group-specific 
yield 
Meta-frontier 
specific yield 
Treatment level 
Fertilizer use in rainfed -0.350*** -352.930*** -374.900*** 
  (0.003) (130.888) (126.321) 
Fertilizer use in irrigated -0.233*** -1,223.273*** 565.874*** 
  (0.003) (204.627) (190.203) 
Fertilizer and certified seed in rainfed -0.214*** 840.206*** 488.732*** 
  (0.002) (170.264) (158.449) 
Fertilizer and certified seed in irrigated -0.121*** 2,573.704*** 519.205*** 
  (0.002) (177.284) (159.016) 
Exogenous 
factors 
Sexe -0.007*** 207.307*** 352.979*** 
  (0.001) (72.160) (127.917) 
HeadLiterate 0.033*** 30.210 79.707 
  (0.002) (42.623) (66.690) 
Organization -0.021*** -131.031** -173.610** 
  (0.001) (57.690) (76.900) 
extension_services 0.068*** 48.262 -15.846 
  (0.001) (63.435) (77.583) 
Credit 0.027*** -273.338*** -490.802*** 
  (0.002) (88.369) (151.511) 
Temperature, std dev  -521.381*** 647.623*** 
   (106.018) (198.817) 
Temperature, mean  231.843*** 55.778 
   (38.545) (60.966) 
Rainfall 2016, total  -1,723.250*** -5,991.150*** 
   (325.184) (560.888) 
Rainfall 2016, std dev  644.753* 3,633.476*** 
   (380.071) (620.137) 
qte_fertilizer_ha  2.524*** 5.048*** 
   (0.246) (0.301) 
qte_seed_cert_ha  -1.339** -0.247 
   (0.612) (0.775) 
capital_ha  0.000** 0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Land -0.003*** -10.152 105.229*** 
  (0.000) (19.425) (21.854) 
SQI  2,742.356*** 10,701.581*** 
   (573.991) (655.888) 
zone2 -0.077*** 512.802*** 952.050*** 
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  (0.002) (115.531) (135.919) 
zone4 -0.001 -774.030*** -615.309*** 
  (0.002) (107.317) (139.118) 
Unobserved 
factors 
Lnsigma -5.455*** 6.416*** 5.694*** 
  (0.144) (0.079) (0.988) 
Fertilizer use in rainfed 0.156*** 183.997 861.977*** 
  (0.001) (154.389) (99.055) 
Fertilizer use in irrigated 0.047*** -175.503*** 70.337 
  (0.001) (54.737) (142.419) 
Fertilizer and certified seed in rainfed 0.016*** -56.329 -317.121*** 
  (0.001) (114.528) (103.642) 
Fertilizer and certified seed in irrigated 0.023*** -355.514*** -152.701*** 
  (0.001) (118.193) (55.222) 
  Constant 0.578*** 3,111.978* 19,701.250*** 
    (0.002) (1,787.482) (2,834.558) 
Log-Likelihood -808.8 -12308 -12613 
Wald chi2 25265 30460 29625 
N simulations 1000 1000 1000 
Observations 1,361 1,361 1,361 
Note : Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Introduction 
Access to input markets is considered to have positive effects on agricultural productivity and 
therefore on poverty reduction and food security. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa few farmers 
invest on inputs even though the returns of such an investment was high (De Groote et al. 2005; 
Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2008; Marenya and Barrett 2009; Karlan et al. 2014). This low 
level of investment is partly related to the random nature of agricultural production.  Rainfed 
agricultural production is a risky endeavor, risks relate to climate, presence of pests (invasions 
of plant bugs), presence of herds of cattle that can destroy crops, etc. Agricultural production 
and returns on investments are highly dependent on rainfall occurrence (Karlan et al. 2014; 
Rosenzweig and Udry 2013) and on the other risks previously mentioned. In Senegal, 
D’Alessandro et al. (2015) observed that a major limiting factor to the widespread adoption of 
improved seeds and fertilizer among smallholder farmers is the reluctance to assume risks 
associated with increased productivity. This is intuitive because agricultural production 
processes take place over time. Farmers must make some decisions regarding inputs before the 
beginning of the production season and therefore before the occurrence of the shocks affecting 
the productivity of these inputs. Furthermore, once a shock has occurred there is no way to 
retrieve the invested resources. This implies that when a farmer decides to invest in inputs, 
he/she does so without any certainty about the outcome of such a decision. Therefore, 
investments in agricultural inputs such as seeds (improved seeds or not) and fertilizers are 
considered risky investments. 
Solutions exist in theory to manage this risk. The literature identifies several strategies for 
managing production risks. Some of these include diversification (Di Falco, Bezabih and Yesuf 
2010; Bezabih and Di Falco 2012; Bezabih and Sarr 2012; Obiri and Driver 2017; Birthal and 
Hazrana 2019; Ullah and Shivakoti 2014), formal insurance products such as index-based 
products (Velandia et al. 2009; Enjolras, Capitanio and Adinolfi 2012; D’Alessandro et al. 
2015; Obiri and Driver 2017; Wang, Ye and Shi 2016), agronomic practices such as 
conservation farming practices, mulching, sustainable land management (Liniger et al. 2011; 
Obiri and Driver 2017; Choudhary et al. 2016) and adoption of risk-reducing inputs or 
technologies8 such as improved and high yield seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation 
 
8 It must be worth noting that although these inputs or technologies are expected to have risk reducing effects, 
they can also potentially increase risk. For example, (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993) find that both fertilizer and 
pesticides may be risk-increasing inputs. 
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(Barnett, Barrett and Skees 2008; Kahan 2008; Obiri and Driver 2017). Thus, the adoption of 
such innovations can mitigate the consequences of risks by enabling farmers to optimize their 
production choices and thus achieve higher profits (Rosenzweig and Udry 2013). In a nutshell, 
the adoption or use of these risky inputs allows farmers to make riskier but more profitable 
decisions.  
However, not all producers have easy access to these solutions. The literature has shown that 
investment constraints are due to farmers' inability to use existing theoretical solutions due to 
incomplete financial and insurance markets resulting in low access to capital, insurance, 
information, etc. Therefore, farmers who do not have access to a well-functioning insurance 
market will tend to act conservatively by investing less on their farms and making crop 
decisions (crop choice, production techniques, etc.) that reduce the volatility of farm profits 
(Rosenzweig and Udry 2013). Thus, farmers' investments in developing countries are 
conditioned by their financial environment and incomplete insurance markets that limit risky 
decisions that can lead to high expected profits. Risk-averse producers will prefer production 
choices that reduce risk even if it means giving up riskier choices that lead to higher expected 
profits. Karlan et al. (2014) show that when farmers are insured, they are able to find the funds 
to facilitate their investments. 
To increase participation in input markets, policies in Sub-Saharan Africa have focused on 
reducing risk (insurance, climate information systems) or increasing access to capital (access 
to credit). In Senegal, where rural households depend mainly on agriculture, policies and 
programs have encouraged farmers to invest in risky inputs by subsidizing the purchasing price 
of inputs (fertilizers and seeds), managing the risk associated with rainfall through the 
introduction of subsidized insurance products and promoting climatic information systems and 
improving access to credit or agricultural implements (Sall 2015; CIAT and BFS/USAID 2016; 
Ribeiro and Koloma 2016). 
These efforts show the importance of such investments. However, in Senegal, empirical results 
on the constraints to private investment in risky inputs is scanty despite the high return on 
investment demonstrated in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Duflo et al. 2008; Karlan et 
al. 2014; Wiredu, Zeller and Diagne 2015; Manda et al. 2016; Liverpool-Tasie 2017; Mensah 
and Brummer 2015; Suri 2011). Therefore, there is a real need to produce evidence for the 
country. To help reduce this gap and better inform these constraints, this study aims to 
understand the factors that influence the decision to invest in seeds and inorganic fertilizers, 
the level of investment, and the welfare impacts of such investment. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly summarizes the literature 
on risks faced by smallholder farmers. Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework of 
household decision making under uncertainty and our empirical specifications. In section 4, we 
present the source of data and briefly describe the sample. Section 5 presents and discusses the 
results and finally, section 6 concludes the study and highlights some policy recommendations 
on risky inputs adoption policies. 
 Review of the literature 
Agricultural commodities production are subjects to many risks that cause distortions in 
production, incomes and hence farm households’ welfare. These risks, which includes climatic 
risks, biological risks, and market risks are numerous, complex, interconnected, and vary in 
their levels of frequency and severity. Risk in general play a crucial role in a great variety of 
economic decisions and is widely acknowledged as one of the factors that shape agricultural 
behavior such as farmers’ technology adoption decisions (Byerlee 1993; Knight, Weir and 
Woldehanna 2003; Gillespie, Davis and Rahelizatovo 2004; Baerenklau and Knapp 2005). For 
instance, several studies (Rosenzweig and Udry 2013; Alem et al. 2010; Zerfu and Larson 
2010; Gebregziabher and Holden 2011; Berhane et al. 2015; Fufa and Hassan 2006; Cavatassi, 
Lipper and Narloch 2011; Yu et al. 2011; Dercon and Christiaensen 2011) have observed that 
in anticipation of covariate shocks, such as droughts, poor farm households are especially prone 
to selecting less risky technology portfolios so as to evade lasting damage and these often also 
generate lower returns on average. 
The presence of risk, therefore, stifles agricultural investments and imposes ex-ante barriers to 
the use of technologies, which in a nutshell, affect agricultural productivity and economic 
growth (Barnett et al. 2008; Di Falco and Chavas 2009; Dercon and Christiaensen 2011; 
Demeke et al. 2016). At the same time, a substantial strand of the empirical literature suggests 
that uninsured risk and uncertainty may be the main driver of the low levels of adoption of new 
and improved technologies. For example, in India, Lamb (2003) shows that in the absence of 
incomplete insurance, risk avoidance as a strategy employed by farmers may be key in 
understanding limited fertilizer use. Hence the protection from downside risk has been 
observed to be a key determinant of technology uptake among subsistence agricultural 
households (Liu and Huang 2013; Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012; Elabed and Carter 2014; 
Karlan et al. 2014; Cai et al. 2015; Farrin and Miranda 2015). 
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However, limited access to credit or formal insurance markets makes it challenging for farm 
households to manage the myriad production risks that they face. Therefore, farm households 
mostly rely on a range of alternative strategies to avoid or minimize losses. Most of these are 
centered on the adoption of agronomic practices such as conservation farming practices, 
mulching, sustainable land management (Liniger et al. 2011; Di Falco and Veronesi 2013; 
Obiri and Driver 2017; Choudhary et al. 2016), and diversification which could be crop or 
income-based (Mishra and Goodwin 1997; Harwood et al. 1999; Adger et al. 2003; Ullah and 
Shivakoti 2014; Obiri and Driver 2017; Birthal and Hazrana 2019). Another strand of literature 
also suggests the adoption of the so-called “risk-reducing inputs or technologies” such as 
improved and high yield seeds, inorganic fertilizer and pesticides (Holzmann and Jørgensen 
2001; World Bank 2005; Barnett et al. 2008; Kahan 2008; Chetaille et al. 2011; Obiri and 
Driver 2017). However, these “risk-reducing inputs or technologies” have also been observed 
to be potentially risk increasing (Just and Pope 1979; Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993; 
Gardebroek, Chavez and Lansink 2010; Moser and Mußhoff 2017). 
In parallel, several other studies have evaluated the impact of these “risk-reducing inputs or 
technologies”. In fact, the general conclusion of these studies is that interventions built on the 
adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies such as quality fertilizers, better seeds, 
improved livestock, etc. improve household welfare outcomes. For instance, Graf et al. (2015) 
show that potential gains from adopting productivity-enhancing technologies increase the 
incomes of smallholder farmers between 80-140%. In Burkina Faso, Koussoubé and Nauges 
(2017) find that the profitability of fertilizer use, which they measured through the marginal 
value cost ratio (MVCR), was 1.4 on plots on which fertilizers were applied. In using the 
endogenous switching regression approach, Abdoulaye et al. (2018) found that the adoption of 
improved maize varieties in Nigeria increased maize grain yield by 574 kg/ha and per-capita 
total expenditure by US$ 77 (US$ 0.21/day). Furthermore, they found that poverty incidence 
among adopters would have been higher by 6% without adoption. Similarly, by using the 
endogenous switching regression approach, Asfaw (2010) finds that the adoption of improved 
varieties of chickpea and pigeonpea in Ethiopia and Tanzania has a significant positive impact 
on crop income.  
Biru et al. (2019) in a panel data analysis via a multinomial endogenous switching regression 
model found that the adoption of improved technologies significantly increases the 
consumption expenditure of Ethiopian farm households. Furthermore, they observed that the 
likelihood of a household remaining poor or vulnerable decreased with the adoption of different 
 
73 
 
complementary technologies. In Ethiopia, Mekonnen (2017) finds a positive and significant 
effect of improved technology adoption on rural households’ crop productivity and welfare. 
Cunguara and Darnhofer (2011) find that rural Mozambican households using improved maize 
seeds and tractors have significantly higher incomes. 
Kassie et al. (2014) found that on average, the adoption of improved maize varieties in 
Tanzania reduced the probabilities of chronic and transitory food insecurity from between 0.7 
and 1.2 % and between 1.1 and 1.7 %, respectively. Comparably, Zeng et al. (2017) in 
evaluating the impact of improved maize varieties adoption on child nutrition outcomes using 
a household survey from rural Ethiopia, found positive and significant impacts of adoption on 
child height-for-age and weight-for-age. They further observed that such impacts were largest 
among children with the poorest nutrition outcomes. Kassie et al. (2011) also found that the 
adoption of improved groundnut varieties significantly increases crop income of Ugandan farm 
households and reduces poverty. Similarly, Khonje et al. (2015) found that the adoption of 
improved maize in Zambia had significant poverty-reducing impacts. They find that adoption 
leads to significant gains in crop incomes, consumption expenditure, and food security. 
Wopereis-Pura et al. (2002) in evaluating the effect of nitrogen application on rice yield, grain 
quality, and profitability in the Senegal River valley, finds that the benefit to cost ratios of 
nitrogen application for farmers ranged from 2.8 in the wet season to 5.4 in the dry season. 
Conceptual framework and estimation strategies 
4.3.1. Theoretical framework 
In microeconomic theory, uncertainty occurs when the outcome of a decision is not known 
with certainty. While the decision-maker may know the probabilities of the different possible 
outcomes, the outcome of the decision is only known when it occurs (Jehle and Reny 2011). 
This phenomenon is observed in agricultural production where farmers make production 
decisions before rainfall and other risks are realized. Thus, farmers have no certainty about 
what their product will be when they decide what crops to produce, what investments to make, 
etc. Here, our focus is on investment decisions on risky inputs, particularly seeds and fertilizers 
for cereals production. The risky nature of these expenditures is exacerbated by their high 
opportunity cost in a context where liquidity constraints are severe. 
We model farmers’ decision to purchase risky inputs (seed and inorganic fertilizer) in Senegal 
following the theoretical framework suggested by Karlan et al. (2014) and extended by 
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Magruder (2018). The model accounts for credit constraints, production risks, and imperfect 
information. A two-period model is considered where farmers purchase inputs (x) at time 0 
before random rainfall risk is realized at period 1. Uncertainty related in period 1 implies the 
existence of several potential states of the world, s ∈ S. This state of the world occurs with 
probability πs and affects the production that a farmer can obtain from any input choice. 
Another barrier to technology adoption is related to incomplete information, especially about 
purchased inputs mainly in developing countries (Bold et al. 2017; Magruder 2018). In addition 
to rainfall variability faced by farmers, the quality of inputs is crucial for its potential 
productivity under different various states of the world. For example, a test of fertilizer and 
seed products in local markets in Uganda by Bold et al. (2017) showed that about 30% of 
nutrients were missing in fertilizer, and hybrid maize seeds contained less than 50% of 
authentic seeds. However, various instruments may be used by farmers to reduce this risk. 
Farmer organization and extension services allow farmers to get more information about inputs 
and the most reliable input providers. Thus, information emerges in the model as an additional 
dimension of the state space, t ∈ T. Suppose the farmer’s beliefs about the probability of any 
technological realization t are given by πt. 
A household obtains the utility us
0 at period zero and ut,s
1  at period 1. Preferences are 
represented by a Von Neuman and Morgenstern utility function. The household consumes c0 
in the initial period (t=0) and ct,s
1  in the second period (t=1) and maximizes its expected utility: 
u(c0) + β ∑ πtπsu(ct,s
1 )t,sϵTxS      (4.1) 
Subject to budget constraints: 
𝑐0 = 𝑦 − 𝑥 − 𝑎   (4.2) 
𝑐𝑡,𝑠
1 = 𝑓𝑡,𝑠(𝑥, 𝑧) + 𝑅𝑎      (4.3) 
𝑥 ≥ 0    (4.4) 
𝑎 ≥ ?̅?     (4.5) 
where y is its wealth at period 0 that the household uses to buy its inputs 𝑥 and saves a, which 
is a risk‐free asset that has a return R in the next period. 𝛽 is the discount factor. fs,t (x) is a 
state-specific production function.  
Constraint (4.5) represents a constraint on borrowing. Thus, this model incorporates all three 
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constraints: Credit is constrained by ?̅? , the risk is generated through the realization of s, and 
incomplete information enters through the realization of t.  
In time 1, we assume there are two states of the world that may be good (g) or bad (b) rainfall; 
thus, the state of nature that is known at period 1 is 𝑠 𝜖 𝑆 = {𝑔, 𝑏}. In the case of complete 
information, the expected yield is higher when the state of the world is ‘good’: 𝑓𝑏(𝑥) < 𝑓𝑔(𝑥). 
Considering the full information context and assuming the Inada conditions on fs(x), farmers 
solving this problem realize the following first-order conditions: 
u′(c0) = β ∑ πs f
′
s(x) u′(c s
1 )sϵS                 (4.6) 
and 
u′(c0) = βR E(u′(c s
1 )) + λa      (4.7) 
The derivative of the first-order conditions on x with respect to a̅ shows that if credit constraints 
bind (a = a̅), then optimal input use is increasing in the amount of available credit (
dx∗
da̅
< 0). 
Second, it is straightforward to observe that risk (or imperfect insurance) reduces input use: If 
there were perfect insurance, then c s
1 = c1I  ∀ s. If we denote λ a
I , the multiplier associated with 
full insurance, then the two first-order conditions point out that  
βR + λ a
I / E(u′(c1I)) =  βE(f ′
s
(x))  (4.8) 
In contrast, in the absence of perfect insurance, we know that for some λa, 
βR +
λ a
I
E(u′(c s
1 ))
= βE(f ′(x)) +  
cov(f′(x),   u′(c s
1 ))
E(u′(c s
1 ))
. (4.9) 
When farmers are not credit constrained, cov(f ′(x),   u′(c s
1 )), and λa = 0 suggests that the 
implication of fundamental risk is to reduce investment in inputs, x. A second implication is 
that risk reduces the demand for credit: In an unconstrained case (where λa = 0), we know that 
input use is lower in period 1 and hence that marginal utility of consumption in period 1 is 
lower at any given borrowing choice a. Therefore, first-order condition (4.7) implies that 
farmers must reduce their consumption in period 1 as well, which is accomplished by 
borrowing less. This model lays out a clear priority for research. Credit constraints and risk can 
both reduce the adoption of new technologies, and the presence of risk further reduces the 
demand for credit. However, a good risk management behavior of farmers may qualify these 
theoretical expectations. A lot of studies currently focus on farmers’ risk perceptions and 
managements (Smit, McNabb and Smithers 1996; Smit and Pilifosova 2003; Finger, Hediger 
and Schmid 2011; Bryan et al. 2009; Huang et al. 2015). Therefore, accounting for various risk 
management strategies of farmers is central to understanding technology adoption. 
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In the case of limited information, Magruder (2018) observed that the absence of full 
information on inputs emerges as an additional uninsured risk. Therefore, incomplete 
information will have a similar influence on technology adoption and on demand for credit just 
as climatic risks. As previously noted, information related uncertainty may be reduced at farm 
household level through different channels such as farmer organization, extension services, and 
education. We may expect also that inputs purchased from cooperatives or government 
recommended shops may be of better quality. 
For the empirical part of this study, two main issues are being investigated: (i) the drivers of 
risky investment, and (ii) the impact of risky investment decisions on farm household 
outcomes. We considered two outcomes: agricultural profit per hectare and food production 
(in calories) per adult-equivalent per day. The first outcome measures the economic return of 
investment in crop production, whereas the second outcome tends to measure a household’s 
self-sufficiency in food production. The latter is very important for households and for 
policymakers since most farm households in Senegal are involved in staples production and 
that they only sell a marginal part of produced food crops. As argued by Kassie et al. (2015), 
food productivity is a good proxy for food security since for most farmers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa ‘the availability of food – and access to food – is crucially determined by the production 
of basic staples at the household level due to pervasive market weaknesses, poverty, and 
subsistence orientation’. 
4.3.1. The Heckman selection model 
From the theoretical model, it is clear that the level of investment in risky inputs depends on a 
set of factors such as production risks, credit constraints, information on inputs, and other 
factors including risk management strategies, and farm households’ characteristics. On the 
other hand, all farm households in the sample do not buy risky inputs. Based on market 
participation literature, the decision to purchase inputs is genuinely linked among others to 
various transaction costs (Goetz 1992; Staal, Delgado and Nicholson 1997; Key et al. 2000; 
Alene et al. 2008; Barrett 2008; Asfaw, Lipper, et al. 2012). Therefore, a Heckman model is 
commonly used to explain in the first step the binary decision to buy risky inputs, in our case, 
then accounting for selection bias, a regression model is used to identify drivers of the level of 
investment made.  
Since individuals self-select in a group (those who invest and those who do not), there is a 
latent variable Di
∗ that dictates the decision to invest. Assume U1 and U0, the expected utilities 
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related to the decision to invest or not. We define Di
∗ = U1-U0, the difference between the 
expected utilities. Di
∗ cannot be directly observed, since it is a latent variable, we express it as 
a function of observable elements in the following latent variable model. 
Di
∗ = 𝐐1,i
′ γ + ui, ui~ N(0,1)       (4.10) 
Individual i decides to invest in inputs if the utility derived from the investment is higher than 
the utility obtained when he/she does not invest. Thus, the decision to invest in risky inputs Di  
is defined according to Di
∗:  
Di = {
1        if           Di
∗ > 0  
0      if          Di
∗ ≤ 0  
         (4.11) 
Once the decision to purchase risky inputs is made, the corresponding investment level (X) is 
modeled as follow: 
Xi =  𝐙1i
′  β + εi         (4.12) 
Where Qi is a non-stochastic vector of observed farm and non-farm characteristics determining 
adoption, Zi represents a vector of exogenous variables thought to influence the level of the 
risky investment. Equations (4.11) and (4.12) are simultaneously estimated using the 
Maximum Likelihood method with the assumption that the two error terms follow a bivariate 
normal distribution with ρ as the covariance between the two distributions: 
( ui, εi)~N [(
0
0
) , (
1 ρ
ρ σ
)]                                         (4.13) 
The existence of a selection bias between the two decisions depends on the covariance ρ. If ρ 
is significantly different from zero, we conclude that there is a selection bias, otherwise, either 
the selection equation is misspecified or there is no selection bias. For the Heckman model to 
be identified, it is important to have at least one variable in the selection equation (4.11) that is 
not included in the intensity equation (4.12). As instruments, we considered three factors. The 
first one is the farmer’s self-report need for extension services on agricultural best practices. 
The second instrument considered is the farmer’s self-report need for insurance. The last one 
is the distance to the nearest market. All these factors have a direct effect on the decision to 
buy risky inputs but do not directly affect the level of investment. 
One common issue related to this kind of estimation is the problem of endogeneity of some 
explanatory factors such as farmer organization, access to extension services, access to credit, 
and the participation in the off-farm activity. For all these factors, it is possible to think of a 
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scenario of reverse causality between these factors and the decision to invest in agricultural 
inputs. To account for this endogeneity, we used the control function approach as exposed in 
Wooldridge (2015). For binary endogenous variables, the correction is made by adding the 
generalized residuals as an additional factor in the selection equation. This additional factor is 
computed from a standard probit model where each potential endogenous variable is the 
dependent variable9. In the absence of obvious instruments for each of these endogenous 
variables, we considered as instruments the department level average of the following factors: 
(i) farmer organization membership, access to extension services,  access to credit, off-farm 
activity dummy, the expressed extension services need, and that of agricultural insurance. The 
average is computed as the total number of farmers with a value 1 for the selected dummy 
minus one divided by the number of farmers in the department. This gives the share of other 
farmers with a value of 1 for a selected factor. 
4.3.2. The endogenous switching regression model 
Endogenous Switching Regression (ESR) model is commonly used to assess the impact of 
treatment when especially experimental data are not available (Di Falco, Veronesi and Yesuf 
2011; Asfaw, Shiferaw, et al. 2012; Abdulai and Huffman 2014; Khonje et al. 2015; Abdulai 
2016).  Consider the following model, which describes the welfare outcome of households with 
two regression equations, and a criterion function Ii that determines which regime the 
household faces: 
Ii
∗=𝐐2,i
′ γ + ϵi         (4.14) 
Regime 1:   Y1i = 𝐙2i
′ β1 + u1i   if   Ii=1    (4.15a)              
Regime 2:   Y2i = 𝐙2i
′ β2 + u2i  if  Ii =0    (4.15b) 
where Ii
∗ i is the unobservable or latent variable for risky input adoption, Ii is its observable 
counterpart, Qi is a non-stochastic vector of observed farm and non-farm characteristics 
determining adoption, Yi is welfare outcome of interest (agricultural profit per hectare or per 
adult food production in calories), Regime 1 stands for adopters (buying risky inputs) and 
Regime 2 for non-adopters, Zi represents a vector of exogenous variables thought to influence 
the considered welfare outcome, and u1i, u2i and ϵi  are the error terms of the three equations 
 
9 The curious reader is referred to Wooldridge (2015, Pp. 427 - 428). 
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(14, 15a, 15b) and follow a trivariate normal distribution of zero mean and variance-covariance 
matrix specified as follows: 
cov(ϵi, u1i, u2i) = (
1 . .
σ1ε σ1
2 .
σ2ε . σ2
2 
)      (4.16) 
The variance of ϵi is equal to 1, σ1
2 and σ2
2 represent the variance of the error terms u1i  and u2i, 
σ1ε is the covariance of ϵi and u1i and σ2ε is the covariance of ϵi  and u2i. The covariance of 
the error terms u1iand u2i (σ12 or σ22) is not defined because of the two regimes Y1i and Y2i 
are not observed simultaneously. The selection equation is used to calculate the inverse Mills 
ratios λ1i and λ2i which are incorporated in equations (4.15a) and (4.15b) to correct for 
selection bias: 
λ1i =
ϕ(𝐐2,i
′ γ)
Φ(𝐐2,i
′ γ)
  and  λ2i =
ϕ(𝐐2,i
′ γ)
1−Φ(𝐐2,i
′ γ)
   (4.17) 
From the theoretical framework, factors included in Qi and Zi are production risks face by 
farmers, production structure (land allocation across crops), credit access, information on 
inputs (prices and origins), output prices, risk management strategies, and household 
characteristics (e.g., age, gender, family size, education, and other household composition 
indicators). 
According to Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), given the joint normality of the error terms in equation 
14 and equation 15a and 15b, to obtain robust standard errors, the model can be estimated using 
the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) which allows the parameters of the three 
equations to be estimated simultaneously. For identification purposes, one need to include at 
least one instrument (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004; Di Falco et al. 2011; Asfaw, Shiferaw, et al. 
2012; Abdulai and Huffman 2014) which is expected to influence the adoption of risky inputs 
(equation 14) but not the welfare outcome of interest (equation 4.15a and 4.15b). The same 
identification strategy is used as explained in the previous section.   
Conditional expectations, treatment, and heterogeneity effects 
The previously estimated model allows us to calculate the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) and the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU). The estimations of the 
ATT and ATU is presented in Table 4- 1. The impact on adopters is measured by the ATT, 
which corresponds to the difference between the average predicted agricultural profit of 
investors in the situation where they invested (observed in the sample) and in the situation 
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where they did not invest (unobserved, counterfactual). The ATU allows us to have the 
difference between the average predicted agricultural profit of non-investors in the situation 
where they invested (not observed in the sample, counterfactual) and in the situation where 
they did not invest (observed in the sample) (Di Falco et al. 2011; Khonje et al. 2015). 
Following Carter and Milon (2005) and Di Falco et al. (2011), one could also investigate “the 
effect of base heterogeneity” for the group of farm households within the same treatment 
decision. The first base heterogeneity (BH1) is the difference of predicted outcome of treated 
farmers in the treatment group and that in the untreated group in the situation where they 
invested (counterfactual). The second base heterogeneity (BH2) is the difference in the 
predicted outcome of treated farmers in the treatment group in the situation where they did not 
invest (counterfactual) and the untreated group. Finally, the difference between the ATT and 
the ATU measures the “transitional heterogeneity” (TH) which compares the effect of already 
adopters to not yet adopters of risky inputs. 
Table 4- 1: Treatment effects 
Sub-samples 
Decision 
Effects 
To buy risky inputs To not buy risky inputs 
Investors E(y1i|I = 1; x) = x1iβ1 + σε1λ1i    (a) E(y2i|I = 1; x) = x1iβ2 −  σε2λ1i   (c) ATT=(a)-(c) 
Non-investors E(y1i|I = 0; x) = x2iβ1 + σε1λ2i   (d) E(y2i|I = 0; x) = x2iβ2 −  σε2λ2i   (b) ATU=(d)-(b) 
Heterogenous effects BH1 = (a) – (d) BH2 = (c) – (b) TH = ATT - ATU 
Source: Adapted from Di Falco et al. (2011) 
The equations (a) and (b) in Table 4- 1 represent the situations observed in the sample: (a) 
would be the predicted outcome of investors who decide to buy risky inputs and (b) would be 
the predicted agricultural outcome if non-investors; ii) the counterfactual situations are 
expressed in equations (c) and (d) and allow to obtain respectively the predicted agricultural 
outcome if investors and non-investors had invested or not invested. 
 Data and descriptive summary 
Data used in this study were collected under the PAPA10 project, which is an initiative of the 
Government of Senegal funded by USAID-Senegal as part of the "Feed The Future" initiative 
implemented for a 3 years period (2015 - 2018) by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Equipment with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) technical support. 
 
10 Official website of the project is http://www.papa.gouv.sn/. 
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A two-stage sampling method was used with the primary units being the census districts (CDs) 
as defined by the 2013 General Census of Population, Housing, Agriculture and Livestock 
(RGPHAE11) and the secondary units being agricultural households. The sample for rain-fed 
led agriculture is 4,533 farm households distributed across all the 42 agricultural departments 
of the country (except the urban departments of Dakar, Pikine, and Guediawaye).  
 Data collection took place between April and May 2017. After data cleaning, the final sample 
size for this analysis is 4,465 farm households. To control for influential observations, we 
remove from the analysis outcome values lower than its first centile (1%) or greater than the 
highest centile (99%). 
The survey gathered information on household characteristics, input quantities, and prices, 
output quantities, and prices, experience of production (climatic) shocks, risk management 
strategies, as well as social and institutional characteristics.  
Treatment variable. The treatment variable is based on the reported expenditure at the 
household level on at least one of the two main inputs in crop production: seeds and inorganic 
fertilizers. We created a binary variable equal to 1 if the total expenditure on these inputs is 
different from zero. The focus here is not on the quality of the input used, but on the presence 
of an investment. The objective being to identify factors that may increase input market 
participation in general and an increase in farm household’s investment in agricultural 
investment. In our sample, the share of households that had purchased seeds (49.79 %) was 
higher than for inorganic fertilizers (35.30 %), while the number of households investing in 
both technologies at the same time was very low (4.97 %).  
Outcome variables. To assess the benefits of investing in risky inputs (seeds and fertilizers), 
this study considered two outcomes: farm profit per hectare and food availability (in calories) 
per adult equivalent per day. The cropping profit per hectare, which measures the economic 
return of investment in crop production, which is computed as the value of crops produced per 
hectare net of the total production costs per hectare. The production is valued using the average 
crop-specific price received by farmers on the local market. On the other hand, the total cost 
includes expenditure on seeds, fertilizers, the wage paid, equipment rental cost, land rental cost, 
and other inputs cost reported. The second outcome measures the household level of self-
sufficiency in food production. This indicator is very important for households and for 
 
11 Recensement Général de la Population, de l’Habitat, de l’Agriculture et de l’Élevage 
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policymakers since most farm households in Senegal are involved in staples production and 
that they only sell a marginal part of produced food crops. The food crops considered are 
cereals (millet, sorghum, maize, rice, and fonio) and cowpeas. Using the West African Food 
Composition Table (Stadlmayr and others 2012), we converted food crops production into 
calories (kcal). The total food available (kcal) was divided by total household size adjusted for 
adult equivalent using weights provided by Claro et al. (2010) and converted to daily food 
available by dividing by 365. The reference food requirement for an adult (men and women 
from 19 to 50 years of age) was 2550 kcal/day (Claro et al. 2010). 
 Table 4- 2 shows that households produced on average 1461 kcal of food per adult equivalent 
per day (AED). According to FAO (2010), the Senegalese population got about 62 percent of 
the energy requirement from cereals. Therefore, food crops considered here should provide 
more than 1600 kcal per AED.  On average, households who invested in risky inputs were able 
to produce this required food while non-buyers produced only 1238 kcal/AED. 
Explanatory variables. The choice of explanatory variables is based on both theoretical and 
empirical reasons. The most important factors include farm characteristics (farm size, crop 
diversification, etc.), production risks factors (rainfall standard deviation over the past years, 
number of risks events reported by households), the risk attitude of households (whether 
farmers reduced cultivated area or reoriented towards non-farm activities due to the production 
shocks experienced), and household characteristics (gender, age, and education of the 
household heads). Factors relative to services are considered, among which are farmer 
organization membership, access to extension services, access to credit. Farm mechanization 
(plow and tractor) dummy, as well as ownership of transportation equipment (cart), are 
considered in the model. Dummy variables accounting for other sources of income of the 
households are also included. 
At the farm level, we considered the total cultivated area, the value of the farm equipment, the 
total number of crops produced,  the share of the farm size allocated to cash crops to measure 
the market orientation of households, the quality of seeds and that of fertilizers. We assume 
here that inputs purchased from parastatal agencies or farmer organizations are of better 
quality. We also controlled for regional heterogeneity and differences by including in the model 
regional dummies. 
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Table 4- 2: Descriptive summary of selected variables used in estimations 
Variable Variable description All sample Investors 
Non-
investors Difference 
Treatment variable         
Treatment 1 if households spent on risky inputs, 0 otherwise 0.63       
Seed investment  1 if households invested in seeds, 0 otherwise 0.50 0.79     
Fertilizer investment  1 if households purchased fertilizers, 0 otherwise 0.35 0.56     
Joint investment 
1 if households jointly purchased both inputs, 0 
otherwise 
0.22 0.34     
Risky investment Value of the risky investment (1000 FCFA) 41.69 65.73     
Outcome variables         
Food availability   1461.96 1593.75 1238.49 355.27*** 
Profit per hectare   115.00 115.88 113.47 2.41 
Household characteristics        
Gender Household head is female (1=YES) 0.07 0.06 0.08 -0.02*** 
Household size The household size in adult equivalence scale 8.91 9.34 8.17 1.16*** 
Age Household head age (years) 53.07 53.33 52.61 0.72* 
Age squared Household head age (years), squared 2996.28 3027.53 2942.12 85.41* 
Formal education Household head received a formal education (1=YES) 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.03** 
Extension services Access to extension services (1=Yes) 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.04*** 
Organization Membership of farmer organization (1=YES) 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.08*** 
Access to credit Household received credit (1=YES) 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03*** 
Livestock activity Has a livestock income (1=YES) 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.08*** 
Off-farm activity Has an off-farm income 0.27 0.25 0.30 -0.04*** 
Remittance Has received remittances (1=YES) 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.02 
Farm characteristics        
Farm size Total cultivated area (hectare) 4.46 5.23 3.11 2.12*** 
Farm equipment value Value of agricultural equipment (1000 FCFA) 106.75 130.46 65.65 64.8*** 
Number of crops Number of crops produced 2.35 2.51 2.07 0.44*** 
Cash crops Land share allocated to cash crops (%) 0.35 0.39 0.27 0.12*** 
Diversification index Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of crop diversification 0.43 0.47 0.36 0.11*** 
Owned plough/tractor Mechanization (1= if plough or tractor) 0.09 0.08 0.09 -0.01 
Owned cart Transportation equipment (1= if cart) 0.44 0.49 0.35 0.14*** 
Seed quality Certified and subsidized seeds (1,0) 0.24 0.37 0.00 0.37*** 
Fertilizer quality Fertilizers purchased from parastatal agencies 0.23 0.37 0.00 0.37*** 
Risk variables/indicators         
Risk events (count) Number of risk events reported (past 5 years) 2.19 2.24 2.11 0.12** 
Risk attitude 
1 if household reduced cultivated area or reoriented 
in off-farm activities 
0.47 0.46 0.48 -0.01 
Rainfall 2010-2015 (std dev) 
Monthly rainfall standard deviation over  2010-2015 
in rainy season 
93.17 88.42 101.39 -12.97*** 
Rainfall 2016 
Annual rainfall observed in 2016 during the rainy 
season 
675.37 644.77 728.42 -83.65*** 
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Instrument variables         
Distance Distance to the nearest market (km) 13.62 12.46 15.63 -3.17*** 
Best practices 
1 if farmers reported to need support on  
farming best practices, 0 otherwise 
0.49 0.53 0.42 0.11*** 
Insurance need 
1 if farmers reported to need agricutural insurance, 0 
otherwise 
0.38 0.41 0.32 0.09*** 
Organization2 
Share of farmers members of farmer organization at 
department level 
0.08 0.09 0.06 0.03*** 
Ext. services need 
Share of farmers that need extension services supports 
at the department level 
0.72 0.73 0.71 0.02*** 
Best practices2 
Share of farmers that need supports on best practices 
at the department level 
0.48 0.49 0.45 0.05*** 
Ext. services2 
Share of farmers that received extension services at 
department level 
0.10 0.10 0.08 0.03*** 
Credit2 
Share of farmers that received credit at department 
level 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01*** 
Off-farm activity2 
Share of farmers involved in off-farm activities at 
department level 
0.26 0.24 0.30 -0.06*** 
Insurance need2 
Share of farmers that need insurance products at 
department level 
0.37 0.38 0.34 0.03*** 
Regional dummies         
Dakar Dakar 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01*** 
Ziguinchor Ziguinchor 0.08 0.03 0.16 -0.14*** 
Diourbel Diourbel 0.09 0.09 0.09 0 
Saint-Louis Saint-Louis 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04*** 
Tambacounda Tambacounda 0.10 0.08 0.13 -0.04*** 
Kaolack Kaolack 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.07*** 
Thies Thies 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.02*** 
Louga Louga 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.03*** 
Fatick Fatick 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.03*** 
Kolda Kolda 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.01 
Matam Matam 0.04 0.01 0.10 -0.09*** 
Kaffrine Kaffrine 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.09*** 
Kedougou Kedougou 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 
Sedhiou Sedhiou 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.01 
Observation Sample size 4133.00 2621.00 1512.00 0*** 
 Source: Authors from PAPA data (2017). Note: FCFA = XOF is the local currency in Senegal and most of the West African 
countries. 1 USD is approximatively equal to 550 FCFA. 
Instrument variables. The identification of the different models estimated required to find 
some instruments variables that may directly affect the decision to invest in seeds or fertilizers 
but will not directly influence various outcomes. As explained in the methodology section, we 
consider distance to the nearest market, farmer’s willingness to receive extension services on 
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farming best practices, and that to access to insurance products. Regarding the issue of 
endogeneity raised, we used the average of various indicators at the department level. 
 Results and discussion 
Investment in risky inputs 
Table 4- 3 shows the results from the Heckman model of the decision to buy risky inputs 
(improved seeds and fertilizers) and the corresponding level of investment. For each model, 
the coefficient estimates as well as the standard error (see Equations (4.2) and (4.3)) are 
presented.  Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors using a cluster approach at the census 
district are displayed. The Wald test (Table 4- 3 and Table 4- 4) of the hypothesis that all regression 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero is highly rejected. Similarly, the Wald test of the 
hypothesis that there is no selection bias (rh0=0) is highly rejected. Therefore, the Heckman 
model is appropriate in modeling investment on risky inputs. The exogenous test for potential 
endogenous variables (farmer organization, extension services, access to credit, and off-farm 
activity) reveals that only farmer organization and off-farm activity participation are not 
exogenous in the model. Therefore, the final model corrected that for these two variables. The 
same specification is used in the endogenous switching regression model. 
The decision to invest in risky inputs is linked to household and farm characteristics, risk 
factors, and access to services. We find that household size, household head age and 
educational level, membership of farmer-based organizations and having livestock income 
sources positively and significantly drives the decision to invest in risky inputs. The effect of 
the household head age on the decision to invest in risk inputs is positive but very small. 
Conversely, we find that access to extension services and participation in off-farm activities is 
negatively related to the decision to invest in risk inputs. Both results here are a bit surprising, 
but the negative effect of extension access on risky inputs investment decisions can be 
modulated by the need for extension services which is positively and significantly related to 
the investment decision. Hence farmers that have a need for extension services are more likely 
to invest in risky inputs. Furthermore, since access to information can be obtained through 
farmer-based organizations, we find that membership of farmer-based organizations is positive 
and significantly correlated to the decision to invest in risky inputs. This modulating effect is 
supported by many empirical studies (Conley and Udry 2010; Isham 2002; Abdulai 2016; 
Hailu, Cao and Yu 2017; Husen, Loos and Siddig 2017). 
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The gender of the household head, credit access, and remittance do not significantly affect the 
decision to invest in risk inputs. The results obtained here are congruent with some studies in 
the empirical literature. For instance, Asfaw et al. (2012b) found the education level of a 
household head to drive the adoption of  Pigeonpea in Tanzania. Muzari et al. (2012) also find 
gender-related differences in technology adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Due to gender 
inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa, women have less access to production resources such as 
land, lower access to education and information on new technologies (Muzari et al. 2012). In 
addition, women are sometimes disadvantaged in terms of access to credit (Muzari et al. 2012) 
that reduces their financial ability to have higher levels of investment in risky inputs compared 
to their male counterparts.  
We find that farm-related variables including size, number of crops grown, and the share of 
land allocated to cash crops correlates positively to the decision to invest in risky inputs. The 
effects are also highly significant. At the same time, the value of farm equipment and ownership 
of a plow or tractor is negatively related to the decision to invest in risky inputs although the 
effect is not significant. The standard deviation of rainfall was found to negatively correlate to 
the decision to invest in risky inputs and the effect is significant. Hence as rainfall becomes 
more and more variable, farmers are less likely to invest in risky inputs. 
Our regional fixed effect variables are all significant at 1%, implying that the location of a 
farmer likely influences their decision to invest in risk. The estimates for the potential 
endogenous variables12, membership of a farmer-based organization and participation in an 
off-farm activity are significant, meaning that endogeneity was indeed present and well 
controlled for in the model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 We do not include the residuals of the other potentially endogenous variables, credit access and extension 
because they were not statistically significant. They are however available on request 
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Table 4- 3 : Drivers of investment on risky inputs, Heckman model results 
  Selection equation Log input investment 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Household characteristics 
  
  
  
  
Gender 0.132 0.085 -0.339*** 0.112 
Household size (adult equivalent) 0.018*** 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Age -0.013 0.01 0.027** 0.012 
Age squared 0.000* 0 -0.000** 0 
Formal education 0.091* 0.055 0.04 0.056 
Extension services -0.232*** 0.087 0.248*** 0.089 
Organization 1.599*** 0.256 0.113 0.095 
Access to credit 0.113 0.14 0.089 0.115 
Livestock activity 0.300*** 0.056 -0.157*** 0.054 
Off-farm activity -0.573*** 0.206 0.032 0.058 
Remittance 0.064 0.077 -0.136 0.086 
Farm characteristics 
  
  
  
  
Farm size (log, ha) 0.082** 0.038 0.605*** 0.044 
Farm equipment value (log) 0 0.012 0.039*** 0.014 
Number of crops 0.122** 0.053 -0.291*** 0.057 
Cash crops (% of farm size) 0.340*** 0.098 0.645*** 0.13 
Diversification index 0.076 0.204 0.567** 0.25 
Owned plough/tractor -0.022 0.085 -0.108 0.097 
Owned cart 0.059 0.052 -0.007 0.062 
Risk variables/indicators 
  
  
  
  
Risk events (count) 0.012 0.016     
Risk attitude 0.06 0.043     
Std. rainfall 2010-2015 -0.363*** 0.133     
Instruments used 
  
  
  
  
Distance to market (log) -0.003 0.019     
Extension services need 0.159*** 0.037     
Insurance need 0.036 0.043     
Organization (RES) -0.678*** 0.133     
Off-farm activity (RES) 0.357*** 0.123     
Regional fixed effects 
  
  
  
  
Ziguinchor -0.418*** 0.142     
Diourbel -0.352*** 0.063     
Tambacounda -0.627*** 0.075     
Louga -0.317*** 0.086     
Fatick -0.423*** 0.084     
Kolda -0.438*** 0.076     
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Matam -1.381*** 0.237     
Constant 1.551** 0.635 2.663*** 0.332 
rho -0.929   -0.929   
Wald chi2 (1) for rho = 287.2*** 287.2   287.2   
Wald chi2 (18) = 405.1*** 405.1   405.1   
Number of clusters 945   945   
Sample size 4,133   4,133   
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported. rho denotes the correlation coefficient between the error term of the selection 
equation and the error term of the outcome equations. Organization (RES) and Off-farm (RES) denote the generalized residuals 
from the first-stage regressions farmer organization membership and off-farm activity participations, respectively. 
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors from PAPA data (2017). 
 
Results of the second stage estimation show that the gender of the household head, age, 
extension access, and livestock income sources significantly drive the levels of investment in 
risky inputs. We, however, find the effect of gender and livestock ownership to be negative. 
Hence, female-headed households invest less in seeds and fertilizers compared to male-headed 
households. Furthermore, households that have livestock income sources invest less in risky 
inputs. On the contrary, the effect of a household’s head age on the level of risky input 
investments decreases with increasing age. Extension access is related to increasing levels of 
investment in risky inputs. The effect of remittance is, however, negative which implies that 
households that receive remittances reduce the level of investment in risky inputs. 
Farm characteristics including size, equipment value, the share of land allocated to cash crops 
and diversification are significant and positively correlated to investment levels of risky inputs. 
On the contrary, despite being significant, the number of crops grown decreases the level of 
investment in risky inputs. We also find that ownership of farm equipment (plow/tractor and 
cart) decreases investment levels in risky inputs but the effect is not significant. 
In summary, we find the age of a household head, extension access, having livestock income 
sources, farm size, the number of crops grown and the share of land allocated to cash crops to 
simultaneously affect the decision to invest in risky inputs and the level of investment in these 
inputs. Extension access, on the other hand, has an opposing effect, it reduces the probability 
of investing in risky inputs but increases the level of investment. The effect of livestock income 
sources and the number of crops grown has the opposite effect of extension access. The 
presence of livestock income sources and the number of crops grown increases the probability 
of investing in risky inputs but decreases the level of investment. Farm size and the share of 
land allocated to cash crops have a consistently positive effect across the decision to invest in 
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risky inputs and the levels of investment. They both significantly increase the probability of 
investing in risky inputs and the level of investment in risky inputs. 
Household welfare impacts 
Since the drivers of agricultural profit are not the main interest of this study, we directly 
discussed the impact of the decision to invest in risky inputs. Detailed results of the model are 
presented in the Supplementary materials section. Table 4- 4 shows the predicted welfare 
outcomes of risky investments under actual and counterfactual conditions for Senegal.  
The results showed that investment in risky inputs (fertilizers and/or seeds) has a positive and 
significant impact on the profit per hectare and on food produced per AED. The treatment effect 
on the treated was estimated at 24 000 FCFA13 per hectare for the profit and 238 kcal per AED 
for food availability. This is equivalent to a 44 percent increase in the profit per hectare and a 
24 percent increase in food availability per AED relative to the expected outcome if they did 
not purchase risky inputs. Moreover, if non-buyers had purchased risky inputs, their average 
profit per hectare and food availability per AED would have increased by 150 percent and 107 
percent, respectively. Therefore, investment in risky inputs increases household welfare 
measured in terms of crop profit per hectare or food availability.  
Table 4- 4: Predicted outcomes and treatment effects 
 Decision stage 
Treatment effects 
 To invest Not to invest 
(Outcome 1): Profit per hectare (1000 FCFA)  
Farm households who invested (a)   79.5 (0.7) (c)   55.4 (0.5) ATT = 24.2*** (0.5) 
Farm households who did not invested (d)   218.9 (2.4) (b)   87.7 (1) ATU = 131.2 (1.6) 
Heterogeneity effects BH1 =  -139.3*** (2.1) BH2 =    -32.3*** (1) TH = -107*** (1.4) 
    
(Outcome 2): Food availability (Kcal/AED) 
 
Farm households who invested (a)   1219.1 (16.6) (c)   980.7 (12.8) ATT = 238.4*** (7.7) 
Farm households who did not invested (d)   2038.4 (40.3) (b)   987.1 (17.6) ATU = 1051.3*** (25.1) 
Heterogeneity effects BH1 =  -819.3*** (37.7) BH2 =    -6.4 (21.5) TH = -812.9*** (21.7) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors from PAPA data (2017). 
 
 
13 FCFA = XOF is the local currency in Senegal and most of West African countries. 1 USD is approximatively equal to 550 
FCFA. 
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However, surprisingly, results also reveal that the treatment effect is higher for non-buyers than 
for actual buyers. De Janvry et al. (2010) stated that such a situation may occur if technology 
adoption increases risks. In the absence of a perfect insurance market, poor farmers will not be 
able to adopt, unlike richer farmers who can adopt the technologies even if their expected gain 
is low. Therefore, the treatment effect on the untreated may exceed the treatment effect on the 
treated. On the other hand, the transitional heterogeneity effect for the two outcomes is 
negative; that is the effect is lower for farm households that did invest compared to the ones 
that did not invest. 
Table 4- 5: OLS regression of the differential impact 
  
Profit equation Food equation 
 
 Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err 
Land share to groundnut (%) 14.139*** 4.850 -986.701*** 62.827 
Land share to Maize (%) 6.188 5.545 4.744 64.552 
Land share to Millet (%) 10.147** 4.650 310.568*** 55.513 
Land share to Rice (%) 32.391*** 5.014 -185.241*** 60.114 
Farm size (Ha) -7.931*** 0.562 59.309*** 6.440 
farm size, squared 0.196*** 0.020 -0.788*** 0.231 
Extension services (0,1) 24.297*** 3.423 348.713*** 39.472 
Credit (0,1) -17.245*** 6.114 231.101*** 69.648 
farmer organization (0,1) 18.148*** 3.764 163.236*** 43.454 
Value of agric. Equipment (1000 FCFA) -0.001 0.002 -0.051** 0.024 
Owned cart 1.788 2.085 113.262*** 23.981 
Mechanization (0,1) 15.457*** 3.630 186.260*** 41.636 
Number of crops 6.917*** 1.228 -15.515 14.587 
Education 4.658** 2.345 46.771* 26.919 
Gender (1=Female) -23.824*** 3.977 -217.998*** 46.446 
Age 0.141* 0.074 0.649 0.847 
Constant 50.228*** 6.002 412.322*** 71.682 
Observations 4,133   3,863   
R-squared adjusted 0.120   0.168   
Note: Robust standard errors are reported. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors from PAPA data 
(2017). 
To gain further understanding of results, we also examined the differential impact of investing 
in risky inputs by running an OLS estimation on a set of factors where our interest is on the 
production structure (share of the total cultivated area allocated to millet, maize, rice, and 
groundnut). Table 4- 5 shows results from this simple OLS regression. 
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Table 4- 6: Comparison of mean of yield and land allocation across groups 
 Yield (kg/ha) land size share (%) 
 Adopters Non-adopters T-Stat Adopters Non-adopters T-Stat 
Groundnut 604.65 639.31 -1.25 0.35 0.25 12.17*** 
Millet 447.80 478.28 -1.87* 0.28 0.32 -5.06*** 
Maize 614.38 550.92 1.73* 0.12 0.13 -0.46 
Rice 1664.36 1120.93 4.34*** 0.08 0.14 -7*** 
 
Results show that the most influential crops are groundnut, millet, and rice. A test of differences 
between the yield and the land size share allocated to these crops across the groups reveals that 
the most important yield gap between adopters and non-adopters is present in rice production 
with an average gap of 543 kg/ha. In addition, non-adopters had allocated more land area to 
that crop (14%) than adopters (7%). This finding clearly explains why the expected profit for 
non-adopters is clearly higher than for adopters. Regarding the food production gap observed, 
it is explained by the fact that adopters had allocated less land size to millet than non-adopters. 
Moreover, there is no yield gap for millet between the two groups (see Table 4- 6). 
 Conclusion and policy recommendations  
Using recent data of rain-fed agriculture in Senegal, this study provides an analysis of the 
investment decision of farm households in Senegal on “risky inputs”. More than half of the 
households in the sample had bought either inorganic fertilizers or seeds during the campaign 
of interest. However, the level of spending on these inputs is quite low. There is, thus, a need 
to investigate the drivers of the investment decision, the level of investment, and the potential 
impact of the household’s welfare in order to convince farmers to adopt and policymakers to 
use results to design appropriate interventions. 
In summary, we find the age of a household head, extension access, having livestock income 
sources, farm size, the number of crops grown and the share of land allocated to cash crops to 
simultaneously affect the decision to invest in risky inputs and the level of investment in these 
inputs. Farm size and the share of land allocated to cash crops have a consistently positive 
effect across the decision to invest in risky inputs and the levels of investment. They both 
significantly increase the probability of investing in risky inputs and the level of investment in 
risky inputs. 
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The main drivers of the decision to purchase risky inputs are household size, education of 
household heads, membership in a farm organization, access to credit, farm size, the number 
of crops and existence of livestock income. On the other hand, results reveal gender, farm size, 
the number of crops grown and the share of land allocated to cash crops, crop diversification, 
the value of agricultural capital, rainfall variability, and extension services as the determinants 
of the level of investment on risky inputs. In terms of impact, results show a positive effect of 
risky investment on farm profit per hectare, and food produced per adult equivalent per day. 
This positive effect is higher for current non-adopters. This greater expected impact on non-
adopters is explained by their cropping patterns. Most of them are involved in rice production 
which is found to be more sensitive to inputs investment. 
Our results highlight that efforts made so far to encourage investments in inputs need to be 
strengthened through the revision of government interventions’ strategy to ensure public 
expenditure efficiency and substantial impacts on beneficiaries of the promotion of private 
(farm) investment in terms of adoption and investment intensity. Private investments could be 
promoted through several complementary channels that affect both the decision to invest and 
the amount invested. Access to information can play an important role in the decision to invest 
in agricultural activity, particularly in improved inputs. The sources of information identified 
here are membership of a farm organization, access to advisory support, possession of means 
of transportation that allow households to access information. Another source of information 
would be climate information systems. Since liquidity constraints hinder agricultural 
investment, any policy that promotes access to credit could generate important returns. Efforts 
to ease access to credit would have to be accompanied by measures to manage agricultural 
risks. 
Interventions along the lines proposed above could reduce the impact of agricultural risks and 
increase farmers' willingness to invest to increase their well-being. In addition, based on the 
positive effect of the use of risky inputs on farm profit per hectare, food availability, private 
operators may be interested to support public efforts to improve technology adoption and 
poverty reduction.  
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Supplementary materials 
Table A4- 1: Determinants of per hectare farm profits and Food produced (endogenous switching regression 
model) 
  Log farm profit (1000 FCFA/ha) Log Food produced (Kcal/adult/day) 
 (1) (0) (1) (0) 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Household characteristics 
      
Gender -0.070 0.080 -0.249*** 0.091 0.036 0.076 -0.107 0.086 
Household size (adult equivalent) 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005 -0.090*** 0.007 -0.079*** 0.004 
Age 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.009 -0.006 0.010 0.001 0.008 
Age squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Formal education -0.092 0.058 -0.044 0.048 -0.075 0.061 0.014 0.044 
Extension services 0.293*** 0.098 0.274*** 0.083 0.261*** 0.074 0.338*** 0.073 
Organization -0.016 0.111 0.087 0.082 0.002 0.100 0.063 0.073 
Access to credit -0.304* 0.181 -0.305*** 0.101 -0.358* 0.196 -0.097 0.094 
Livestock activity -0.021 0.047 -0.042 0.045 -0.002 0.048 -0.027 0.041 
Off-farm activity -0.116** 0.050 -0.006 0.049 -0.045 0.053 0.035 0.046 
Remittance -0.075 0.076 0.007 0.071 -0.023 0.076 -0.102* 0.059 
Farm characteristics 
      
Farm size (log, ha) -0.396*** 0.038 -0.368*** 0.039 0.571*** 0.042 0.545*** 0.040 
Farm equipment value (log) 0.031*** 0.012 0.026** 0.011 0.028** 0.012 0.035*** 0.010 
Number of crops 0.110*** 0.039 0.167*** 0.040 0.074* 0.042 -0.014 0.036 
Cash crops (% of farm size) 0.462*** 0.103 0.207* 0.112 -1.259*** 0.123 -1.656*** 0.107 
Diversification index 0.289* 0.164 -0.204 0.204 0.207 0.183 0.408** 0.194 
Owned plough/tractor 0.328*** 0.076 0.220*** 0.067 0.257*** 0.079 0.250*** 0.067 
Owned cart 0.083 0.052 0.077 0.052 0.053 0.051 0.047 0.045 
Rainfall 2016 (log, total) 0.382*** 0.074 0.351*** 0.091 0.600*** 0.077 0.223*** 0.085 
Seed quality 
  
0.042 0.043 
  
0.004 0.039 
Fertilizer oquality 
  
0.249*** 0.045 
  
0.334*** 0.042 
Other model parameters 
      
Constant 1.257** 0.519 2.112*** 0.665 3.164*** 0.547 5.857*** 0.601 
lnsigma0 -0.271*** 0.041 
  
-0.324*** 0.029 
  
lnsigma1 0.026 0.036 
  
-0.146*** 0.039 
  
rho0 -0.354** 0.161 
  
-0.110 0.202 
  
rho1 -0.935*** 0.126 
  
-0.742*** 0.138 
  
Wald chi2 (2) for rho = 55.41*** 55.41               
Wald chi2 (19) = 388.0*** 388.0 
       
Number of clusters 945  945  927    
Sample size 4,133  4,133  3,863       
Note : (1) risk takers, (0) No risk takers. Regression with robust standard errors clustered at the Census District was used. Significance 
: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A4- 2: Results of probit models for the control function 
 Farmer organization Extension services Access to credit Off-farm activity 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
organisation . . 0.912*** 0.094 0.662*** 0.126 -0.062 0.091 
appui_conseil 0.903*** 0.094 . . -0.087 0.151 0.020 0.086 
credit_recu 0.784*** 0.144 -0.114 0.172 . . -0.045 0.147 
dinc_off -0.042 0.082 0.067 0.077 0.002 0.118 . . 
Age 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.020 0.025 -0.020* 0.011 
age2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Gender 0.011 0.153 0.000 0.140 0.156 0.213 0.144 0.091 
hsize_aduleq 0.012 0.007 -0.011 0.007 -0.009 0.011 0.005 0.005 
formal_educ 0.278*** 0.079 0.223*** 0.077 0.265** 0.108 0.127** 0.057 
dinc_live 0.097 0.075 0.073 0.069 0.223** 0.100 0.501*** 0.050 
dinc_remit 0.018 0.121 0.343*** 0.101 -0.099 0.180 -0.201** 0.082 
Lsuptot 0.104* 0.055 0.144*** 0.049 0.120 0.078 -0.093*** 0.036 
Lcap 0.020 0.020 0.007 0.018 0.028 0.027 -0.040*** 0.013 
plough_tractor -0.004 0.118 0.021 0.112 0.118 0.164 0.230*** 0.086 
transport_char -0.043 0.093 0.037 0.085 -0.096 0.122 0.121* 0.062 
N_crop -0.049 0.072 -0.023 0.069 0.087 0.091 -0.012 0.049 
cash_crop 0.263** 0.131 0.271** 0.121 0.139 0.194 0.054 0.089 
HHI_div 0.128 0.311 -0.292 0.284 -0.333 0.423 0.221 0.204 
risk_count_5y 0.030 0.024 0.138*** 0.021 0.020 0.031 0.061*** 0.017 
risk_averse_strategy -0.007 0.073 0.076 0.067 0.214** 0.100 0.362*** 0.049 
lrain_sd 0.276 0.232 0.525** 0.220 -0.088 0.346 0.018 0.159 
ldistmark -0.023 0.037 0.117*** 0.038 -0.026 0.048 -0.009 0.024 
extension_bestpractices 0.130* 0.077 0.322*** 0.072 0.061 0.105 0.054 0.051 
insurance_need 0.346*** 0.078 0.180** 0.075 0.291*** 0.110 -0.209*** 0.054 
reg_organization 5.787*** 0.625 -1.157** 0.588 -0.653 0.910 0.785* 0.444 
reg_ext_need 0.037 0.438 -0.126 0.436 0.001 0.708 0.030 0.269 
reg_ext_best -0.219 0.343 -0.319 0.314 -0.291 0.542 0.035 0.221 
reg_ext_access -1.672*** 0.515 5.611*** 0.458 0.499 0.858 -0.702** 0.325 
reg_credit_access -0.113 2.166 1.715 1.870 13.653*** 3.094 -0.963 1.449 
reg_offfarm_access 0.230 0.326 -0.494* 0.291 -0.243 0.459 2.755*** 0.214 
reg_insur_need -0.403 0.267 -0.170 0.256 -0.043 0.362 0.116 0.164 
REG2 -0.017 0.189 0.023 0.189 0.283 0.321 0.010 0.131 
REG3 -0.614** 0.301 0.323* 0.182 -0.317 0.385 -0.032 0.117 
REG5 -0.033 0.170 0.116 0.144 -0.242 0.232 0.035 0.107 
REG6 -0.102 0.169 0.247 0.156 -0.059 0.206 -0.094 0.132 
REG7 -0.113 0.198 0.223 0.147 -0.151 0.303 0.126 0.108 
REG8 -0.388 0.243 0.256 0.161 -0.060 0.251 0.171 0.118 
REG9 -0.254 0.215 -0.165 0.252 -0.537 0.428 0.093 0.115 
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REG10 -0.108 0.128 0.217* 0.121 0.064 0.180 -0.121 0.099 
REG11 -0.065 0.327     0.143 0.155 
Constant -3.975*** 1.193 -5.701*** 1.076 -2.907* 1.672 -1.423* 0.788 
Observations 4,133   4,133   4,133   4,133   
Pseudo R-squared 0.325  0.299  0.193  0.178   
Log-Likelihood Ratio (Chi2) 795.4   823.4   198.9   857.1   
Note : Significance : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Introduction 
Agricultural market participation is widely recognized as a key determinant of structural 
transformation in developing countries (Alene et al. 2008; Barrett 2008; Poole 2017). The 
reasons that call for such a view are i) market participation is a way for poor smallholders to 
generate higher income and therefore to increase their welfare (Poole 2017), ii) it improves 
access to new technology14 that can generate a shift upward of total factor productivity 
increasing the production of marketable surplus (Barrett 2008; Asfaw et al. 2012). 
There is a large body of literature on determinants of market participation since the seminal 
work by Goetz (1992), which suggests that transaction costs (transportation and search costs), 
productive assets endowment (land, labor, machinery and transport equipment), or socio-
economic characteristics of households farmers (age of head, gender of head, education), are 
the main drivers of farmer’s decisions to participate and supply in agricultural market (Goetz 
1992; Staal et al. 1997; Key et al. 2000; Alene et al. 2008; Barrett 2008; Ouma et al. 2010; 
Asfaw et al. 2012; Burke et al. 2015; Olwande et al. 2015). 
With exception of Alene et al. (2008) and Asfaw et al. (2012), most empirical studies 
emphasize output market participation, while there may be important transaction costs in inputs 
(fertilizers/ seeds) markets, preventing farmers to get access to new technologies. As a 
consequence, this can jeopardize the intensification process and mitigate the production of 
marketable surplus (Winter-Nelson and Temu 2005; Camara 2017). While Alene et al. (2008) 
studied the determinants of maize supply and fertilizer demands, Asfaw et al. (2012) analyzed 
participation in pigeonpea and seed markets, and their implications for household welfare. 
However, some elements can be raised as limitations of these studies. First, they analyze output 
market participation distinctly from input market participation; therefore, they might hide 
important heterogeneities among participants either in output market or input market. For 
example, a buyer of fertilizer may (not) sell a surplus of production because he/she faces 
specific low (high) costs-information and search costs (i.e. time spent to find a better price or 
a buyer- when trading in output market) can affect the intensity of participation in the fertilizer 
market and the production of marketable output surplus. The point we make here is that buyers 
in input market may have idiosyncratic factors creating considerable differences in transactions 
costs when deciding (not) to participate in output market; therefore, it is possible to observe 
 
14 use of fertilizer, improved seed or mechanization 
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different profiles of farmers based on their overall market strategies15. Thus, a joint analysis of 
input and output markets might be more insightful as it allows for better profiling of farmers 
and a better formulation of targeted policies aiming at improving households’ welfare. 
Studies by Alene et al. (2008), and Asfaw et al. (2012) are applied in specific regions in Kenya 
and pay attention to specific crops markets (maize, or pigeonpea) or analyze specific input 
market (fertilizer or seed), whereas the determinants of output market participation depend on 
the context and the nature of crop, and farmers’ demands for inputs may include both fertilizers 
and seeds. On the other hand, Teklewold (2016) modeled simultaneously the decisions to adopt 
technology and to participate in output market. This study was very similar to ours, however, 
it only focused on the correlation between decisions (using a multivariate probit model) instead 
of the analysis of the determinants of the choice of a specific market participation regime. 
This study pays attention to the above gaps. More specifically, we seek to answer the following 
questions: (i) What is the most gainful market regime when both input and output markets are 
simultaneously considered? (ii) Is this regime invariant across crops? The main objective of 
this study is to draw a joint analysis of participation in both output and input markets and find 
the market participation regimes that lead to the highest net revenue per hectare at the 
household level. Contrary to previous studies, we rely on a recent representative survey of 
Senegalese rainfed agriculture with more than 4,000 farm households and consider both 
fertilizers and seed as inputs and pay attention to both staple and cash crops. 
From an econometric standpoint, we account for selection bias that may affect market 
participation by using the multinomial endogenous treatment effects model (Deb and Trivedi 
2006a, b). The main advantages of this approach are that it accounts for selection bias due to 
both observed (through farm or household characteristics) and unobserved (via latent variables) 
heterogeneity in an impact evaluation setting. 
The next section gives a description of the conceptual framework and the empirical strategy 
used. Section 3 presents the data and a descriptive summary of the variables used in the 
analysis. Results are presented and discussed in section 4. The last section provides conclusions 
and implications. 
 
15 A farmer may buy inputs (fertilizers) because he/she wants to be self-sufficient regarding food crops, or to increase food 
surplus in order to sell that surplus. Therefore, farmer’s behavior on output market may have its origin on the inputs choices 
and depends on the household-specific final objective.  Thus, when considering simultaneously both markets, a set of four 
regimes of market participation emerge. 
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 Conceptual framework and empirical strategy 
5.2.1. Conceptual framework 
The theoretical framework builds on the work by Alene et al. (2008), who analyzed the effects 
of transaction costs on both output and input market participation. Unlike these authors, this 
study supports that the decision to buy input is likely correlated with that of participating in the 
output market, thus revealing the strategic behaviors of farmers under transaction costs. A 
similar argument was made by Teklewold (2016) who modeled jointly the decisions to adopt 
crossbreeding technology (input side) and to participate in milk and milk products marketing 
(output side). Using a multivariate probit model, these authors found that input-side technology 
adoption decision was not independent of that to participate in the output market.  
The analysis is based on a static farm household model where a decision-maker maximizes its 
utility that is a function of net revenue (5.1) under production technology constraint (5.2) 
𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝑋}𝑈(𝑅) =  𝑈{?̂?𝑄 − ?̂?𝑋 − 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑓(𝑧) − 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑓(𝑧)}     (5.1) 
𝑄 = 𝐺(𝑋, 𝐴)          (5.2) 
?̂? = 𝑝 − 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑣(𝑧)          (5.3) 
?̂? = 𝑤 + 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑣(𝑧)         (5.4) 
𝑄 = 𝑆 + 𝐶̅            (5.5) 
𝑋 = 𝑋𝑏 + ?̅?𝑜         (5.6) 
𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝑅⁄ > 0; 𝜕2𝑈 𝜕2𝑅⁄ < 0 ; 𝜕𝑄 𝜕𝑋⁄ > 0; 𝜕2𝑄 𝜕2𝑋⁄ < 0 
?̂? is the specific price that the decision-maker gets when he/she decides to sell in the output 
market. This price is equivalent to market price 𝑝 minus incurred variable transaction costs 
such as transportation costs 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑣(𝑧) (3). 𝑄 is the production which can be sold (𝑆) or consumed 
at home (𝐶̅) (5). Similarly, ?̂? is the specific price that farmer faces when buying input 𝑋; this 
price is equivalent to market price 𝑤 plus variable transaction costs 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑣(𝑧) (4). A farmer can 
buy input in the market 𝑋𝑏 or relies on his/her own resources
16 ?̅?𝑜 (6). 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑓(𝑧), 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑓(𝑧) stand 
for fixed transactions when buying input and/or selling output. Fixed transaction costs include 
information and research costs and are not directly observable in surveys. However, they can 
 
16 For fertilizer, farmer only relies on market. 
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be expressed in terms of observable variables 𝑧 at the household level. 𝐴 stands for fixed 
factors. 
The optimization problem and the associated Lagrange ℒ function can be rewritten as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝑠,𝑥𝑏}𝑈(𝑅) =  𝑈{(𝑝 − 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑣)𝑆 + 𝑝𝐶̅ − (𝑤 + 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑣)𝑋𝑏−𝑤?̅?𝑜 − 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑓
− 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑓
}  (5.1’) 
                       S/C       𝑆 + 𝐶̅ = 𝐺(𝑋𝑏 + ?̅?𝑜, 𝐴)    (5.2’) 
ℒ = 𝑈{(𝑝 − 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑣)𝑆 + 𝑝𝐶̅ − (𝑤 + 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑣)𝑋𝑏−𝑤?̅?𝑜 − 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑓
− 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑓
}
+ 𝜆{𝐺(𝑋𝑏 + ?̅?𝑜, 𝐴) − 𝑆 − 𝐶̅}  (5.7) 
Due to the existence of fixed transactions costs that influence the decisions to participate in 
markets, there is a discontinuity when maximizing over 𝑆 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑏. The literature suggests, first 
to determine the first-order condition (FOC) under each regime and second to retain one that 
gives the highest utility level (Alene et al. 2008; Ouma et al. 2010). 
FOC 1: Seller in the output market and buyer in the input market   (𝑆 > 0 and 𝑋𝑏>0; 
j=3). 
{𝑆}:  𝑈′(∙)(𝑝 − 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑣) − 𝜆 = 0                                  (5.8) 
{𝑋𝑏}:     −𝑈
′(∙)(𝑤 + 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑣) + 𝜆𝐺′(∙) = 0              (5.9) 
Combining (5.8) and (5.9) ➔ 𝑤 + 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑣 = 𝐺′(∙)(𝑝 − 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑣)   (5.10) 
Equation (5.10) shows that for farmers who decide to sell a part of their production and buy 
inputs, the unit cost including transaction costs in the input market must be equivalent to 
marginal productivity value net of incurred transaction costs when selling output. This reveals 
the rationale underlying the behavior of this group of farmers. More specifically, higher 
transaction costs in the output market 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑣 compared to those existing in the input market 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑣 
impose a reduction of the quantity bought in the input market, thus increasing marginal 
productivity. Similarly, when transaction costs are relatively higher in the input market, rational 
behavior imposes a reduction of output sales as the farmer could reduce the output volume 
because he/she may decrease the quantity bought in the input market. Thus, for this group, an 
idiosyncratic shock affecting transaction costs when selling output may result in a considerable 
gap between transaction costs incurred in output and input markets; the consequence is an 
adjustment in the quantities traded in the input market. Under this condition, public policies 
focusing on input (output) market only may not be enough to significantly affect the 
household’s participation. 
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 FOC 2: Only seller in the output market (𝑆 > 0 and 𝑋𝑏=0; j=2). 
Under this regime, equation (5.8) remains valid only if the farmer relies on his/her own input, 
which we suppose is exogenous ?̅?𝑜. The rationale behind this equation is that the relative 
opportunity cost of selling (𝜆/𝑝 − 𝑡𝑐𝑞𝑠
𝑣)  must be equivalent to the marginal utility. Thus, higher 
transaction costs increase the relative opportunity cost, therefore, a rational farmer should 
reduce output sales in order to maintain the same utility level. So far, for this group, variable 
transaction costs are added to the fixed transaction costs that households could face before 
deciding (or not) to participate in the input market. As they are already non- participants in the 
input market, they could stay in that position if there are high costs of marketing. 
FOC 3: Only buyer in the input market (𝑆 = 0 and 𝑋𝑏>0; j=1). 
In this regime, only equation (5.9) remains valid and households buy input to increase farm 
productivity in order to meet home consumption needs 𝐶̅ (exogenous). The underlying 
rationale here is that the relative opportunity costs (𝜆/(𝑤 + 𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑏
𝑣)) of output is equivalent to 
relative marginal utility. In this case, an increase in transaction costs reduces relative 
opportunity cost; and a rational behavior suggests that a farmer should increase the marginal 
productivity by reducing the quantities bought in the input market. Similarly, to the previous 
case, a farmer who belongs to this regime could not be a participant in the output market as 
long as input market conditions are not good enough to allow him/her to produce a marketable 
surplus. 
FOC 4: Autarky  (𝑆 = 0 and 𝑋𝑏=0; j=0). 
In this regime, equations (5.8) and (5.9) are not valid. The farmer relies on his/her production 
to meet household consumption needs and depends exclusively on his/her own input to 
produce. To focus on market participation process, we assume that these quantities 𝐶̅ and ?̅?𝑜 
are exogenous. 
As the choice of the regime is based on the comparison of utilities 𝑈𝑗 derived from above FOCs 
(see Figure 5- 1), conditional on crop choice, the representative farm household would choose a 
regime k if: 
𝑈𝑘 > 𝑈𝑗   , 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 
𝑈(𝜋𝑘) > 𝑈(𝜋𝑗) , 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 
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The utility function is monotone and strictly increasing; therefore 𝜋𝑘 > 𝜋𝑗 and the potential 
welfare gain related to regime k is  ∆𝑈 =  𝑈(𝜋𝑘) − 𝑈(𝜋𝑗) . As transaction costs play a critical 
role in determining the utility level associated with each market regime, we investigate 
empirically their effects on market regime choices and the implications for household’s 
income.   
Figure 5- 1: Market participation regimes 
  
5.2.2. Empirical framework 
Following the conceptual framework, four groups of farmers may exist when we analyze both 
markets jointly: (i) no market participation at all (autarky), (ii) farmers buy inputs, but don’t 
sell their production (input), (iii) farmers don’t buy any inputs, but sell part of their production 
(output), (iv) farmers buy inputs and sell part of their crop production (joint). 
As we have more than two groups, the standard propensity score approach or the endogenous 
switching model is not appropriate. Furthermore, in a multivalued treatment framework, 
efficient-influence function estimator (EIF) by Cattaneo (2010) could be a good candidate to 
be applied for the analysis. However, this method relies on a strong assumption of Conditional 
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Independence which implies, in our case, that the market choice regime is random once one 
can control for farmers’ characteristics. Therefore, we adopt a more flexible modeling 
framework. 
We model a farmer’s choice between the four options and its impact on outcome variables in 
a multinomial endogenous treatment effect model as proposed by Deb and Trivedi (2006a, b). 
This framework simultaneously models the treatment equation (multinomial mixed logit 
model) and the outcome equation. The main advantages of this approach are that it accounts 
for selection bias due to both observed (through farm or household characteristics) and 
unobserved (via latent variables) heterogeneity in an impact evaluation setting. 
Let 𝑑𝑖𝑡 be binary variables representing the observed market choice (treatment) by farmer i. 
𝑑𝑖𝑡(𝑇𝑖) = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡   (t = 0,1,2,3)
0,                               𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
The probability of treatment can be represented as: 
𝑃𝑟[𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑧𝑖, 𝑙𝑖] = 𝑧′𝑖𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑘
𝑇
𝑘=1
+ 𝑖𝑡     (5.11) 
𝑖𝑡 error term, and 𝑃𝑟[𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑧𝑖, 𝑙𝑖] is supposed to be a multinomial logistic function g, z denotes 
exogenous covariates with associated coefficients 𝛼𝑡,  𝑙𝑖𝑘 stands for unobserved characteristics 
(unobserved heterogeneity) common to individual i’s choice and outcome such as motivation 
or level of information. 𝑙𝑖𝑘 are assumed to be independent of 𝑖𝑡. We assume that t = 0 denotes 
the control group (autarky). 
For the model to be identified, a set of restrictions are imposed. First, we impose 𝛿𝑡𝑘 = 0 ∀ 𝑡 ≠
𝑘, i.e. each market regime choice is affected by a unique unobserved factor. In addition, we 
assume that  𝛿𝑡𝑡 = 1, which implies that the scale of effects of an unobserved factor is 
normalized and equal to 1 in the treatment equation (Deb and Trivedi 2006a, b). 
The outcome (net revenue per hectare) equation is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥′𝑖𝛽 + ∑ 𝜃𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
 ∑ 𝜋𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑡 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝜖𝑖    (5.12) 
𝜖𝑖   error term, 𝑦𝑖 is supposed to follow a normal density distribution f, x denotes exogenous 
covariates with associated coefficients 𝛽, 𝜃𝑡 are the treatment effects relative to the control. 
The outcome  𝑦𝑖  is affected by unobserved characteristics 𝑙𝑖𝑡 that affect selection into 
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treatment.  If 𝜋𝑡 is positive (negative), treatment and outcome are positively (negatively) 
correlated through unobserved characteristics, i.e., there is positive (negative) selection. 
In practice, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 are non-observed. Following  Deb and Trivedi (2006a, b) we assume that they 
are i.i.d and drawn from a normal distribution and their joint distribution h can be integrated 
out of the joint density distribution  of selection and outcome variables as follows: 
𝝎(𝑦𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = ∫{𝒇(𝑦𝑖, |𝑥𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡) ∗ 𝒈(𝑧𝑖, 𝑙𝑖)} 𝒉(𝑙𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑡          (5.13) 
For a given specification of f, g and h, the integral (13) does not have a closed-form solution. 
Then, the full estimation of equations 11 and 12 is based on a simulated-based estimation 
framework. This method finds the values of parameters that maximize the simulated log-
likelihood function associated with a joint density distribution of selection and outcome 
variables (equation 13). For a large number of simulations (S), the maximization of the 
simulated log-likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the log-likelihood (Train 2009). 
The simulated log-likelihood function of 𝝎(𝑦𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) is:  
𝒍𝒏 𝑳(𝑦𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = ∑ 𝒍𝒏?̂?(𝑦𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖)
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏
= ∑ 𝑙𝑛 (
1
𝑆
∑{𝒇(𝑦𝑖, |𝑥𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑠) ∗ 𝒈(𝑧𝑖, 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑠)}
𝑆
𝑠=1
)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑠  is the s
th draw (from a total S draws) of a pseudo-random number from the density 
h. 
Since our outcome variable is a continuous variable, we assume that it follows a normal 
(Gaussian) distribution function. The resulting model was estimated using a Maximum 
Simulated Likelihood (MSL) approach using the Stata command mtreatreg proposed by Deb 
(2009). 
 Data and Pre-estimation Analysis 
Data used in this study were collected under the PAPA17 project, which is an initiative by the 
Government of Senegal funded by USAID-Senegal as part of the "Feed The Future" initiative. 
PAPA has a 3 years implementation period (2015 - 2018) and is being carried out jointly by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment and the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI). 
 
17 Official website of the project is http://www.papa.gouv.sn/. 
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A two-stage sampling method was used with the primary units being the census districts (CDs) 
as defined by the 2013 General Census of Population, Housing, Agriculture and Livestock 
(RGPHAE18), and the secondary units being agricultural households. The sample for rain-fed 
agriculture is 4,533 farm households distributed across all the 42 agricultural departments of 
the country (except the urban departments of Dakar, Pikine, and Guediawaye). Data collection 
took place between April and May 2017. After data cleaning, the final sample size for this 
analysis is 4,160 farm households. 
Regarding other income sources, about 33 % of households in the sample received income 
from livestock activities, 27 % from off-farm activities, while only 9 % of households had 
received transfers from migrants. Regarding the overall household wealth indicator, 
households in different subsamples have very close scores (3 over 6). 
 
Table 5- 1 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of the households in our sample per main 
crop groups (staples, groundnut, and other crops). In the staples group, crops included are 
millet, sorghum, maize, rice, fonio, and beans. The “Other” group is composed of crops that 
are not included in the first two groups. The sample is mainly composed of households with, 
on average, 10 individuals. Household heads are mainly older (53 years old on average) and 
males (93%). This table also shows that few household heads (36.4%) are literate. In terms of 
crop choices, results show that about 94 % of households are involved in grain or beans 
production, while around 69 % of the total households produced groundnut, which is the main 
cash crop in Senegal. Other crops are produced by less than 10 % of households. About 70 % 
of staple food producers also produced groundnut, while almost all groundnut producers also 
produced staple foods (92%). 
Only a few farm households have access to extension services (11%), to credit (3%), and are 
members of farmer organizations (9%). Surprisingly, households involved in staples 
production had more access to extension services and farmer organizations than households 
that produced groundnut. However, it is important to note that the staples group is a very broad 
group with about six individual crops.  
Many households owned transport means (carts) and relied on animal traction tools. As 
groundnut is the major crop in the country, households seemed to allocate about half of their 
 
18 Recensement Général de la Population, de l’Habitat, de l’Agriculture et de l’Élevage 
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total farm size to its production. All staple crops occupied 2.7 ha of land on average. The net 
crop production value (profit) per household is around 447,000 CFA19. For staples producers, 
the average profit from crops is 213,000 CFA per household and for groundnut producers, the 
average profit from crops is about 292,000 CFA. The few households that are involved in other 
crop production earned higher net income. It is worth noting that the crop profit is computed 
as the total production value net of the total production cost (fertilizer, seed, wage paid, land 
and equipment rental cost, and other costs). The production is valued using the observed 
average crop marketing price in the sample for each crop. In terms of crop profit per hectare, 
the highest is observed for other cash crops (209, 000 CFA) followed by staples production 
(74, 000 CFA) and groundnut production (60, 000 CFA). 
In terms of market participation, as expected, almost half staples producers (45%) do not 
participate in any market. About 36 % of these households bought inputs during the campaign 
but they did not sell any of their harvests. Only 13 % of staples households had purchased 
inputs and had sold part of their production. So far, only 14 % of groundnut producers 
intervened neither in the input market nor in the output market -autarky-. About 24 % of 
groundnut producers had participated only in the output market, while 17 % were present only 
in the input market during the season of interest. About half of groundnut producers (45%) had 
bought inputs and sold part of the produced groundnut. Therefore, market participation depends 
on crop choices. Finally, food producers had sold less than 25 % of the total value of food 
produced, while groundnut producers had sold about 70 % of the total production in value. 
Regarding other income sources, about 33 % of households in the sample received income 
from livestock activities, 27 % from off-farm activities, while only 9 % of households had 
received transfers from migrants. Regarding the overall household wealth indicator20, 
households in different subsamples have very close scores (3 over 6).  
 
 
 
19 CFA is the local currency in Senegal. 1 USD ≈ 550 CFA. 
20 The wealth index is computed as a count of a selected dummy variables related to household’s assets. The 
formula used is: 𝑊𝐼 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖
6
𝑖=1 , where D is a dummy variable, i stands for various dimensions considered. The 
dimensions included are : use of running water for cooking and drinking, access to electricity or solar power for 
light, quality of the roof (1 if the material used for the roof is either cement, tile, slate or metal sheet, 0 
otherwise), quality of the wall (1 if the wall is made of cement, 0 otherwise), quality of the floor (1 if the floor is 
tiled, cement, or carpet, 0 else) and number of rooms available for household’s members (1 if the ratio of 
household size to the number of rooms is less than or equal to 2, zero otherwise). 
 
113 
 
 
Table 5- 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Staple crops 
producers  
(N= 3880) 
Groundnut 
producers 
(N=2917) 
Other crops 
producers 
(N=329) 
Total 
(N=4157) 
HH gender (1 male, 0 female) 0.936 0.948 0.933 0.935 
HH age (year) 53.104 53.151 54.410 53.132 
HH education (1=yes; 0=non) 0.362 0.364 0.435 0.363 
Size of Household 9.932 10.419 10.529 9.887 
Farmer organization (1=yes; 0=non) 0.085 0.073 0.164 0.086 
Extension services (1=yes; 0=non) 0.107 0.090 0.134 0.107 
Access to credit (1=yes; 0=non) 0.027 0.032 0.046 0.027 
Received livestock income (1=yes) 0.335 0.341 0.347 0.328 
Received off-farm income (1=yes) 0.266 0.245 0.264 0.266 
Received remittances (1=yes) 0.094 0.098 0.097 0.092 
Wealth index (0/6) 3.023 3.038 3.377 3.080 
Cart ownership (1=yes; 0=non) 0.442 0.496 0.465 0.443 
Farm machinery ownership (1=yes; 0=non) 0.088 0.089 0.073 0.087 
Produced staples (1=yes) 1.000 0.923 0.796 0.933 
Produced groundnut (1=yes) 0.694 1.000 0.653 0.702 
Produced other crops (1=yes) 0.068 0.074 1.000 0.079 
Total cultivated area (ha) 2.820 2.482 1.176 4.467 
Labor costs ('1000) 4.936 3.207 4.778 7.235 
Fertilizer costs (rent) ('1000) 12.764 9.254 6.232 18.900 
Seed costs (rent) ('1000) 2.547 32.590 7.793 25.863 
Other inputs costs ('1000) 5.803 4.846 4.631 9.183 
Agricultural profit ('1000) 213.035 292.268 543.107 446.910 
Agricultural profit per hectare ('1000) 74.282 60.614 209.055 130.034 
Total crop sale value ('1000) 40.794 200.581 474.665 216.392 
Market participation: None 0.445 0.140 0.064 0.206 
Market participation: Input only 0.355 0.168 0.070 0.202 
Market participation: Output only 0.072 0.243 0.319 0.155 
Market participation: Both markets 0.128 0.449 0.547 0.438 
Distance to the nearest road (km) 10.244 7.950 8.809 10.070 
Distance to the nearest market (km) 13.598 12.409 13.353 13.540 
Distance to the regional city (km) 46.395 43.851 45.962 45.929 
AEZ: Agro Sylvo Pastorales 0.114 0.091 0.009 0.110 
AEZ: Groundnut Basin 0.504 0.609 0.526 0.502 
AEZ: Senegal River 0.046 0.015 0.021 0.045 
AEZ: Littoral and Niayes 0.007 0.010 0.082 0.014 
AEZ: Sylvo-pastoral of Ferlo 0.081 0.047 0.125 0.083 
AEZ: Casamance 0.248 0.229 0.237 0.246 
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Number of observations 3880 2917 329 4157 
Source: Authors from PAPA data (2017). Note: CFA is the local currency in Senegal. 1 USD ≈ 550 CFA. 
Our theoretical model shows the central role of transaction costs in market decisions, especially 
for smallholder farmers in developing countries. Since these costs are directly collected and 
are even difficult to collect or empirically computed, we follow the standard approach in the 
literature, which is to use some observed factors that explain or mitigate transaction costs 
(Alene et al. 2008; Teklewold 2016). Factors considered in this study due to data availability 
are distance to the nearest market; distance to the nearest road; distance to the regional city; 
ownership of animals used for transportation (cart); and membership in farmers’ organization. 
Distance variables were computed for each household using its GPS coordinates. 
Table 5- 2: Mean comparison of crop profit per hectare across market choice (‘000 CFA) 
  Staples Groundnut 
input vs Autarky -11.73 (4.24)** -21.72 (5.89)*** 
output vs Autarky 7.48 (7.57) 21.44 (5.47)*** 
Joint vs Autarky 49.9 (5.98)*** 14.65 (4.99)** 
output vs input 19.2 (7.7)* 43.15 (5.17)*** 
Joint vs input 61.62 (6.14)*** 36.37 (4.66)*** 
Joint vs output 42.42 (8.78)*** -6.78 (4.1) 
Note: “Autarky” if a farm household does not buy any inputs and does not sell any crop groups; “Input” if a farm household 
only buys inputs for production and does not sell any crop produced; “output” if the farmer does not buy an input, but sells 
part of crop production; “joint” if the farm household participates into the two markets (input/output). 
Our theoretical model shows the central role of transaction costs in market decisions, especially 
for smallholder farmers in developing countries. Since these costs are directly collected and 
are even difficult to collect or empirically computed, we follow the standard approach in the 
literature, which is to use some observed factors that explain or mitigate transaction costs 
(Alene et al. 2008; Teklewold 2016). Factors considered in this study due to data availability 
are distance to the nearest market; distance to the nearest road; distance to the regional city; 
ownership of animals used for transportation (cart); and membership in farmers’ organization. 
Distance variables were computed for each household using its GPS coordinates. 
Table 5- 2 shows the mean comparison for crop profit per hectare across market choice (4 
categories). Results show that for staples production, the largest positive gap is observed 
between the group “Joint” and the group “Input”. This suggests that farmers that are present on 
the two markets for staples production earned about 62, 000 CFA of profit per hectare more 
than farmers that only purchased inputs. Moreover, the latter choice is even less profitable than 
 
115 
 
being in autarky for staples production. For all other choices, being more involved in market 
participation is positively correlated with higher profit in staples production. For groundnut 
production, results show that buying inputs associated with autarky in the output market is 
worse than being completely in autarky. On the other hand, there is no significant difference in 
profit per hectare between farmers connected in the two markets and those that participated in 
the output market. Therefore, it seems that input market participation for groundnut production 
does not significantly increase groundnut productivity. 
 Estimation results 
We estimate the econometric framework presented above using two sub-samples: staple food 
producers and cash crop producers (groundnut). We chose these two groups for two reasons: i) 
their importance in terms of cultivated areas in the context under analysis, ii)  the optimal 
market regime may be crop-specific (cash or staples crops). 
5.4.1. Market participation regimes 
The full estimation of equations (5.11) and (5.12) for both sub-samples is presented in  
Table 5- 3. Columns 1-6 present estimation results for treatment equations for both types of 
crops; the autarky regime is overlooked as it stands for the control group; the last 2 columns 
present results for the two outcome equations. The likelihood-ratio test for exogeneity of 
treatment, which is a test for the joint hypothesis that coefficients associated to the latent factors 
(unobserved heterogeneities) are jointly equal to zero, shows that the null hypothesis is rejected 
in both cases; therefore, unobserved heterogeneities are critical when explaining market choice 
and its linkage with a farm’s net revenue. 
For the market choice decisions, results (columns 1-6) suggest that these decisions are quite 
distinct and that the factors driving the participation decision across groups are different. This 
suggests that analyzing participation as we have done may bring more insights than the 
common approach of market participation that separately analyzed input market participation 
and output market participation. In addition, results are quite different between staples 
producers and groundnut producers, thus revealing the critical role played by the crop selection. 
Ownership of transport means (cart) has a positive and significant effect on market 
participation regimes. Households that owned carts had fewer constraints to transport 
purchased inputs (products to sell) from (to) local markets to farms. In addition, in rural 
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Senegal, these households may rent their owned assets to other households, thus allowing them 
to generate more income. Alene et al. (2008) and Teklewold (2016) found similar results.  
Membership in farmer organizations increases the probability that staple food producers 
intervene in the inputs market and in the two markets. For groundnut producers, being a 
member of a farmer organization has a positive effect on the probability to sequentially 
participate in both input and output markets. In general, farmer organizations increase market 
access for their members by reducing search and information costs or by increasing their 
bargaining power (Holloway et al. 2000; Teklewold 2016). For example, Burke et al. (2015) 
showed that the presence of milk cooperative in the village is likely to increase milk market 
participation in Kenya; and Fan and Salas Garcia (2018) revealed that being a member of an 
association increases farmers’ market participation in Peru. 
Other proxy variables for transaction costs are the distance from the household’s location to 
some infrastructures such as market, road, and regional city. Results show that distance to the 
nearest market has a strong negative effect on groundnut input market participation. A similar 
result is found for Ethiopia by Woldeyohanes et al. (2017). Regarding distance to the nearest 
paved road, results are a bit ambiguous. A positive correlation is found for staples input market 
participation, groundnut joint market participation, while a negative and significant effect is 
observed for staples output and joint market participation. Distance to the regional city is found 
to have a very limited impact on market participation regimes. These ambiguous results may 
be due to the fact that agroecological zone dummies may already account partly for regional 
accessibility effects. 
Access to extension service is found to decrease the probability to be connected to output 
market participation for staples food. Opposite results were found by Alene et al. (2008). 
Education (literacy rate) improves the bargaining power of farmers, therefore it increases the 
probability of intervention in the input market, and both markets for staple food producers. 
Household heads' gender and age seem to not have significant impacts on market choice 
decisions for farmers in the sample. Access to credit helps to relieve financial constraints for 
cash crop producers who are connected to both markets; therefore, it positively affects market 
participation. In the milk sector in Kenya, Burke et al. (2015) found similar results. The impact 
of credit is very limited in the case of staples crops, the associated coefficient is positive and 
significant at a 10 percent level. 
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Table 5- 3: Estimation results based on the mixed multinomial logit model 
 
To buy inputs To sell output Joint participation Net crop revenue per hectare 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Treatment: Input 
 
          0.348 -27.705*** 
  
 
          (11.919) (4.674) 
Treatment: Output 
 
          -0.284 38.140*** 
  
 
          (7.179) (5.755) 
Treatment: Joint 
 
          69.959*** 13.934*** 
  
 
          (14.376) (4.568) 
HH gender (1=Female) 0.037 -0.129 -0.324 0.458 0.459 0.473* 7.096 5.175 
  (0.178) (0.286) (0.281) (0.304) (0.307) (0.285) (7.239) (6.786) 
HH age (years) 0.013 -0.051 0.026 -0.041 0.031 -0.024 -0.930 1.282** 
  (0.022) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034) (0.860) (0.637) 
HH age squared -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.012 -0.011* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.006) 
HH education 0.283*** -0.234 0.189 -0.170 0.260* 0.122 -1.796 3.948 
  (0.097) (0.167) (0.157) (0.156) (0.134) (0.146) (3.656) (3.821) 
Organization membership 0.787*** 0.515 -0.205 0.240 1.366*** 0.874** 38.783*** 0.659 
  (0.189) (0.388) (0.407) (0.377) (0.204) (0.341) (10.638) (5.179) 
Extension services  -0.018 0.459 -0.743** -0.069 0.225 0.342 77.885*** 12.331* 
  (0.165) (0.283) (0.349) (0.283) (0.210) (0.255) (11.013) (6.297) 
Access to credit 0.092 0.527 -0.234 0.876 0.620* 1.832*** -24.976*** -10.696** 
  (0.300) (0.724) (0.536) (0.706) (0.341) (0.651) (7.653) (4.620) 
Livestock income dummy 0.415*** 0.160 0.088 -0.043 0.636*** 0.342** 4.105 8.793** 
  (0.098) (0.170) (0.161) (0.160) (0.138) (0.149) (3.955) (4.396) 
Off-farm income dummy -0.254** -0.128 -0.445** -0.410** 0.015 -0.026 -0.632 -5.419 
  (0.106) (0.183) (0.190) (0.174) (0.153) (0.159) (4.120) (3.469) 
Remittances income dummy 0.086 -0.023 0.341 -0.302 -0.286 -0.535** -19.136*** 15.334 
  (0.155) (0.240) (0.235) (0.238) (0.225) (0.224) (5.194) (9.881) 
Wealth index (0/6) 0.129*** 0.113** 0.066 0.024 0.219*** 0.066 4.360*** 1.679* 
  (0.029) (0.050) (0.048) (0.047) (0.040) (0.044) (0.988) (0.949) 
Transport equipment 0.355*** -0.321** 0.711*** 0.173 0.522*** 0.552***     
  (0.096) (0.160) (0.148) (0.153) (0.135) (0.143)     
Mechanization 0.092 -0.412 0.394 -0.587** -0.399 -0.278 24.611*** 16.039*** 
  (0.176) (0.289) (0.287) (0.257) (0.277) (0.240) (6.555) (4.621) 
Land holding (ha)  0.080*** 0.097*** 0.063*** 0.126*** 0.155*** 0.174*** -4.770*** -2.006*** 
  (0.016) (0.033) (0.020) (0.032) (0.019) (0.033) (0.402) (0.364) 
distance to market, KM 0.001 -0.042*** 0.012 -0.007 -0.002 -0.009     
  (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)     
distance to road, KM 0.017*** 0.019* -0.018** -0.005 -0.010** 0.019**     
  (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009)     
Distance to city 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.005* -0.000 0.001     
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  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)     
Produced also staples 
 
-1.809***   -1.104***   -1.646***   -54.429*** 
  
 
(0.352)   (0.359)   (0.338)   (13.670) 
Produced also groundnut 0.111   -0.384**   -0.245   -63.177***   
  (0.120)   (0.195)   (0.166)   (4.285)   
Produced also other cash crops -0.029 0.095 0.590** 0.569* 0.310 0.484 -18.037*** -12.110* 
  (0.197) (0.371) (0.262) (0.337) (0.245) (0.330) (4.797) (6.234) 
AEZ: Agro Sylvo Pastorales 0.249 0.453 2.084*** -0.168 1.523*** 0.057     
  (0.163) (0.350) (0.319) (0.340) (0.271) (0.346)     
AEZ: Groundnut Basin -0.108 0.409 1.649*** 0.755*** 1.069*** 1.950***     
  (0.135) (0.296) (0.311) (0.280) (0.230) (0.289)     
AEZ: Senegal River 0.054   0.514   2.835***       
  (0.344)   (0.680)   (0.355)       
AEZ: Littoral and Niayes 3.097***   -37.634***   5.001***       
  (1.146)   (1.113)   (1.164)       
AEZ: Sylvo-pastoral of Ferlo -1.897***   1.388***   1.033***       
  (0.255)   (0.409)   (0.322)       
AEZ: Casamance 
 
-0.027   2.630***   2.536***     
  
 
(0.362)   (0.315)   (0.321)     
lnSigma 
 
          4.587*** 4.423*** 
  
 
          (0.049) (0.156) 
Lambda (Input) 
 
          -8.548 4.981*** 
  
 
          (13.985) (0.694) 
Lambda (Output) 
 
          25.251*** -18.215*** 
  
 
          (4.691) (5.105) 
Lambda (Joint) 
 
          -20.396 7.086*** 
  
 
          (12.686) (1.330) 
Constant -2.133*** 2.219* -4.430*** 0.623 -5.813*** -0.330 115.483*** 59.388*** 
  (0.618) (1.156) (1.021) (1.079) (0.925) (1.030) (24.128) (17.889) 
  
 
              
Observations 3,880 2,917 3,880 2,917 3,880 2,917 3,880 2,917 
LR test for treatment exogeneity (Lambdas=0) 
    
13.43*** 15.73*** 
Log-Likelihood 
    
-27661 -20461 
Number of simulations         5000 5000 
Notes: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. AEZ refers to agroecological zones. Note: 
HH stands for household head. 
Farm size is a critical determinant of market participation for both types of producers. This 
finding is common in the literature on market participation (Alene et al. 2008; Burke et al. 
2015). Farmers with larger farms show a greater propensity to participate in markets. The 
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largest coefficients are associated with the joint market participation. This suggests that 
increased farm size has a great impact on joint market participation. 
Households that received income from livestock activities seem to be more integrated into 
markets, especially the input market for staples producers, and both markets for groundnut and 
staples producers. Therefore, a complementarity may exist between livestock and crop 
production as livestock activities help farmers to produce organic fertilizer (manure), thus 
increasing crop productivity. This finding is in line with results by Woldeyohanes et al. (2017). 
However, being involved in off-farm activity is shown to reduce the propensity to participate 
in the input market for staples food and output market for both groundnut and staples. 
Participating in off-farm activities is likely to reduce the time allocated to farming and thus, 
may reduce the productivity and likelihood to sell output. Farmers that received remittances 
similarly tend to reduce their joint participation in the two markets. The overall household 
wealth index is positively correlated with market participation, especially input market 
participation for both products, and the joint market participation for staples producers. This 
confirms that financial constraints may seriously reduce market choice in rural Senegal. 
Finally, results show that staples producers that also produce groundnut appear to participate 
less in markets for staples. On the other hand, when groundnut producers also produce staples, 
they commercialize less on the groundnut output market. This suggests that market 
participation regimes depend on the crop under consideration and also on the mix of crops 
produced.  
5.4.2. Effects of market participation regimes 
Columns 7-8 in   
Table 5- 3 display results of the outcome equation for staples and groundnut production. Before 
analyzing the impact of market participation regimes on net production value per hectare, a 
brief look at other explanatory variables is worth it. Results reveal that crop profit per hectare 
is heterogeneous across farmers. For staples producers, their profit per hectare is positively and 
significantly associated, among others, with farmer organizations, extension services, wealth 
index, and mechanization. On the contrary, the following factors display a negative correlation 
with staples profit per hectare: access to credit, access to remittances, and farm size. Regarding 
groundnut profit per hectare, farmer’s access to livestock income and mechanization have a 
positive effect, while access to credit and farm size seem to decrease groundnut profit. 
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In terms of impacts of the treatment variable, results reveal that once one controls for farm 
household characteristics and agroecological zones, a strong and positive effect is observed for 
joint market participation choice in the context of staples producers. Ceteris paribus, staples 
producers that decided to participate in input and output markets will earn around 70,000 CFA 
more profit per hectare than staples producers in complete autarky. Conversely, any other 
choice of participation in the markets, ceteris paribus, is unprofitable compared to autarky for 
food crops.  
For groundnut production, the impact of market participation regimes is more nuanced. In fact, 
all else being equal, the purchase of inputs for self-consumption production generates a loss of 
nearly 28,000 CFA per hectare compared to households that remain self-sufficient. On the other 
hand, production intended for sale but without buying inputs generates a profit gain of 38,000 
CFA, whereas when the farmer buys inputs and sells part of the harvest (joint participation), 
he obtains a net gain of about 14,000 CFA per hectare on average. 
5.4.3. Discussions 
From the results presented in the previous section, we found that the most gainful market 
participation regimes depend on the crop under consideration, as far as profit per hectare is 
concerned. For staples producers, the only strategic choice to maximize net cropping income 
per hectare is to buy inputs (fertilizer and/or seeds) in order to increase production for 
marketing. The average treatment effect (ATE) associated with this choice is about 70,000 
CFA per hectare. In the case of groundnut production, the most profitable choice is to avoid 
purchasing inputs (especially seeds) but to sell products. The associated ATE is estimated at 
38,000 CFA per hectare of groundnut farm. The second-best choice for groundnut production 
is to jointly participate in the two markets (buy inputs and sell groundnut), with an ATE of 
14,000 CFA. 
When looking at production cost structure, we note that for staples producers, the main inputs 
from markets are inorganic fertilizers, which account for about 83% of the total seed-fertilizer 
cost. On the other hand, most groundnut producers spent around 88 percent of their input costs 
(seeds and inorganic fertilizers) on seeds. This suggests that fertilizers are more important for 
cereals and other staples crops than for groundnut production. Moreover, farmers may use 
seeds from their previous production, which in turn will lower the production cost. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that staples producers rely more on markets to meet their input needs than 
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groundnuts producers. In addition, we do not note any yield gap between groundnut producers 
that bought seeds and those who used their groundnut stock. 
Previous discussions were on the most profitable market choice if farmers produced one of the 
two crops under consideration. However, as stated in the data description section, about 70 
percent of staple food producers also produced groundnut, while almost all groundnut 
producers also produced staple foods (92%). Therefore, it is interesting to see which choice is 
the most profitable at the household level, summing the two profits. 
Figure 5- 2: Comparison of predicted household level profit for producing the two groups of products by 
market regimes 
Notes: On the X-axis, labels are related to market regimes per household regarding the two value chains (staples 
and groundnut). The first digit is related to the participation regime adopted for food crops, while the second digit 
is the one for groundnut production. Example: “00” autarky for both products; “13” input market participation for 
staple food production combined with input and output market participation for groundnut production. 
Figure 5- 2 displays the average profit per hectare from the two farming activities for households 
that were involved in both. Results show that the top 3 strategies of crop diversification and 
market regimes choice are: (i) being in autarky for groundnut and fully integrated in the staples 
input/output markets; (ii) being fully integrated in staples markets and participate in the 
groundnut output market; and (iii) being fully integrated in the two segments (staples and 
groundnut). Among the three most profitable choices, the best one is the first choice: being 
fully integrated for staples production and autarky for groundnut production. The main lesson 
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from this finding is that to maximize farming profit per hectare in rainfed agriculture in 
Senegal, farm households need to invest in inputs for staples production, and to produce staples 
for marketing. Results also reveal that is not enough to get access to inputs for staples 
production. A marketing target for staples production seems to be the key to better welfare 
gain. Therefore, policymakers should find a way to increase access to inputs for producers, 
especially those involved in staples production. On the other hand, any policy that facilitates 
access to the output market should complement input side policies. 
 Conclusion 
Agricultural commercialization is a critical pathway to stimulate a structural transformation in 
developing countries, as it allows poor smallholders to generate more income for better welfare. 
Analyses of determinants of market participation have focused on identifying factors 
influencing participation in the output market. However, transaction costs--i.e information and 
search costs, may exist in the input market -fertilizers/seed-and may be highly different from 
those existing in the output market; this can result in jeopardizing the production of marketable 
surplus. In addition, technology adoption (input side) has a great impact on farm productivity 
and thus on the propensity to market products (Teklewold 2016). A few studies (Alene et al. 
2008; Asfaw et al. 2012) have included determinants of input market participation when 
analyzing output market participation. However, these studies suffer from some limitations: i) 
they analyze output market participation distinctly from input market participation; and 
therefore, they might hide important heterogeneities among participants either in the output 
market or the input market; ii) they are located in specific regions in Kenya and pay attention 
to specific crops markets (maize, or pigeonpea) or analyze specific input market (fertilizer or 
seed), while the determinants of output market participation depend on the context and the 
nature of crop, and farmers’ demands for inputs may include both fertilizers and seeds. To the 
best of our knowledge, the only paper that jointly analyzed technology adoption (input side) 
and output market participation was Teklewold (2016). Nevertheless, he only focused on that 
joint modeling and did not analyze the impact of such strategic choices on farm household’s 
welfare. 
This study goes beyond these limitations. Specifically, we jointly model the market 
participation regimes and their impact on farm profit per hectare. The theoretical model is 
applied to an agriculture representative survey conducted in Senegal in 2017. Using a 
multinomial endogenous treatment effects model, results show that the transaction costs drive 
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market participation decisions. We also find that the drivers of the choice of market 
participation regimes depend on the crop under study. More importantly, we find that the most 
gainful market participation regime for staples producers is the joint participation in both input 
and output markets, while for groundnut producers, the most profitable regime is to market 
their products without a need to purchase inputs. Finally, when farmers choose to produce both 
groundnut and staples, the efficient market choice combination is to be fully integrated into the 
two markets for staples production and being in autarky for groundnut production. 
As policy implications of our findings, it is important to promote market access for farm 
households to increase their livelihood. Especially, it is not enough to provide inputs to 
producers, there is a need to find the right policy to connect them to both input and output 
markets. Especially, this study shows that staple crops are more responsive to joint market 
participation than groundnut which is the most common cash crop in Senegal. Therefore, 
special attention to the staples sector is required. Such a policy would increase farming profit 
per hectare and also reduce food insecurity in the country. 
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6. Final Remarks 
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 Main findings 
Adoption of new and profitable technologies is crucial for smallholder farmers to increase their 
productivity (yield), and then their production, which in turn will allow them to move from 
subsistence farming towards market-oriented production. However, the level of adoption of 
agricultural technologies is still low in African countries. In Senegal, there is very little up-to-
date data on the technologies adopted by small-scale farmers. Thus, this thesis aims to provide 
more information on the level of technology adoption and to identify the drivers and impacts 
of agricultural technology adoption in Senegal. 
Using the most recent survey data, collected in 2017, results show a two-tier agricultural 
economy in terms of technology adoption. In the irrigated agriculture dominated by rice 
production, almost all farmers adopt the most advanced technologies (certified seeds and 
chemical fertilizers), with an average intensity of chemical fertilizer use of more than 300 kg 
per hectare. On the other hand, in the rain-fed agriculture characterized by a lack of financial 
resources and climatic variability, only a few farmers use improved agricultural inputs. For 
example, in this rain-fed agriculture, less than 30 kg of chemical fertilizer per hectare is used 
in the survey year (the 2016/2017 season). 
In Chapter 2, we explore the determinants of joint adoption of certified seeds and inorganic 
fertilizers in rainfed agriculture in Senegal using a flexible bivariate probit model in a context 
of production risk. The proposed framework is applied to study the joint adoption of certified 
seeds and inorganic fertilizers in rice and groundnut sectors in Senegal. Results show a 
heterogeneous correlation between the two decisions under consideration for rice, while for 
groundnut technology adoptions, a homogeneous correlation is found. For both sectors, the 
decision to adopt certified seeds and that to apply inorganic fertilizers were dependent. 
Production risk measured by the partial moments of agricultural profit per hectare has a 
significant effect on technology adoption in Senegal. For the rice sector, profit variance has a 
significant and positive influence on the correlation parameter of the joint distribution. For in 
the groundnut sector, profit variance has a positive impact on both marginal distributions. 
Therefore, production risk has an unobserved effect on the joint adoption of rice technologies, 
while it has a direct and positive effect on the probability to adopt individual technologies and 
their joint adoption for groundnut. Other drivers of technology adoption identified include 
cooperative membership, access to extension services, access to credit, education, family size, 
and farm size. 
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Based on findings from Chapter 2, we assess the impact of joint technology adoption on the 
rice sector. It is worth noting that rice is the main staple in the country. Three main rice 
technologies are considered: irrigation, rice certified seeds, and inorganic fertilizers. Data 
description shows that the rice irrigated system is the most productive in terms of rice produced 
per hectare. The metafrontier framework reveals that different rice production frontiers are 
present in the rice sector. The estimated technical efficiency is very low (about 50%), 
suggesting that with the right policies the country rice production could double without any 
additional investment on inputs. Across groups, the traditional rice system is the most efficient. 
A huge technological gap is also observed, especially for farmers that partially adopt improved 
inputs (certified seeds or inorganic fertilizer). Therefore, there is an important knowledge gap 
regarding advanced technologies. In terms of impact on rice yield, results show that the most 
productive technology choice is the joint adoption of certified seeds and inorganic fertilizers in 
both systems of production (rain-fed and irrigated). We also find that the most impactful 
technology between certified seeds and inorganic fertilizers is the use of the latter. 
In chapter 4, we model the decision to invest in inputs (seeds and inorganic fertilizers) under 
uncertainty. A Heckman model is used to study the main drivers of the investment decision 
and the level of investment, while an endogenous switching regression model is applied to 
analyze the causal effect of the risky investment on agricultural profit and food security. Results 
show that the main drivers of the decision to purchase risky inputs include household 
composition, farmer organization, farm size, access to livestock income, and crop 
diversification. Drivers of the level of investment in risky inputs are gender, extension services, 
farm size, agricultural capital, and cropping patterns. On the other hand, results reveal a 
positive impact of risky investment on agricultural profit per hectare and food security 
measured as total food crops produced per capita. The expected impact for non-adopters is 
found to be higher than that for adopters. In addition, the heterogeneity effect shows that for 
each treatment level, current adopters perform less than current non-adopters. 
In chapter 5, we model the choice of market participation regimes for both input and output 
markets and the corresponding welfare effect. Using a farm household model, we show that 
transaction costs have a strong impact on the choice of a market participation regime. 
Empirically, a multinomial treatment effects model, that combines a multinomial logistic 
regression and an outcome equation, is used. The framework is applied to study the cases of 
groundnut and staples crops. The driving factors of the market choices identified are very 
distinct across value chains and market regimes. This suggests that analyzing participation as 
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done here brings more insights, revealing more heterogeneities among farmers. Regarding the 
impact of market participation regimes on agricultural profit per hectare, being integrated into 
the two markets displays the highest staples profit per hectare, whereas participating only in 
the output market is the best choice for groundnut producers, as far as profit per hectare is 
concerned. For farmers who are involved simultaneously in the production of food crops and 
groundnut, the most profitable alternative is to be fully integrated for staples production and to 
be in autarky for groundnut production. 
 Policy implications 
Based on our results, several policy implications are obvious. Firstly, the adoption of a given 
technology is not an isolated fact and takes into account the existence of complementary and 
non-complementary technologies. Thus, a comprehensive vision to promote complementary 
technology packages is required. Secondly, in some contexts, the most obvious combination of 
technologies is not necessarily the most efficient or productive choice. For example, results 
show, among other things, that the adoption of certified rice seed does not particularly improve 
the yield of irrigated rice. In this context, the adoption of chemical fertilizers is largely 
sufficient. This result shows the usefulness of identifying the best choice of technologies 
adapted to each crop and agroecological zone, hence the importance of the work of extension 
agents in advising producers. Therefore, to better assist producers, the government must 
provide good training to the agents supplying advisory support services. Thirdly,  results show 
that investment in inputs such as seeds and chemical fertilizers is generally profitable in 
Senegal and even the expected return for those who have spent nothing is even higher when 
they would make that decision. This suggests that the government and the private sector should 
pay more attention to the agricultural sector since the sector is profitable and remains the basis 
for structural transformation. Fourth, production risks and climate shocks are found to impact 
the choice and performance of agricultural technologies. Thus, the development of contract 
farming and agricultural insurance are serious options to be explored by the different actors in 
the sector (cooperatives, government, and the private sector). Finally, results have shown that 
the option that provides the maximum profit per hectare for the food sector is agriculture that 
buys inputs and sells part of the production. In other words, market-oriented food agriculture 
gives the best welfare to farm households. Thus, policies to facilitate access to inputs only are 
no longer sufficient to bring the desired structural transformation. Above all, it is necessary to 
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develop joint policies for access to markets for both inputs and products. This calls for a 
thorough review of the current policies and for structural reforms in the agricultural sector. 
 Future research 
The current research has focused on the analysis of technology adoption, market participation, 
and their impacts on farm profit or food security in Senegal. One possible extension of this 
work would be to consider more than two improved technologies in order to find the best 
technology combination that generates the most welfare effects for farm households.  Another 
interesting direction in the technology adoption literature would be to extend our flexible 
bivariate probit using the copula framework. This extension will be useful to study the drivers 
of joint decisions in a higher dimension.   Finally, since transaction costs are so central in the 
literature of technology adoption and market participation, it would be important to find an 
empirical strategy to estimate them. One approach would be to use the Bayesian framework 
(data augmentation approach) to solve this issue of missing data. 
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Appendix 
A. Summary 
Essays on Technology Adoption in Senegal 
Anatole Goundan, M.A. 
African agriculture is characterized by very low average productivity. This results in a very 
high yield gap, i.e. the average yields achieved by farms are up to 90% below the yields that 
can be achieved by applying proven best-practice technologies. A central problem of low 
agricultural productivity is, therefore, technology adoption, i.e. the question of why farms do 
not apply available best-practice technologies. In this context, this dissertation investigates the 
mechanisms of technology adoption using a unique farm data set of more than 4000 farms in 
Senegal and innovative econometric methods. A first descriptive analysis reveals dual 
Senegalese agriculture with a small percentage of farms using modern technologies, i.e. 
irrigation, use of mineral fertilizers and pesticides and improved seeds, and a majority of farms 
using traditional extensive farming without the use of purchased inputs and irrigation. For 
example, the use of N-fertilizer in the majority of traditional farms is less than 30kg/ha while 
modern farms use more than 300kg/ha. While a shift from traditional to modern agriculture at 
the macro level has a clear positive effect on food security and rural development, the question 
arises as to the key micro-level barriers that prevent traditional farms from using modern 
technologies. While the potential obstacles have been identified from the theoretical literature, 
i.e. transaction costs in credit, labor, goods, and insurance markets as well as imperfect 
technological knowledge of farmers, for practical agricultural policy the question arises as to 
which are the central causes in a specific empirical case. This is particularly important because 
the efficient agricultural policy measures to reduce these obstacles differ significantly 
depending on the specific obstacle. In this interesting and highly relevant area of agricultural 
policy, the present study makes central contributions by applying innovative econometric 
methods for the microeconomic analysis of technology adaptation, i.e. the concrete obstacles 
to the application of modern agricultural technology at the farm level. In total, the dissertation 
comprises 4 contributions. In the first contribution, a flexible bivariate probit model is applied 
to analyze the joint use of certified seed and mineral fertilizer in rice and peanut production. 
While the flexible versus the standard probit model is theoretically and statistically preferable, 
both approaches lead to the same key policy implications. The second paper analyzes the 
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impact of multiple technology decisions on technical efficiency and yield using rice production 
as an example. On a methodological level, the paper combines a metafrontier approach with a 
multinominal treatment-effects model to take into account the heterogeneity in rice production 
and potential selection bias in the choice of technologies. A remarkable result of the analyses 
is the identification of significant knowledge gaps as a central obstacle for the use of modern 
inputs. The third paper examines the importance of yield risk for the use of modern inputs and 
its significance for the income and food security of agricultural households. Methodologically, 
an endogenous switching regression model is used to adequately analyze the treatment effects 
of modern input use. In the fourth paper, an interdependent farm household model is used as a 
theoretical approach to analyzing participation in relevant agricultural input and output 
markets. Transaction costs are a central determinant of the market participation of agricultural 
enterprises. Since transaction costs can be specific for different input and output markets, 
different market regimes result, including complete self-sufficiency, selective participation in 
specific output or input markets, and complete market participation. Methodologically, a 
multinomial endogenous treatment effects model is applied to empirically analyze the market 
participation decisions of individual farm households. Interestingly, farms participate 
selectively in output and input markets. This implies market-specific transaction costs, which 
cannot be explained by general factors such as infrastructure and market distance, but rather, 
for example, by specific social network structures that determine selective access to markets. 
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B. Zusammenfassung 
Essays on Technology Adoption in Senegal 
Anatole Goundan, M.A. 
Die afrikanische Landwirtschaft ist durch eine sehr geringe durchschnittliche Produktivität 
gekennzeichnet ist. Dabei ergibt sich ein sehr hohes Yield-GAP, d.h. die von den 
landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben durchschnittlich erzielten Erträge liegen bis zu 90% unter den 
Erträgen, die bei der Anwendung bewährter best practice Technologien erzielt werden können. 
Ein zentrales Problem der geringen landwirtschaftlichen Produktivität ist somit Technology 
Adoption, d.h. die Frage, warum landwirtschaftliche Betriebe verfügbare best practice 
Technologien nicht anwenden. In diesem Zusammenhang untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit 
anhand eines einmaligen landwirtschaftlichen Betriebsdatensatzes von über 4000 Betrieben im 
Senegal mit Hilfe innovativer ökonometrischer Methoden die Mechanismen des technology 
adapotion. Eine erste deskriptive Analyse ergibt eine duale senegalische Landwirtschaft mit 
einem kleinen Anteil an Betrieben, der moderne Technologien, d.h. Bewässerung, Einsatz von 
mineralischem Dünger und Pestiziden sowie verbessertem Saatgut, verwendet und einer 
Mehrheit an Betrieben, die eine traditionelle extensive Landwirtschaft ohne Einsatz 
zugekaufter Inputs und Bewässerung betreibt. Zum Beispiel beläuft sich der Einsatz von N-
Dünger in der Mehrheit der traditionell wirtschaftenden Betriebe auf unter 30kg/ha während 
der modern wirtschaftenden Betriebe über 300 kg/ha einsetzten. Während ein Wechsel von der 
traditionellen zu der modernen Landwirtschaft auf der Makroebene einen klar positiven Effekt 
auf die Nahrungsmittelsicherheit und die ländliche Entwicklung ausübt, stellt sich die Frage 
nach den zentralen Hindernisse auf der Mikroebene, die traditionell wirtschaftenden Betriebe 
davon abhalten, moderne Technologien anzuwenden. Während die potentiellen Hindernisse 
klar aus der theoretischen Literatur herausgearbeitet worden sind, dies sind im Wesentlichen 
Transaktionskosten auf Kredit-, Arbeits-, Güter- und Versicherungsmärkten sowie 
unvollkommenes technologisches Wissen der Farmer, stellt sich für die praktische Agrarpolitik 
die Frage, welches jeweils die zentralen Ursachen in einem konkreten empirisch Fall sind. Dies 
ist insbesondere deshalb von Bedeutung, da sich die effizienten agrarpolitischen Maßnahmen 
zum Abbau dieser Hindernisse je nach konkretem Hindernis signifikant unterscheiden. In 
diesem interessanten und agrarpolitisch hoch relevantem Bereich leistet die vorliegende Arbeit 
zentrale Beiträge, in dem diese innovative ökonometrische Verfahren zur mikroökonomischen 
Analyse von technology adaption, d.h. der konkreten Hindernisse der Anwendung moderner 
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landwirtschaftlicher Technologie auf Betriebsebene, anwendet. Insgesamt umfasst die 
Dissertation 4 Beiträge. Im ersten Beitrag wird ein flexibles bivariates Probitmodell zur 
Analyse des gemeinsamen Einsatzes von zertifiziertem Saatgut und mineralischem Dünger in 
der Reis- und Erdnussproduktion angewendet. Während das flexible gegenüber dem Standard-
Probit-Model theoretisch und statisch zu präferieren ist, führen beide Ansätze zu den gleichen 
zentralen Politikimplikationen. Im zweiten Beitrag wird die Bedeutung von multiplen 
Technologieentscheidungen auf die technische Effizienz und den Ertrag am Beispiel der 
Reisproduktion analysiert. Auf methodischer Ebene kombiniert der Beitrag einen 
Metafrontier-Ansatz mit einem multinominalen treatment-effects-Modell um die Heterogenität 
in der Reisproduktion sowie potentielle Selektionsverzerrungen bzgl. der Auswahl der 
Technologien zu berücksichtigen. Ein bemerkenswertes Ergebnis der Analysen ist die 
Identifikation von signifikanten knowledge-gaps als zentrales Hindernis für den Einsatz 
moderner Inputs. Der dritte Beitrag untersucht die Bedeutung des Ertragsrisikos für den Einsatz 
von modernen Inputs und deren Bedeutung für das Einkommen und die 
Nahrungsmittelsicherheit landwirtschaftlicher Haushalte. Methodisch wird ein endogenous 
switching regression Modell verwendet, um Treatment Effekte des Einsatzes modernen Inputs 
adäquat zu analysieren. Im vierten Beitrag wird ein interdependentes Farm-Haushalts-Modell 
als theoretischer Ansatz verwendet, um die Partizipation in relevanten landwirtschaftlichen 
Input- und Outputmärkten zu analysieren. Zentrale Determinante der Markteilnahme 
landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe sind Transaktionskosten. Da diese spezifisch für unterschiedliche 
Input- und Outputmärkte ausfallen können, ergeben sich unterschiedliche Marktregimes, die 
eine komplette Autarkie, eine selektive Teilnahme an speziellen Output- bzw. Inputmärkten 
sowie eine komplette Marktteilnahme umfassen. Methodisch wird ein Multinomial endogenous 
treatment effects model angewendet, um die Marktpartizipations-Entscheidungen individueller 
Farm-Haushalte empirisch zu analysieren. Interessant ist, dass Betriebe durchaus selektiv an 
Output- und Inputmärkten teilnehmen. Dies impliziert marktspezifische Transaktionskosten, 
die nicht durch generelle Faktoren wie Infrastruktur und Marktdistanz erklärt werden können, 
sondern z.B. durch spezielle soziale Netzwerkstrukturen, die einen selektiven Zugang zu 
Märkten determinieren. 
